UNPACKING VIOLENT EXTREMISM DYNAMICS IN THE PHILIPPINES

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Context

In May 2017, the Armed Forces of the Philippines attempted to raid the suspected safe house of Isnilon Hapilon, a prominent leader of Abu Sayyaf Group fighters who were allied with the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS). Prevailing intelligence suggested that Hapilon and his counterparts in the Maute Group, another Mindanao-based IS affiliate, planned to carry out a series of joint attacks later that year.\(^1\) The attempted raid, however, was met with unexpected but significant militant force, sparking five months of urban conflict between the Abu Sayyaf Group, IS-affiliates, and the Philippine government for control over the city.

The Battle for Marawi, as the conflict is now known, drew significant international attention and interest

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FAST FACTS

- Overstating the importance of foreign ideology in driving conflict in Mindanao and elsewhere in the Philippines obscures localized drivers that must be addressed to prevent further violence.

- At the height of IS influence in the Philippines, the Filipino factions subscribing to IS were a small fraction of the various militant groups who claimed to have Islamist or jihadist goals.

- Recent policy initiatives related to violence reduction and conflict resolution present opportunities to improve conflict prevention and P/CVE efforts.

to the influence of the self-proclaimed Islamic State and violent extremism (VE) in the country. Beyond local IS-affiliates, the battle included a contingent of foreign fighters, popularizing narratives suggesting a shift in fighters’ focus from Syria and Iraq to battlegrounds elsewhere, including Southeast Asia. \(^2\) Up until the termination of hostilities in Marawi, there was wild speculation over the impending establishment of an IS \textit{wilayah}, or province, in the Philippines. \(^3\) As early as 2016, however, there were indications that IS core leadership, reeling from military defeats in Iraq and Syria, had abandoned their \textit{wilayah} ambitions in the Philippine state. \(^4\)

IS’s influence in the Philippines, however, is not uniform or cohesive, nor is it the only driver of VE. Other non-state armed groups (NSAGs)—including the New People’s Army, the insurgent militant wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines—remain active and continue to carry out attacks. At the height of IS influence in the Philippines—arguably when Hapilon launched the Marawi siege—the Filipino factions subscribing to IS (commonly referred to as IS-P) were a small fraction of the various militant groups who claimed to have Islamist or jihadist goals. \(^5\) The subsequent downscaling of IS’s territorial ambitions meant that rather than a push for territory, the actions of Isnilon Hapilon and his IS-pledged allies in the Maute Group were a late-blooming, perhaps futile, attempt to hitch their fortunes to IS’s already weakened core. In 2019, however, the involvement of the first Filipino in an IS-affiliated suicide bombing in the island province of Sulu renewed claims of IS’s increasing influence and expanding operations in the Philippines. \(^6\) The extent of IS’s actual involvement or influence remains unclear.

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\(^2\) In one example article, the narrative that the Marawi siege changed terrorism in the region and directly ordered by the late Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was premised on propaganda statements released by IS. See: Rohan Gunaratna, “The Siege of Marawi: A Game Changer in Terrorism in Asia,” \textit{Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses} 9, no. 7 (2017).

\(^3\) A “\textit{Wilayah} Philippines” was never established contrary to the forecast found in: Bilveer Singh and Kumar Ramakrishna, “Islamic State’s \textit{Wilayah} Philippines: Implications for Southeast Asia,” \textit{RSIS Commentary} No. 187, July 21, 2016, \url{https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/co16187-islamic-states-wilayah-philippines-implications-for-southeast-asia/#.XnPLg6hKjIV}. Repeated references to a \textit{wilayah} in the Philippines could also be interpreted as a way for IS to recover from their reputational losses after the fall of their so-called caliphate.

\(^4\) Charlie Winter, “Has the Islamic State Abandoned its Provincial Model in the Philippines?” \textit{War on the Rocks}, July 22, 2016, \url{https://warontherocks.com/2016/07/has-the-islamic-state-abandoned-its-provincial-model-in-the-philippines/}. Winter also stressed that the late Isnilon Hapilon was only considered an \textit{emir} (leader) of IS, not a \textit{wali} (governor) of a \textit{wilayah}.

