PHASE 1: Mapping the Literature on Community-Based Armed Groups in Sub-Saharan Africa

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Community-based armed groups (CBAGs) vary by their purpose, historical origins, operational focus, deployment of violence, and measures of success. They are distinct in that, unlike terrorist or insurgent groups, they have localized agendas and do not seek to undermine the state. This is because CBAGs form and proliferate in places where communities experience security vacuums, historical inter- and intra-communal conflicts, enmity, marginalization, or deprivation in relation to the state security apparatus. Relationships and affiliations to the state and the community—including sources of legitimacy, funding, and sociocultural norms around the exercise of violence—define and transform CBAGs over time. Sometimes these groups form to counter localized violent extremist and insurgent threats. In certain contexts, they may also have gained historic or cultural significance. Understood in this way, the composition, behavior, and impacts of CBAGs demonstrate their highly contextual and fluid nature. They are known to adapt readily in response to changing environments and have flexible relationships with conflict and security stakeholders around them. The inherent tensions embedded in the shifting bounds of legitimacy and illegitimacy in state-society relationships is central to the CBAG phenomenon.

To map the fluid variability of CBAGs across Sub-Saharan Africa, the RESOLVE Network collaborated with experienced researchers to produce three mapping papers that survey the existing literature on CBAGs and identify gaps in knowledge. These three desk reports launched the research initiative with a comprehensive literature review. The first research report develops a typology to organize the array of attributes, motivations, and relationships that determine CBAG identity, behavior, and their exercise of violence. The second report provides a comprehensive overview of the factors that drive the formation and evolution of CBAGs, including historical legacies of colonial security governance that contributed to a normative culture of non-state community protection and security mobilization. The third paper assesses the potential of engaging, managing, and transforming CBAGs through a comparative review of current and historical efforts in technical post-conflict reconciliation methodologies—disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), alternative dispute resolution (ADR), community violence reduction (CVR), and preventing violent extremism (PVE)—both on the continent and in other conflict-affected regions around the world. Research findings from the mapping papers inform

two in-depth case studies that formulate recommendations under the engagement, management, and transformation (EMT) framework.4

Findings

The papers concur that CBAGs are best defined as armed groups that represent the interests of a community or source their power and legitimacy from that community, and do not seek to overthrow the state. At their core, these groups can be understood as a manifestation of sovereignty based on geography, socioeconomic function, or, often ethic, identity.

The typology developed by Van Metre identifies two factors that “define CBAG identity: (1) the external factor of the group’s relationships with the state and communities, and (2) the internal function of the group’s exercise of violence.”5 The typology links external factors—the operational environment, resources, norms, and relationships of groups—to their internal functions, chiefly their exercise of violence. This dynamic model connects CBAG organization and operation to environmental factors to explain group shifts with changes in these factors.6 The research recognizes the complex, fluid, and contextual nature of CBAGs. While clear definitions of core concepts are vital for efficient research and conceptualization, strict definitional boundaries are unlikely to capture the full range of CBAG behaviors and relationships. This complexity encompasses their interactions with their associated community, state governance and security apparatus, as well as international actors, insurgent groups, criminal organizations, and violent extremist organizations. These dynamic relationships present both a challenge and an opportunity to working with CBAGs.

Local, state, cross-border, or international actors often leverage CBAGs as part of their strategies of governance or non-governance. Thus, the political nature of CBAGs and their history and mobilization must be accounted for to leverage them in the security landscape or amend their behavior. The legacy of colonial security governance creates tangible friction between states and CBAGs. According to Agbiboa, in postcolonial Africa the emergence of CBAGs “echoes decades of selective, limited, and unrepresentative forms of colonial policing.” A relatively weak and violent state provided limited police presence, especially in rural areas, which drove marginalized communities to devise local solutions to security challenges such as violent crime and threats to the social order. CBAGs as local security actors outside of conventional policing often fill in roles to maintain law and order or organize communal economic activities. Governmental security institutions and regulations around armament and organization can catalyze group formation and participation in licit and illicit activities.7

5 Van Metre, From Self-Defense to Vigilantism, 40.
6 Ibid, 14.
Because CBAGs emerge from and are usually closely tied to their communities, this relationship can serve both as a source of legitimacy and as a potential starting point to develop mechanisms for community-based accountability and oversight. CBAGs’ internal rules and regulations can function as a code of conduct endorsed by the community. Accountability mechanisms and community oversight can manage group operations and present an opportunity to leverage customary systems to bring these groups into coherence with national policing and military policies and regulations. Successful examples of such bottom-up social accountability mechanisms have been implemented in communities from Southeast Asia to the Middle East, West Africa, and the Sahel.8

However, accountability is difficult to enforce if the group’s relationships with the community or the state are coerced.9 Although some CBAGs appear to be efficient sub-state security and justice providers with a clear mandate from their constituents, it is important not to romanticize community-led approaches to security. Lack of oversight can result in abuses of power, including failing to adhere to local laws, violating human rights norms and protections, or endorsing excessive violence and torture.

Understanding the context of CBAGs—including their historical roots, formation, and evolution—is key to designing effective interventions. To better understand and categorize external interventions, RESOLVE has developed the analytical framework of engagement, management, and transformation (EMT) encompassing “how intervening actors—communities, governments, civil society organizations, humanitarian and development agencies, and security providers—have approached the challenges posed by CBAGs and how to best measure the success of these interventions.”10

The holistic approach of EMT embraces the fluidity of intervention programs in between fixed models of technical approaches, responsive to the politicization of these groups embedded in their relationships with the community and the state. The EMT framework has two key components. First, EMT acknowledges that development actors can have different capacities to negotiate behavior change at specific points in time, and that parallel and coordinated efforts between stakeholders can have a positive impact on CBAG behaviors—just as uncoordinated efforts can lead to negative outcomes. Second, the EMT framework encompasses the capacity of these groups to change over time in response to local security dynamics and intervention attempts to alter their operations. In this way, EMT moves beyond existing stabilization methods and standard technical approaches, including SSR and DDR, and opens the possibility of addressing the political domain of the challenge. The strategic value of EMT lies in its flexibility to respond to cultural, historical, contextual specifics, and draw lessons learned from previous interactions with CBAGs.

8 The U.S. Institute of Peace has engaged in justice security dialogue (JSD) programming for over a decade, focused on countries in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and the Sahel and West Africa. The goal of JSD programming is to assist communities in developing locally informed accountability mechanisms for security actors. Learn more here: USIP, “Justice and Security Dialogues: USIP Brings Communities Together to Strengthen the Rule of Law,” https://www.usip.org/index.php/programs/justice-and-security-dialogues.
10 Schuberth, Approaching Community-Based Armed Groups in Sub-Saharan Africa, 4.
While measuring the success and impact of EMT approaches is difficult, Schuberth proposes a set of indicators that can help measure the progress of EMT interventions against their objectives and offers lessons learned from past programs. Similarly, specific success factors—such as accountability and oversight mechanisms—can showcase constructive transformations in CBAGs towards more capable and accountable community security providers.