\(^5\) In the Battle for Marawi, only the Basilan-based faction of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was involved. ASG has other factions in Sulu province that operate independently of their Basilan peers. Scoping down further to Sulu, the two main Group factions have opposing views on the legitimacy of IS. Factionalism in the Group limits the utility and validity of tracking IS influence over individual ASG faction leaders as attempted in Vere Lingam Kalicharan, “An Evaluation of the Islamic State’s Influence over the Abu Sayyaf,” \textit{Perspectives in Terrorism} 13, no. 5 (2019).

\(^6\) Norman Lasuca, the first identified Filipino suicide bomber was from the Tausug ethnic group. See: Consuelo Marquez, “Deadly Sulu Army Camp Blasts: Who is Norman Lasuca?” \textit{Philippine Daily Inquirer}, July 10, 2019, \url{https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1140246/deadly-sulu-army-camp-blasts-who-is-norman-lasuca}. The degree IS foreign fighter involvement in the attack, if any, remains widely speculative. Lasuca used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of a similar type and mechanism to templates common to Western Mindanao. Lasuca’s IED was not based on foreign designs exogenous to the region. See: Joseph Franco, “Indigenous Roots of the ‘First’ Filipino Suicide Bombing,” \textit{The Interpreter}, August 1, 2019, \url{https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indigenous-roots-first-filipino-suicide-bombing}.

\(^7\) An example of an orientalist perspective on how IS suicide tactics have subsumed a purported “Filipino warrior culture” can be found in Kenneth Yeo, “Suicide Bombing: Is this the End of Filipino ‘Warrior Culture’?” \textit{The Diplomat}, July 12, 2019, \url{https://}}
Most work on the Philippines, however, uncritically regurgitate jihadist propaganda without examining the roots of the conflict that precede the modern Philippine state, much less the number of non-IS affiliated militant groups that still operate in the Philippine territories. At the tactical level, there are indications that local non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have purposely distanced themselves from affiliation with foreign groups and fighters, some fearing that such affiliations would bring about more intense military operations that could, at the very least, disrupt NSAG illicit profit generating activities. Understanding how to address VE and the influence of IS in the Philippines, therefore, requires deeper engagement with ongoing local dynamics, histories, and conflict resolution initiatives.

Relevance to Policy and Practice

Recent policy initiatives related to violence reduction and conflict resolution present opportunities to improve conflict prevention and P/CVE efforts in the Philippines. In March 2019, the Philippine government launched the Bangsamoro Transition Authority, ushering in a new era of self-rule in Muslim Mindanao. The Authority follows the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, which negotiated an end to hostilities between the Philippine government and the Mindanao separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The constituents of the new Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, over which the Authority provides transitional governance, hold high expectations on promised improvements to quality of life and socioeconomic development. While the Authority has yet to start specific programs or set aside budgets for initiatives tagged as “preventing or countering violent extremism” (P/CVE), its leaders are confident that investments in social and human development can help dissuade potential recruits from joining militant groups, including IS-P.

Later that year, in July 2019, the Philippines’ Anti-Terrorism Council approved the National Action Plan on P/CVE, to “take care of potential terrorists”. The primary implementing arm of the Philippines’ P/CVE National Action Plan is the Department of Interior and Local Government, which appears to have adopted a narrow conception of VE as a challenge posed by jihadist or Islamist groups.

Building on these policy developments, this Policy Note lays out considerations for policymakers to reduce the foothold of violent extremism and bolster conflict prevention efforts in the Philippines.

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9 Author interview with senior Philippine Army officer based in Central Mindanao, November 2019.


Recommendations

Refining P/CVE terms and activities

→ Adopt a more nuanced approach to understanding and reporting on violent extremist groups in the Philippines. IS-P is not as unified or widespread as its moniker may suggest. When media reports and analysts describe how the Abu Sayyaf Group pledged allegiance to IS, they often erroneously imply that all of its 300 members did so as well. In reality, only one faction, comprising about 15 percent of the Group pledged its allegiance to IS.