Conclusion

The overall objective of the initial mapping phase was to identify the characteristics and contextual factors that either enable CBAG engagement, management, or transformation, or contraindicate specific intervention or programming efforts. Recognizing that these groups change over time, the research attempts to highlight milestones or transition points in their evolution, when groups may be more or less receptive to certain programming or denoting significant events that calcify positive or negative behavior towards communities or states. The research establishes a knowledge base that has potential for field applications and future research on specific groups and diverse community contexts around the world. The second phase of the initiative builds on the findings from the desk research through two field research case studies in the Sahel, in Niger and Mali.

Researching the complexity and nuances of CBAGs is timely due to their rapid proliferation across the deteriorating security environment in the Sahel, instability in West Africa, and persistent civil conflict and state failure in central Africa and the Great Lakes region. Moving forward, it is imperative to clearly define the parameters of successful intervention or behavior change. What does “successful” intervention mean for the local community, the group, the state, or the international community? How can states most effectively engage with CBAGs to promote this outcome? Throughout the project, RESOLVE Network research reports and policy notes not only provide the analytical frameworks to seek to answer these questions through case study investigations in diverse local contexts across the continent.


RESEARCH REPORTS


POLICY NOTES


FROM SELF-DEFENSE TO VIGILANTISM
A Typology Framework of Community-Based Armed Groups

Dr. Lauren Van Metre
ABOUT THIS REPORT

This report was written and researched by Dr. Lauren Van Metre. Several members of the RESOLVE Network Secretariat contributed to this report’s development, including Ms. Bethany McGann, Research & Project Manager; Ms. Boglarka Bozsogi, Research and Communications Coordinator; Ms. Kateira Aryaeinejad, Research and Project Manager; and Ms. Leanne Erdberg, Interim Executive Director. RESOLVE would like to thank the reviewers of this report and the members of the RESOLVE Network Research Advisory Council who lent their support and guidance. Finally, RESOLVE would like to thank the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Africa Bureau for its generous support for this report and RESOLVE’s research initiative on Community-Based Armed Groups in Sub-Saharan Africa.

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*From Self-Defense to Vigilantism* is part of the RESOLVE Network’s Community-Based Armed Groups research series, an initiative investigating the dynamics of community-based armed groups and the contexts they operate in to identify potential approaches to engage, manage, and transform them.

For more information about RESOLVE, its network of experts, and its research projects and activities, please visit our website at [www.resolvenet.org](http://www.resolvenet.org) and follow the discussion on Twitter via [@resolvenet](https://twitter.com/@resolvenet).
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overview

In conflicts across Sub-Saharan Africa, community-based armed groups (CBAGs) are a fixture in the security landscape, presenting a complex challenge to communities, governments, development implementers, and security providers. Community-based armed groups are a subset of non-state armed groups (NSAGs), defined by their relationship to the state and local communities and the ways they exercise power. While NSAGs, such as insurgent or terrorist groups, seek to disrupt or undermine the state to take it over or establish an alternative political system, CBAGs can be aligned with, or complementary to, the state, or they can operate in gray areas with minimal state presence. They do not typically pursue large political ambitions and strategies; rather, they advance the local ambitions of their stakeholders.

Given the influential and growing presence and diversity of CBAGs in conflict-affected states, it is critical to develop analytical frameworks and typologies to support international, state, and community actors interacting with armed groups as political and security actors. Two key questions are (1) how CBAGs can be engaged, managed, or transformed to play constructive roles in local communities in weak, fragile, or conflict-affected states; and (2) how their operations can exacerbate fragility and violence by, for example, preying on communities or aligning with other non-state armed groups. As attention increases on state fragility and predation as the root causes of intrastate violence and the emergence of violent extremism, it is critical to include CBAGs in any analysis of the informal political and security networks that dominate fragile states in the absence of formal state institutions.

This report develops a typology framework to enhance the understanding of these groups and their roles in informal political and security networks. To elucidate CBAG operations, particularly the use of force, this report identifies key internal functions that anchor the position of CBAGs within state-society relations. Further, the report denotes external factors that drive CBAG transformations from one type of armed group to another.

The study hopes to help community, state, and international actors to better monitor these groups, to contribute to a deeper analysis of informal elite power pacts in fragile states, and to identify moments when other actors might engage, manage, or transform CBAGs and the ways to create those moments. Understanding the conditions under which a CBAG may transition from a more positive community role to a more predatory one, or vice versa, is critical for community security and development, as well as for local political stability.

Typology framework

The typology framework builds on a series of studies exploring links between the external operational environments of armed groups and armed groups’ internal functions. External factors—negotiated relations with the state and the community, resources, social norms, the threat environment, and inter-
national actors—influence the internal functions of the group—leadership structures, discipline, and recruitment processes. In turn, internal functions determine the fundamental characteristics of CBAGs: how they exercise violence and against whom. The two defining factors of CBAG identity are external in terms of state-community relations and internal in terms of how and if the groups exercise violence. The typology informs a dynamic model linking CBAG organization and operations to environmental factors, and it identifies evidence of CBAG transformations due to shifts in these interrelated factors.

**Core Characteristics**

*Exercise of violence.* The core factors defining CBAG identity are its relationship with the state and with its local community, and whether that relationship is negotiated with shared norms and determinations around CBAG activities and duties or coercive entailing violence, predation, or extortion. These core relationships influence the internal functions of the group, which, in turn, determine its first core characteristic: how it exercises violence.

As state-community relations, the exercise of violence can be coercive or negotiated.

- **Coercive violence** is more offensive, conflictive, and indiscriminate, targeting the state or the community, and violating local social norms around violence. A neighborhood gang that extorts funds from local businesses and engages in retributive violence against competitors is an example of a group that exercises coercive violence.

- **Negotiated violence** is more defensive or protective of the community or the state, discriminating, directed against external threats, and more aligned with social norms around violence and a negotiated relationship with the community or state to use violence for political or social goals. A tribal militia that patrols the community perimeter and organizes reconnaissance missions at the behest of tribal elders is an example of a group in a negotiated relationship.

Communities can also authorize the use of coercive violence against others, for example, when a militia is directed to attack state security forces or neighboring militias. How a CBAG exercises violence will define its identity, the purpose it fills in the security environment, and the reasons that a state or community might leverage, coopt, or initially mandate the creation of the group.

*Fluidity.* Fluidity is a secondary core characteristic of CBAGs. In response to shifting external factors, CBAGs transform their identity and operations to remain viable and relevant. CBAGs operate similarly to other social and political organizations in that they are constrained in their operations from without and from within. This report presents a dynamic model that links CBAG organization to environmental factors and links CBAG transformations to shifts in these factors. As predatory state security actors enter a region, CBAGs may respond to the external threat environment by expanding their organizations and operations, eventually transitioning to an insurgency, as with Boko Haram in Nigeria. In addition, community and government structures and norms can shift in conflict-affected and fragile states as they recover from or fall into violence or undergo political transitions. In these cases, CBAGs, while maintaining the same relative functions, can find themselves in a different relationship between the state and communi-
ties because the surrounding environment has shifted. For example, a hunter group that easily operates across national borders may be perceived by the state as an alien presence when a state begins promoting a purist ethnic identity, as happened with the Dozo hunters’ groups of Côte d’Ivoire.

Conclusions

In the final section of this report, the external and internal factors and their dynamic inter-relationships are tested using two historical case studies: the South Africa’s People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), an urban community protection group that morphed into a vigilante and then a terrorist-labeled group; and Cote d’Ivoire’s Dozos, which evolved from rural hunting groups to community and government-sanctioned private security groups, and then to an ethnic militia when the government turned against them. The case studies could confirm several hypotheses for this out-of-category transformation:

- If a CBAG grows in size and influence, has significant access to natural resources, and is threatening the state/enters into direct mutual conflict with the state, the CBAG may transition to an NSAG.

- If a CBAG has a strong, historical negotiated relationship of trust with the local community, relies on community resources for its operations, and has mutually-agreed social norms of community protection, it may adopt additional local governance roles beyond security provision, such as dispute resolution.

- If a CBAG exercises violence in ways that violate community and state norms of social order and loses access to patronage and funding by the state or community, it may transition to an autonomous group that exercises coercive violence, such as a gang, vigilante, or criminal group.

For international organizations working in an environment with CBAGs or local civil society groups working within a community impacted by or supporting a group, it is critical to understand CBAG shifts, especially if there is the possibility that CBAGs may change to more pernicious types of organizations based on dynamic external changes. There may be an ideal type of CBAG ripe for engagement: a group rooted in community norms and values, protective, and exercising internal discipline and order. However, these groups may be unique but easily transform in negative ways if factors in their external environment change, such as funding and threat levels.

Holistic monitoring and engagement strategies for CBAGs are key for identifying routes to create defensive, noncoercive hybrid security systems. Strategies must consider the entirety of their existence: norms of social order that may legitimize types of CBAG violence, endorsement by the state, and legitimacy rooted in communities. CBAGs differ greatly, yet engagement policies are often similar. Engagement strategies also need to consider internal characteristics—such as sources of legitimacy and loyalty, leadership capacities, recruitment pools, and institutional structures. As CBAGs are manifestations of local elite pacts, analyzing how they exercise violence and against whom gives international actors key insights into the informal political processes central to fragile state governance.
International actors need to recognize that they themselves influence the external factors within which CBAGs operate and can expect responses in internal CBAG functions. For example, if the international community supplies increased resources to a CBAG, then it may attract a wider base of opportunistic recruits who may wield violence indiscriminately and abandon community-based norms. Similarly, the international community may appear as a threat in a CBAG’s environment, thereby institutionalizing the CBAG’s roles and making it a more disciplined, effective fighting force.

INTRODUCTION

Defining community-based armed groups

“New” wars—intrastate wars perpetrated by non-state actors—have come to dominate the conflicts of the past 30 years.1 With their rise, international, state, and community actors increasingly operate in environments infused with numerous armed groups. Armed groups have varying goals and strategies but influence the course of violent conflict—whether protecting communities from predatory security forces, expressing local grievances and embodying community empowerment, spoiling peace agreements, or disrupting humanitarian and state-building operations.

In conflicts across Sub-Saharan Africa, community-based armed groups have become a visible fixture in the security landscape; they present a challenge to communities, governments, development implementers, and security providers. Given the influential and growing presence and diversity of community-based armed groups in conflict-affected states, developing analytical frameworks and typologies is critical to support international, state, and community actors to better understand and interact with armed groups. A key question is whether community-based armed groups can be engaged, managed, or transformed to play a constructive role in local communities in weak, fragile, or conflict-affected states; or whether their operations exacerbate fragility and violence by, for example, preying on communities or aligning with other non-state armed groups.

CBAGs are not a new phenomenon. However, with the increasing attention on state fragility and predation as root causes of intrastate violence, CBAGs are influential security actors. As major international intervention policies—such as the United States (US) government’s Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR) and the United Kingdom (UK) government’s Elite Pacts in Fragile States Review—elevate the centrality of engaging with fragile state political processes above institution building, CBAGs must be included as a manifestation of those politics. Therefore, security, development, humanitarian, and peacebuilding institutions need to consider their impact. This report develops a typology framework to enhance the understanding of these groups and the possibility of creating moments of hybrid security governance and more constructive elite pacts with their participation.

To understand the operations of CBAGs, particularly their use of force, this report identifies key internal functions that define their positions in the state-society nexus. Further, the report denotes external factors that affect CBAG transformations. The two defining factors of CBAG identity are the external factor of state-community relations and the internal function of the exercise of violence.

The study hopes to help local civil society, state, and international actors to better monitor these groups and to identify moments when other actors might engage, manage, or transform CBAGs and the ways to create those moments. Understanding how a CBAG may transition from a more positive community role to a more predatory one is critical for community security and development.

This report defines community-based armed groups (CBAGs) as a subset of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) defined by their relationship to the state and the host community and how they exercise power. Although NSAGs, such as insurgent or terrorist groups, seek to disrupt or undermine the state in order to take it over or establish an alternative political system, the activities of CBAGs can be aligned with or complementary to the state or can occur in gray areas with minimal state institutional presence. CBAGs can be deputized by the state to provide local security or serve at the discretion of informal and formal local governance institutions. They are often deeply embedded in communities. They do not operate in support of large political ambitions and strategies; rather, they advance the localist ambitions of their stakeholders.

Examples of CBAGs are youth groups in Kenya sponsored by local and national politicians to protect or project their economic interests, community defense forces in Nigeria that defend communities involved in pastoralist-agriculturalist conflicts, and community-sponsored protective forces in Kenya to combat criminal networks and gangs. Other types of CBAGs are not legitimized by governance officials or community institutions and are self-governed or autonomous. Gangs, criminal networks, and vigilante groups may have relationships with the state and be highly embedded within communities—however, these relationships with the state and the community are coerced rather than negotiated. These CBAGs use violence or the threat of violence to exercise control in areas where the state is largely absent.