A similar dynamic plays out in mainland Mindanao, where only the Dawlah Islamiyah-Turaype Group, comprising a third of known anti-government forces in Maguindanao province, explicitly linked itself to IS. Dawlah Islamiyah-Turaype—a sub-faction of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, a broader conglomerate group that, as a whole, is often mistakenly classified as an IS affiliate—is even further fragmented. The eponymous Turaype subgroup of Dawlah Islamiyah-Turaype stays clear of ties with foreign fighters to avoid attention from the Philippine military, a decision that is not uncommon among other Philippine non-state armed groups. It is important to note that militant organizations in the Philippines often ascribe themselves as belonging to a specific group, notwithstanding in-group factionalism. For local militants, latching on to IS’s brand of savagery can provide an opportunity to differentiate themselves from other NSAG or organized crime groups in close proximity.

Rather than simply referring to groups as IS-linked, greater transparency about the nature of those groups and any connections they have to IS is necessary, particularly in military and media reporting. For militants originating from overseas, the same semantic specificity should be employed in order to avoid over-attribution and potentially misinformed, or worse, counterproductive P/CVE strategy.

→ Understand the impact of local factors on violent extremism and P/CVE. Overemphasis on foreign ideologies and ties risks blurring or overlooking factors at the local

12 ASG is estimated at 200-300 members across the island provinces of Sulu and Basilan.
13 Author interview with intelligence officer covering Western Mindanao, November 2019. The Sawadjaan ASG faction based in Sulu is estimated at 30-50 members, which is typical of the faction sizes of other Group sub-leaders.
14 Author interview with senior Philippine Army officer and intelligence officer based in Central Mindanao, November 2019.
15 Only one of the three Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) factions have pledged to IS, the other two have publicly disavowed any links to foreign terrorist fighters.
16 Author interview with intelligence officer based in Central Mindanao, November 2019. In one example, Dawlah Islamiyah-Turaype Group (DITG) faction members were instructed to avoid interactions and to distance themselves from a Singaporean foreign fighter seeking refuge in Maguindanao.
17 Author interview with senior Philippine Army officer based in Central Mindanao, November 2019.
19 For example, “Jemaah Islamiyah” is often used in reporting on foreign terrorist fighters from Indonesia, despite the splintering and fragmentation of Indonesian groups away from Jemaah Islamiyah (a militant group affiliated with al-Qaeda). Active Indonesian militant groups are more ideologically affiliated with IS than Jemaah Islamiyah or al-Qaeda.
level that have engendered the rise of militant IS-inspired groups. In 2005, a pioneering work by the Human Development Network uncovered how measures of deprivation—such as disparities in access to water supply, electricity, and educational institutions—predict conflict in the Philippines. More than a decade later, statistical studies conducted in the aftermath of the Battle for Marawi demonstrated how conflict in Mindanao remains multi-causal comprising “political and identity-based violence.”

Certain tactics often attributed to IS also have cultural roots in the Philippines. For instance, Tausugs—a large Muslim ethnic group in the southern Philippines—have a tradition of conducting no-surrender suicide attacks called the parang sabil, often translated as “war in the path of God.” Tausug community leaders delegitimized the practice of parang sabil after the U.S. colonial period, and ritual suicide was virtually eliminated from 1915-1974. The parang sabil, along with other cultural practices, should be catalogued to determine if they had a part to play in driving current conflict. In addition, researchers should conduct periodic analysis to determine which cultural practices remain influential in Mindanao and the Philippines writ large.

Avoid using P/CVE as a catchall term to address different manifestations of violence and policies. Concepts such as P/CVE have infiltrated government and non-government discourse in the Philippines, but these concepts still lack clear, and necessary, definitions. In the absence of a clear definition, state security services are often too quick to tag lawful dissent as actions carried out in support of or in collaboration with NSAGs. In Muslim Mindanao, for example, activists pushing for the identification and accounting of missing civilians after the Battle for Marawi are sometimes tagged as Maute Group or IS sympathizers. Government policies on various NSAGs should clearly define what constitutes VE.