How does research and analysis inform the development of a typology framework for CBAGs? Research by Jeremy M. Weinstein on the micropolitics of rebel groups and by Klaus Schlichte explored the strong link between armed group responses to factors in the external environment (for example, resource endowments, interaction with communities, and the presence of the state) and how a group operates, especially how it exercises violence. Armed group leaders make decisions or choices about how to

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4 Schuberth, “The Challenge of Community-Based Armed Groups.”
5 Klaus Schlichte, In the Shadow of Violence: The Politics of Armed Groups (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2009), 85, 116, 144.
recruit, organize, lead, mobilize, and resource their organizations, which environmental factors condition and constrain. Weinstein argues that armed groups in his research on insurgent groups operate similarly to other social and political organizations in that they are constrained in their operations from without and from within. As a subset of NSAGs with different objectives but similar environments, CBAGs also respond to external constraints.

Moritz Schuberth maintains that state absence or fragility conditions the existence of CBAGs. State fragility can define the existence of different types of CBAGs. For example, vigilante groups are associated with ungoverned spaces, militia groups with new wars conducted in fragile states, and criminal networks with states that fail to manage societal greed and grievances. CBAGs can shift among different ideal types when their environments change, as when an ungoverned space populated by vigilante groups becomes the battleground for armed clashes with the state, and militias emerge.

This report expands on Schuberth’s categorization by state fragility factors, arguing that it is not the nature of fragility that defines CBAGs, but whether the group’s relationships with the state and communities are negotiated or coerced in nature. In a negotiated relationship, a CBAG uses violence as one of several approaches—such as dialogue, deterrence, or confidence building measures (CBMs)—to leverage its strategies and goals as agreed with the state or community. In a coerced relationship, the CBAG’s primary activity is the exercise of violence to force the state or community to bend or accede to its ambitions.

This report adopts previous research in several ways. Weinsten and Schlichte focus primarily on two external factors that condition CBAG operations: the threat environment and natural resources. First, the emergence of a threat influences CBAG growth and the formalization and institutionalization of group roles. Second, the availability of natural resources conditions recruitment and group discipline. This study identifies additional external factors that condition CBAG internal functions and operations.

The external factors the report analyzes are the relationship of CBAGs to the state and communities, the threat environment, access to resources, norms of social order, and international actors—diaspora groups, other states, and other CBAGs. These external factors condition internal group functions: the leadership structure, group discipline, and recruitment of CBAGs.

Two core factors define CBAG identity: (1) its relationship with the state and the local community, and (2), whether that relationship is negotiated with shared norms and determinations around CBAG activities, or coercive to advance CBAG ambitions at the expense of the state or community. These core relationships influence the internal functions of the group, which determines its fundamental characteristic: how it exercises violence.

7 Ibid., 51.
8 Schuberth, “The Challenge of Community-Based Armed Groups,” 304.
9 Ibid.
Exercise of violence. The exercise of violence can be characterized as coercive or negotiated. Coercive violence would be more offensive, conflictive, and indiscriminate, targeted against the state or the community, and disregarding local social norms around violence to serve CBAG goals and objectives. Negotiated violence would be more defensive or protective toward the community or the state, discriminate, directed against external threats, and align more with social norms around violence, and state and community social and political goals. How a CBAG exercises violence at its essence will define its identity.

Fluidity. Fluidity is another central characteristic of CBAGs. In response to shifting external factors, CBAGs often transform their identity and operations to remain viable and relevant. For instance, the Funga File, a neighborhood watch group in Kisuani, Kenya, turned into a vigilante group, when, having secured the community, the citizens stopped paying for the group’s services. In Côte d’Ivoire, Dozo hunters’ groups that contributed to the local game meat economy took on the mandate of protecting farmers from cattle rustlers when the levels of big game declined from overhunting. In some conflict environments, CBAGs have been observed to shift rapidly from one group type to another, such as civil society-like organizations, or, at the other end of the spectrum, to align themselves with or incorporate into non-state armed groups, such as violent extremist organizations. The fluidity of these groups in response to changing dynamics makes them particularly complex security actors.

The final section of this report tests the utility of the typology in identifying the impact of changing external and internal factors and their dynamic interrelationships through two historical case studies: South Africa’s People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), an urban community protection group that morphed into a vigilante group, and then a terrorist-labeled group, and Côte d’Ivoire’s Dozos, which evolved from rural hunting groups to community and government-sanctioned private security groups to ethnic militia when the government turned against them. The case studies were selected for their maximum comparative value. Both PAGAD and the Dozos began as community protection groups, but they followed very different trajectories in group identity, allowing the identification and validation of intervening variables.

Methodology

The research identified the core factors that determine CBAG behavior through an extensive literature review and comparative analysis of different examples of CBAGs in Sub-Saharan Africa and around the world. Subsequently, the external and internal factors identified in the literature were validated through the two historical case studies of this report, in Côte d’Ivoire and South Africa. The author employed inductive methods to theorize a typology framework for CBAGs, creating hypotheses that can be tested against historical cases of group operation and transformation. In this way, practical examples support both the construction of the theoretical framework and the testing of the resulting hypotheses, creating a dynamic typology rooted in on-the-ground realities. The external and internal factors listed were selected based on their significance in the case studies reviewed during the desk research process.
The critical role of the state in defining how and against whom CBAGs exercise violence is evidenced in several cases, including the Senegal Islamic Militia\textsuperscript{10} and Côte d’Ivoire’s Dozos in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{11} CBAGs that operate in grey zones of governance in lieu of a state security presence can adopt state governance practices, such as taxation\textsuperscript{12} and the exercise of public authority, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo,\textsuperscript{13} and security provision, as in Borno state, Nigeria, where the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) organized to protect communities from violent extremist groups, mainly Boko Haram.\textsuperscript{14}

Community collective action, protection, and vulnerability in Colombia informs theories regarding community relations, including how CBAGs negotiate power with local communities,\textsuperscript{15} act as agents of coercion when it comes to community engagement,\textsuperscript{16} and adopt or reflect norms of violence from the communities with which they interact.\textsuperscript{17} The CJTF has a mixed reputation in Nigeria, but aspects of its activities in the communities in Borno include constructive governance and civil society roles, such as bringing together community members across ethnic and tribal divides, providing health and justice services, and administering dispute resolution\textsuperscript{18}—activities similar to the Tatmadaw militias in Myanmar.\textsuperscript{19}

State influence is consequential even for CBAGs that operate autonomously from any state or community institution, such as gangs, criminal networks, or drug cartels. In urban communities in South and Central America, violence has become normalized through the historical legacy of sustained state repression,\textsuperscript{20} allowing autonomous CBAGs to exercise violence coercively against citizens and state. This desensitization to violence facilitates recruitment and characterizes operations and command and control for gangs

\textsuperscript{11} Thomas Bassett, “Dangerous Pursuits: Hunter Associations (Donzo Ton) and National Politics in Cote D’Ivoire,” \textit{Africa} 73, no. 1 (2003).
and criminal groups. The group, state, and community relationship creates a feedback loop where violence is normalized, rather than deviant, by social norms.