Beyond definitional ambiguities, P/CVE policy is broadening to include additional security measures meant to address NSAG, not just VE, violence. Internal memoranda issued by the Department of Interior and Local Government (the implementing arm for the Philippine P/CVE National Action Plan) in July 2019 do not appear to adhere strictly to the National Action Plan. In fact, the Department seems to have added on a counterinsurgency mission to plan itself, stressing that the mission encompasses “prevention and countering violent

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22 The parang sabil is attributed to the 1876 establishment of a Spanish garrison in Jolo, Sulu. For more information, see: Thomas Kiefer, “Parrang Sabbil [sic]: Ritual Suicide Among the Tausug of Jolo,” Bijdragen Tot De Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde 129, no. 1 (1973).
24 As reported in Gerard Rixhon, ed., Voices from Sulu: A Collection of Tausug Oral Traditions (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2010). See, also, note 6 on the recent suicide bombing of a Philippine Tausug.
25 For example, the New People’s Army (NPA), the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), often receives legal support and financial assistance from a network of front organizations. In 1992, membership in the CPP was decriminalised with the repeal of the Anti-Subversion Act. NPA cadres apprehended by Philippine security forces are often indicted and convicted for criminal offenses under the Revised Penal Code instead of any specific anti-terrorism statutes.
26 Author interviews with activists based in central and northern Mindanao between March to November 2019.
extremism and insurgency” (P/CVE). Consolidation of efforts against jihadist groups and NSAGs may be driven by economies of scale and local government initiatives—such as financial assistance programs for former fighters, be they violent extremist or not—may have crosscutting best practices. However, without clearly drawing the lines between preventing violent extremism, countering violent extremism, and counterinsurgency, the risk of conflating policy responses or adopting ineffective, one-size-fits-all policies is higher.

There is room for the Philippine government to improve the National Action Plan on P/CVE and narrow its focus to P/CVE-specific activities in its initial stages. At present, the Plan lacks implementing guidelines, rules, and regulations. Donor agencies and other non-governmental organizations are poised to provide technical support to Manila’s efforts to craft actionable policies for P/CVE. Best practices from demobilization and reintegration programs can also be incorporated into planning for the National Action Plan, supplemented by psychosocial interventions to facilitate the effective disengagement, reintegration, and reconciliation of former fighters.

→ Delink P/CVE discourses from government initiatives meant to advance Filipino Muslim rights. Executive Order No. 67 transferred the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos (NCMF) from the Office of the Cabinet Secretary to the Department of Interior and Local Government. The NCMF’s mandate is largely focused in managing Hajj applications from Philippine citizens and overseeing madrassas. However, subsuming the NCMF under the same government body tasked with implementing the P/CVE National Action Plan may risk over-securitizing the NCMF or the unwarranted blending of the two processes and the policies that guide them. Ensuring that these two initiatives remain separate should be a key policy priority to reduce the stigmatization and alienation of Muslim populations.

**Improving post-conflict reconstruction and overall governance**

→ Fast track the return of displaced civilians from the Islamic City of Marawi. The reconstruction of Marawi after the Battle carries risks exacerbating already prominent non-ideological drivers of conflict in Mindanao. Thousands of people remain classified as internally displaced persons (IDPs) today, more than two years after the end of combat operations in Marawi. What remains of Maute Group has already sought to capitalize on these issues, referencing the squalor in temporary IDP encampments and appealing to...

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the grievances of ethnic populations living in the camps. These appeals by recruiters are not ideological, rather, they utilize visceral propaganda of the ruins of Marawi to portray the government as neglecting its people. NSAGs even offered financial inducements to Marawi’s out-of-school-youth in exchange for their membership. The Philippine government’s top-down attempts to rebuild the city have been met with protests from locals in Marawi. Currently, existing efforts to adopt a more bottom-up, inclusive approach to reconstruction emerge primarily from the NGO sector. It may be prudent for Task Force Bangon Marawi, the interagency body tasked with rebuilding Marawi to formally and systematically involve NGOs into project planning and implementation, instead of just tolerating their participation.