The influence of international actors in the form of funding, diaspora links, ideological influence, or political pressure is also present in several cases. Somali militias in the 1990s flourished on diaspora funding, while PAGAD in South Africa adopted foreign ideologies in their affinity for the spread of the Iranian Revolution in Africa. The United States placed pressure on the regime in Côte d’Ivoire to apply international human rights norms after abuses by the Dozo hunters’ group, just as Human Rights Watch did in Mali regarding abuses by ethnic militias.

Social norms of violence were salient in a comparative research study of communities in Syria and Colombia by Oliver Kaplan. The study found that the production of violence by armed groups adheres to local “logics of appropriateness” that arise within communities and influence the chances of the community influencing the behavior of armed groups. Another case study on the Dozos of Côte d’Ivoire discusses their adherence to a spiritual belief system and how that system affects recruitment, mission orientation, and community perception.

Finally, the theses on CBAG fluidity are taken from multiple sources and cases, including Mali, where Bambara and Dogon self-defense groups used the fight against armed Islamist groups to force another ethnic group, the Puehl, from their land. What began as protection against violent extremism evolved into identity-based vigilantism. In Kenya, the Funga File shifted from a community protection group to a vigilante group when citizens withdrew their payments because they viewed the original security threat as resolved.

Relevance

A typology of CBAGs and of the external factors that constrain and support their functions and operations helps to elucidate the roles that they play in communities. This understanding is critical for any community assessment to determine whether CBAG operations contribute to community resilience.

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or vulnerability, and to identify the role these groups might play in the co-creation of defensive, non-coercive hybrid security systems. Further, a more thorough understanding of how shifts in external factors affect CBAG transformations allows community, state, and international actors to better monitor and identify entry points for engagement, management, and transformation (EMT). EMT embraces the applicability of intervention strategies beyond conventional, standard technical approaches common to security sector reform programming; it also appreciates the fluidity of CBAGs and their responsiveness to changes as security dynamics evolve.

Sukanya Podder argues that armed groups are ripe for engagement, if the following are in place:

- Community resource bases that create armed group dependency on local communities for a range of support, which encourages them to be more protective
- High levels of civilian support that lend authority and legitimacy to the armed group
- High internal and external leadership monitoring group member activities and discipline
- Diverse activities, including security and service delivery support.

Podder’s analysis substantiates the need for a typology to strengthen the EMT framework. CBAGs exercise violence within communities in particular ways, depending on their structure and operations. Understanding the conditions under which a CBAG may transition from a community protection group to a criminal network is critical for community security. Similarly, identifying the conditions under which a CBAG may shift from an armed group to a civil society or political organization is critical for governance reform. Understanding the impacts of external factors on CBAGs could identify moments when community, state, or international actors could engage, manage, or transform CBAGs and could elucidate how those moments might be anticipated or shaped.

The research also contributes to the growing attention on elite bargains—the hidden informal power structures that define peace and security in fragile states in which power is weakly institutionalized. Security in fragile states is an extension of politics and power at all levels from national to community. Understanding CBAGs as instruments of informal elite power pacts has important implications for security sector reform in fragile states. In addition, analyzing how these informal security networks are negotiated, legitimized and constrained can inform how international organizations working in these areas can support, leverage, or incentivize power dynamics to promote peace, development, and governance.

TYPOLOGY FRAMEWORK

The typology framework builds on a series of studies that explore links between the external operational environment of armed groups and the internal functions of the armed groups, in particular, how they exercise violence. This is a dynamic model that links CBAG organization and operation to environmental factors and links CBAG transformations to shifts in these factors.

The first typifying factor for CBAGs is whether their relationship with the state or communities is coercive or negotiated. Coercive relationships entail violence, predation, or extortion; negotiated relationships include shared norms or determinations around CBAG activities and duties. Whether CBAGs use violence in support of, complementary to, or in conflict with state or local governance institutions, formal or informal, conditions their identity.

Second, building on the literature, this study explores how external, environmental factors condition CBAG internal operations, specifically how they exercise violence—its target, level, and alignment with the norms of social order. Coercive violent behavior denotes offensive, indiscriminate use of force; negotiated norms around violence signal more protective, discriminate practices. For example, national political entities might deputize a local CBAG to police a community or territory in conjunction with the national police or to fill a security gap. Community protection groups often operate with the authority of formal or informal community leaders to prevent or reduce crime or deter external threats. Other CBAGs are autonomous and exercise self-governance, for example, raider groups, criminal networks, or gangs. They often exercise violence coercively to control their environment, deter competitors, and dominate their communities or state representatives.

Other external factors modify their exercise of violence: international actors, access to resources, the threat environments, and socially accepted norms around violence. Internal functions, as conditioned externally, will influence how CBAGs exercise violence and modify group characteristics. These factors modify the relationship to the state and their communities, pushing and pulling the CBAGs along vectors that explain how they choose to exercise violence.

For example, the rise of a significant threat to a community could modify a community protection group’s exercise of violence from defensive or protective to offensive or predatory. If a CBAG gains access to substantial resources, it might recruit more opportunistic members and expand its operations, possibly challenging state authority in a locale. In such a case, its exercise of violence could be more offensive and predatory.
External factors

Relationship to the State

The relationship of CBAGs to the state affects their internal organization and armed operations. In a negotiated relationship, violence is one of many ways of engagement to achieve goals; in a coercive relationship, violence is primarily a means to an end.

Negotiated Relationship: In negotiated relationships, the state can become the authority structure, and the CBAGs operate according to the state’s strategic security goals. An authoritative leadership dominating a community or a region—for example, a warlord, politician, or informal community leader—is more likely to direct operations to protect and secure the land or political power granted by the state or to cooperate with state security forces. CBAGs can also operate under state sanction to extend state control into localities. An example of a CBAG that gained the support of the government in power is the Naparama, a peasant militia created by a traditional healer that believed that its members were invulnerable to bullets. In the Mozambique civil war, the Naparama recaptured most of the northern territory held by Renamo insurgents. The governing party, Frelimo, tolerated and, at times, actively supported Naparama operations against Renamo. 32

Coercive Relationship: If the group authority is in a coercive or coopted relationship with the state through threats, personal ties, or greed, the community may perceive CBAGs as corrupted by the state and thus as illegitimate. Case studies indicate that state-coopted CBAGs are more likely to respond violently to community opposition. In addition, such CBAGs are organized to protect the state from political rivals, inviting potential violence on the communities within which the CBAG operates. In many cases, CBAGs may operate in tandem with state security forces that predate on the communities to maintain their local power.

Some examples of how a state may use CBAGs in coercive relationships at the community level come from Pakistan. In 1971, the Pakistan Army colluded with armed Islamist militants of the Jamaat-e-Islami’s student wing to commit violence in East Pakistan, with both groups in opposition to the establishment of a secular state. In the Pakistani province of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, beginning in 2002, a number of local factions made deals with the Pakistani state to act as local stabilizers in areas of unrest, in exchange for the state’s noninterference in their operations.33 This policy changed in 2018 when the Pakistan government reasserted its control over the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.34

Autonomous CBAGs that have coopted state officials can operate with greater impunity in communities than those that must depend on protection and legitimacy from the communities in which they are embedded. For example, a criminal network that bribes local and national security officials is less dependent on the acquiescence of the community for its operations, and, therefore, less careful in how it exercises violence. Gangs or criminal networks that have not coopted the state may exist through coopted or coerced relationships with their communities. In such cases, an autonomous group may treat the communities as safe havens and conduct its activities outside of its home base.

Finally, CBAGs targeted by the state for threatening national security or government officials and posing a threat to state authority face a stark choice: disband or transform. In many cases, the CBAGs will disband, go underground, or retreat. However, others may transform into or ally with non-state armed groups, such as violent extremist groups, insurgents, or armed separatists. The classic case of state suppression forcing a group to go underground and then emerge as a nonstate actor group is Boko Haram. As Boko Haram camps and schools grew and were perceived as a threat, police pressure increased. In 2004, Boko Haram began attacks on local police, resulting in a Nigerian military operation against the compound of its leader, Muhammad Yusuf, in 2009. Yusuf and more than a hundred of his followers were killed. The attack sent Boko Haram underground, although many assumed that the group was defunct. In 2010, it reemerged after a spectacular prison break and resumed operations as a non-state armed group. 35

Relationship to the Community

Negotiated relationships with the community build on shared norms and mandates governing the activities, duties, and responsibilities of CBAGs. Often, in traditional societies, these long-established norms

create not only reservoirs of social trust but also a shared culture and values. These long-standing symbiotic relationships facilitate recruitment from local populations. With a shared system of values and culture, recruits are easily indoctrinated and gain status in the larger communities as a result of being a CBAG member. The community-CBAG negotiated relationship is especially strong when the community funds the CBAG and community leaders provide guidance. In such cases, CBAGs are institutionalized as security actors at the community level.36

Oliver Kaplan, in his research on armed groups and civilian protection in Syria and Colombia, finds that civilians have agency and influence over CBAGs, even in highly insecure, violent environments. Kaplan asserts that, even in situations where CBAGs can exercise coercive violence against communities, civilians have significant influence and can transmit “norms of protection, good conduct, and responsibility.”37 Communities do this when they organize collectively and negotiate with coercive armed groups around protective norms. These negotiations often create fissures within the CBAG organizations, empowering fighters less inclined to attacking civilians to challenge those more prone to exercise violence indiscriminately to control the civilian population.38

There is another factor that can determine CBAGs’ exercise of coercive violence. Communities that have been exposed to high levels of violence that destroyed community trust and intercommunal networks of support (as members flee and are displaced) are not able to mount the types of collective action that can control CBAG operations.39 In addition, communities in which violence has become normalized are also more vulnerable to CBAG’s exercise of coercive violence, such as in Latin American cities where state-sponsored violence has allowed gang and illicit criminal networks to take root.40

**Resources**

A CBAG’s resource endowment is a significant external constraint on its identity and operations. It drives membership recruitment, operations, and, ultimately, how a group exercises violence. Beyond an organization’s resource wealth is how it mobilizes and disposes of resources. Lootable resources are easily extracted and transported; a related factor is how easily they are obstructed. Drugs, diamonds, and agricultural products are highly lootable and disposable. Drugs and diamonds are also hard to obstruct by the state or competitors and therefore provide easier access to funding.41

Groups with access to significant resources—through extensive illicit criminal networks, political rents, or control of a local natural resource base—have more opportunistic recruits.42 These groups attract low-commitment individuals, who gain short-term material benefits from their participation in the group. Because the reward for participation is monetary, these organizations have less control over their mem-

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36 As illustrated by the Côte d’Ivoire dozo case study presented in this report.
37 Kaplan, “Nudging Armed Groups.”
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Winton, “Youth, Gangs and Violence.”
42 Ibid., 7.
bers, who are likely to engage in violence against citizens. In contrast, groups with fewer resources are more likely to attract high-commitment individuals motivated by the norms and principles of the group and the affirmation they receive from upholding them. With a stronger control structure, individuals in these groups self-police and are less likely to engage in willful violence against civilians.

The nature of the resources available to CBAGs also impacts their relationships with local communities. CBAGs with access to significant economic endowments, such as mines and agriculture, can behave in a more coercive fashion to their communities because they need compliant community members to extract or harvest the resources. If the resources are easily accessed or are already part of local economies, CBAGs might choose taxation and theft over citizen suppression.

**Social Norms**

CBAGs can symbolize communities’ local sovereignty and independence from the state, governance practices, and aspects of community identity. CBAGs have a long history in regions where the state has not consolidated its monopoly over security. They also flourish where politicians or customary rulers encourage non-state security groups to deter challenges to their authority. Informal hunter, tribal, youth, and ethnic armed groups, in the absence of the state, play historical roles in providing community security and social order. They also play important symbolic and identity roles, as representatives of communities’ strength, purpose, and sovereignty.

In traditional societies, norms of order and violence and the CBAG’s role in upholding them are accepted and expected. What may look like outbursts or cycles of violence to outsiders may be community-accepted practices. It is when CBAGs violate community norms around violence and order that their identity, and thus relationship to the community, might shift.

**Threat Environment**

CBAGs can form in response to a threat or arm themselves to protect relationships and equities. If the threat environment remains stable, CBAGs can focus on consolidating their internal functions and operations. Changes to the threat environment, however, can impact the organization of CBAGs. The emergence of a new threat or the escalation of an existing threat might increase recruitment levels, expand membership, increase mandate or mission roles, affect leadership structures, or establish a new CBAG.

For example, in 2013, the rise in violent extremism caused the Kenyan government to establish a new community policing system called Nyumba Kumi, dividing neighborhoods nationwide into blocks to monitor and report on suspicious activities. Similarly, the disappearance of a threat can undercut the legitimacy and resources of CABGs, and the response may entail a transition to an autonomous criminal group.