→ **Prioritize capacity-building for the new Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.** More is needed, however, than the reconstruction of Marawi alone. To restore justice, rule of law, and a normal life, and to thwart further attempts at NSAG or VE recruitment or conflict, local government policies and bodies require greater attention. The absence of several key policy instruments, namely the Administrative Code, Revenue Code, Electoral Code, Local Government Code, and the Education Code needed for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to function and provide basic services remains a key challenge.

Greater attention to the construction of coherent and clear lines of authority, guidelines around security provision and policing services and command structures, and demobilization efforts—particularly with regard to the private security employed by local politicians—is needed, among other institutions of governance. Manila should look to experiences designing demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration schemes for former communist rebels as potential sources of best practices.

**Embracing local conflict resolution practices**

→ **Allow for and support the emergence of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms.** Post-conflict response and infrastructure reconstruction are not sufficient to build the

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33 Julia Chernov Hwang, “Relatives, Redemption, and Rice: Motivations for Joining the Maute Group,” *CTC Sentinel* 12, no. 8 (September 2019).


35 An example of this community-based approach can read in Maria Carmen Fernandez, et. al., *Community-led Rehabilitation is the Practical Thing to Do in Marawi: Critical Points for Addressing Land Issues After the Siege* (San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, April 2018), [https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.19023.64164](https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.19023.64164).

36 These include the Revolutionary Proletarian Army–Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPA-ABB) that signed a peace agreement in 2000; and the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA), which signed a “closure agreement” in 2011.
resilience of local communities. Attempts to provide basic goods and services and rebuild conflict-ravaged areas in Mindanao and beyond should be complemented by culturally relevant peacebuilding and conflict resolution interventions prior to, during, and after conflicts. Muslim Mindanao’s thirteen ethnic groups offer a wide array of potential cultural practices that remain untapped for peacebuilding purposes.\textsuperscript{37} Much of the research tackling the nexus between Muslim Filipino cultural practices and NSAG violence only examines culture as a driver for inter or intra-group conflict, but fails to understand its potential role in resolving and preventing violence.

As an example, the culture of rido or “clan feud” is often used as a heuristic to explain cycles of violence in Mindanao specifically.\textsuperscript{38} While VE has affected Mindanao in certain areas, it has failed to gain traction in others. A corridor in northern Maguindanao province, for example, populated mainly by ethnic Iranuns, is thought to have remained resilient to VE and armed conflict, despite their proximity to Maute Group and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters strongholds.\textsuperscript{39} Militants’ inability to gain a foothold on the turf of the Iranun ethnic group has been credited to their use of indigenous and communal justice mechanisms and elder council conflict resolution mechanisms.\textsuperscript{40} Policymakers should assess if they can extract these communal justice and conflict resolution models from their specific contexts and apply them more generally. As in other locations, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms may present important means to stem VE recruitment and activity.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{37} The 13 ethnic groups are Badjao, Iranun, Jama Mapun, Kalagan, Kalibugan, Maguindanao, Palawanon, Maranao, Molbog, Sama, Sangil, Tausug, and Yakan.

\textsuperscript{38} The seminal text on rido can be found in Wilfredo Torres III, \textit{Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao} (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2014).

\textsuperscript{39} Author interview with country director of international NGO, October 2018.

\textsuperscript{40} Author interview with Iranun traditional leader based in Maguindanao province, March 2019.

\textsuperscript{41} After the rediscovery of the \textit{parang sabil} in the 1970s, Tausug elders were alarmed over how the idea of the \textit{sabil} was used to legitimize violence and crimes against other families. Community leaders banded together to denounce the use of \textit{sabil} for personal grudges, emphasizing that it is a tool only utilised when there is an existential external threat against the “Bangsa Sug” or Tausug country. Author interview with Tausug Bangsamoro Transitional Authority (BTA) Member in Cotabato City, November 2019.
Suggested Further Readings, by topic

**On the Non-ideological Roots of Conflict in Mindanao**


**On Indigenous Sources of Political Violence in the Philippines**


**On Resentment over the Aftermath of the Battle for Marawi**


**On Criticism of the IS “Second Front” Narrative**


Sources


About the Note

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