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43 Ibid., 204–206.
44 Ibid., 204–205.
to fund and continue operations. For example, when the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, many local militias, previously funded by the United States, turned to drug production and trafficking.

**International Actors**

International actors can have amplifying or modifying effects on the external factors in CBAGs’ environments that condition their existence. These actors can provide resources through development assistance, diaspora remittances, cross-border financial flows, illicit trade, or natural resources. International actors can provide social resources—a worldview or moral framework—such as a revolutionary ideology or traditional value systems. In some cases, international actors are threats, such as al-Shabaab in Kenya, al-Qaeda in Yemen, or French forces in Mali, that can coopt or target local armed groups. Outside actors can also influence CBAG-state relations. For example, the United States, in the wake of 9/11, pressured South Africa to categorize the People Against Gangsters and Drugs (PAGAD) as an international terrorist organization for its long-held sympathies to Qibla, the ideology of the Iranian revolution.

**Internal Functions**

**Leadership Structures**

One of the most critical factors is whether an authority or authoritative group governs and directs a CBAG, defining its mission and purpose. CBAGs can be either autonomous or subject to an authority, for example, a warlord, community council, or politician. Autonomous CBAGs—gangs, criminal and vigilante groups, and hunters’ groups—are self-governed and self-serving, creating their own rules, principles, and ways of organizing.

Four types of authority structures can, in general, dominate CBAGs:

- **Community-based**: Community leaders and members manage CBAGs either because the state is not present in these areas (whether urban or rural) or because the community needs protection from the state as a conflict actor.

- **Political entrepreneur**: CBAGs answer to a para-state or local political power that is not connected with the state and may serve as a governance actor for a community or region, for example, a warlord or tribal or ethnic leader.

- **Politician**: CBAGs serve national or local politicians to protect their personal political and economic interests.

- **State**: State authorities coopt CBAGs to perform security functions, in conjunction with or in lieu of national security services.

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47 Rachel Monaghan, ““One Merchant, One Bullet”: The Rise and Fall of PAGAD,” *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement* 12, no. 1 (2004): 1–19
How CBAGs organize for violence depends greatly on the parochial political and security interests of their governance authority, the legitimacy of that authority within their communities, and their relationship with the state. CBAG authorities who have consolidated their legitimacy within the community and have clear negotiated relationships with the state might exercise violence judiciously and predictably to maintain control of their parochial political interests. They might maintain control over the violence and order exercised by their members, prohibiting violence against the groups that extend legitimacy to them. They might act as quasi-governing authorities, relying on rules and norms for maintaining power within the community and exercising violence only against those who challenge their position.

CBAG authorities who have not consolidated their power with their communities and relationships with the state can use violence to demonstrate their desire and capability to dominate. Unconsolidated CBAG authorities can exercise violence strategically and symbolically as part of a broader negotiated process to assert legitimacy and authority, including to establish political alliances, buy loyalty, and terrorize non-loyalists. Paul Staniland argues that social embeddedness—the density of an armed groups networks in the local community and the more they recruit and interact with those networks—is the key characteristic for explaining armed group cohesion and control, more than ideology, provision of services, and popularity.48

Communities with little to no state institutional presence and weak local authority structures might see CBAGs emerge that are self-sufficient and extractive—autonomous groups that survive and enrich themselves through illicit activities and take advantage of community weaknesses. Thus, the source of CBAG authority largely directs its mission and exercise of violence; the objectives of these authorities typically fall into three interrelated categories: political, security, and economic.49

GROUP DISCIPLINE

How well the leadership of CBAGs can exercise group discipline is a critical factor in the level and types of violence the groups employ. The key to group discipline is institutionalization, the acceptance of norms, roles, and processes defined by CBAGs as an institution. In groups that have no established formalized command and control processes or principles that govern their armed operations, violence may be reactive or indiscriminate and not predetermined, that is, personal, opportunistic, or vengeful. To predict patterns of violence, it is critical to understand when and how institutionalization happens, what it looks like, and what external factors influence it.

Institutionalization primarily occurs to manage growth and security. As CBAGs secure their legitimacy within communities and with states, they may take on new roles and grow in operations and size. They are also likely to grow in response to threats to their territory or groups. Autonomous CBAGs that have not consolidated their autonomy and power may use organizational discipline and secrecy to prevent threats, infiltration, and outside monitoring. Therefore, external factors, such as the level and nature of threats, could have an impact on CBAGs’ command and control.

48 Staniland, “Explaining Cohesion, Fragmentation and Control in Insurgent Groups.”
49 Schuberth, Approaching Community-Based Armed Groups in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Organizational growth and security present the leadership of these groups with the management challenge of controlling subordinate units. Most units operate with decentralized command and control, and so communications in the areas where CBAGs deploy are often challenging. Furthermore, CBAGs can suffer from defections—individuals who are primarily interested in their own self-interest can undermine group cohesion and goals by avoiding security operations, targeting civilians indiscriminately, or seeking personal gain.

To institute mechanisms of command and control and to ensure organizational cohesion, the leadership can adopt several strategies:

- An inculcation regimen that includes training, mentoring, or a rite of passage that transmits operational standards and shared beliefs
- An organizational environment that reinforces operational and social norms through codes of conduct, monitoring systems, and incentive structures, such as promotion and punishment
- A shared system of organizational belief systems and social norms that all members, including leadership, submit to.

Formalization—the institutionalization of command and control structures to ensure better coordination and recurring rules that are legitimated within the group—can take many forms. Often, group norms are drawn from the culture of its members—from their communities or previous organizational affiliations, such as military or tribal. Formalized command and control structures are often based on patrimony or bureaucratization, depending on dominant social norms.

When patrimonialism is the mechanism of institutionalization, the command and control chain is normalized but personalized, revolving around the top leader. In such cases, leadership legitimacy depends on the leader’s reputation to fight, forge alliances, and extend clientelist political rents. The patrimonial relationship is replicated throughout the institution with subordinate leaders mimicking the credentials and fealties of the leader or drawing legitimacy from familial or ethnic relationships. A good example of a patrimonial system is the warlord of Afghanistan, Abdurrashid Dostum, who centralized commands and violence through clientelist networks that advanced his political ambitions. In clientelist systems, leaders punish members who defect or subvert harshly and violently, as a warning to others of the dangers of insubordination.

Another form of institutionalization is depersonalized power tied to a position. As CBAGs grow, diversify tasks, or illicit activities become more complex, a degree of formalization of roles and responsibilities

50 Ibid., 137–138.
51 Schlichte, In the Shadow of Violence, 164.
52 Ibid., 168.
53 Ibid.
occurs that exceeds the control of one leader.\textsuperscript{54} For example, as a drug cartel expands, it diversifies its business and institutionalizes its operations. Armed groups that are decentralized often have more effective levels of internal discipline. In contrast, centralization may be a response to higher levels of indiscipline both in terms of group control and the exercise of violence.\textsuperscript{55}

**Recruitment**

A group’s resources influence options for recruitment and exercise of violence. The recruitment process shapes how CBAGs can respond to organizational challenges and the external factors that influence them. Groups with significant or highly accessible and disposable resources—with primarily economic endowments—can deliver benefits to members immediately and reduce the costs of participation to members by supplying weapons, uniforms, and food. However, this ease of participation for recruits affects the levels of trust and make it difficult to establish when the basis for membership is transactional. Low commitment recruits are more expensive for an organization, less loyal, and prone to ignoring or re-interpreting group mandates. Recruits in materially resourced organization can be freeloaders,\textsuperscript{56} but they can also be mobilized quickly and in large numbers.

CBAGs also have what Weinstein calls “social endowments”: distinctive identities and dense interpersonal networks that can be readily mobilized to provide sustenance and support.\textsuperscript{57} These group identities and norms shared with their communities provide CBAGs with access to recruits and logistical support based on communal identities and values. Social endowments can take different forms, such as lower transaction costs with recruits or communities because of a long-standing reciprocal relationships; shared identities and interests; and horizontal linkages among CBAGs and other groups, such as clans, tribes, or ethnic or kinship groups.\textsuperscript{58} Finally, CBAGs may offer community members an alternative process for political and social agency and collective action as a social good.

Organizations founded on social endowments are more adept at institutionalizing the commitment of their members by building an environment of cooperation and control. Resource-poor groups tend to attract members committed to the group who will sacrifice or postpone individual reward for the success and survival of the group. Strong moral, social, historical, or political identities provide rationales for group purpose and the conduct of operations, a selective recruitment process, and rules for punishing defectors. Resource-poor groups attract members willing and able to cooperate long-term. Their members are more likely to follow leadership orders and remain disciplined in the conduct of their operations.\textsuperscript{59} However, organizations that recruit based on long-term commitments and social endowments do not do so with high levels of success. Their recruits are committed to the organizations, rather than themselves, but they are fewer in number.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 175.
\textsuperscript{55} Weinstein, 158.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 102.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 49.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 49.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 139.
The core characteristics defining CBAGs are their embeddedness with national and local political networks; state power structures, such as political elite or security forces; and local power structures, such as tribal and local government leaders. Whether their exercise of violence on behalf of or outside of these power networks is based on relationships that are negotiated or in the process of consolidation further defines these groups. External factors—such as access to resources, international actors, shifting social norms regarding violence, and the stability of the threat environment—may disturb or disrupt those relationships, and, in turn, how groups exercise violence.

A typology of community-based armed groups

Table 1 helps analyze any given CBAG at any point in terms of its external and internal characteristics to identify potential points of leverage to engage, manage, or transform it. Case studies and future conceptual research can use these factors to think about CBAGs and analyze them on a case-by-case basis, in cross-comparison, or by tracing the evolution of one group across these dimensions. While the factors do not capture the entirety of the complex characteristics of CBAGs and their operational contexts, they provide a comprehensive overview of the key drivers to elucidate the understanding of CBAGs’ behavior and inform the design of potential intervention strategies.

Table 1. Analyzing CBAG Internal and External Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERNAL FUNCTIONS</th>
<th>EXTERNAL FUNCTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE</td>
<td>DISCIPLINE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTONOMOUS/AUTHORITY</td>
<td>COHERENT/DECENTRALIZED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author.

Table 2 provides an illustration of ideal types of CBAG, based on the nature of their relationship with the state and the community and the function their exercise of violence fulfils (security, political, or economic), conditioning group identity.60

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60 See Schuberth, Approaching Community-Based Armed Groups (CBAGs) in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Table 2. A Typology of Community-based Armed Groups Based on Their Relationship with the State and the Community and the Function of Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUNCTION/TYPE OF VIOLENCE</th>
<th>RELATIONSHIP</th>
<th>...WITH THE STATE</th>
<th>...WITH THE COMMUNITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECURITY</strong></td>
<td>NEGOTIATED</td>
<td>PARAMILITARY, WARLORD, HUNTER, GOVERNMENT-DEPUTIZED</td>
<td>COMMUNITY PROTECTION, HUNTER, NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH, ANTI-CRIME, COUNTERINSURGENCY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COERCED</td>
<td>WARLORD, PARASTATE, MILITIA</td>
<td>VIGILANTE, PARAMILITARY, TRIBAL/ETHNIC MILITIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLITICAL</strong></td>
<td>NEGOTIATED</td>
<td>PARAMILITARY, PRIVATE SECURITY, PATRONAGE</td>
<td>TRIBAL/ETHNIC SELF-DEFENSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COERCED</td>
<td>ARMED POLITICAL WING, MILITIA</td>
<td>POLITICAL WING OF VIGILANTES/HUNTERS, CLIENTELISM, PATRONAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ECONOMIC</strong></td>
<td>NEGOTIATED</td>
<td>CARTELS, STATE CAPTURE, OLIGARCHY, CLIENTELISM</td>
<td>RESOURCE COMPETITION, ARMED LABOR/OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS, CATTLE PROTECTORS, HUNTERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COERCED</td>
<td>GANGS, SMUGGLERS, TRAFFICKERS</td>
<td>BANDITS, ROBBERS, CATTLE-RUSTLERS, TRAFFICKERS, ORGANIZED CRIME</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author.

For example, a CBAG with a weak command and control structure due to quick growth resulting from threats or resource booms, many opportunistic recruits, exposure to high-level violence, and a leadership structure with no negotiated relationship with the community may exercise violence against the community offensively and coercively. In contrast, a CBAG with social norms of community protection and service, institutionalized command and control structure, and negotiated leadership relations with the community will operate as a community protection group, exercising violence defensively and discriminately to prevent threats from entering or impacting the community.

**Fluidity**

CBAGs are fluid organizations that shift identities among different types; changes in external dynamics drive these shifts. Changes in resources, international influence, threat environment, and norms of social order force CBAGs to modify their recruitment practices and their command and control and leadership structures. When these functions change, they can drive CBAGs to different organizational forms, for
example, from a gang to a politician-sponsored security group, or from a community protection group to a state-deputized police force. In these cases, how CBAGs exercise violence—negotiated, coercive/discriminate, indiscriminate—may fundamentally shift.

Figure 2 tracks a shift that the author discovered in previous research in Kisuani, Kenya. The community paid a community protection group to exercise limited violence against violent criminal gangs, deploying a social order protection norm. When the community stopped paying for the CBAG’s protection services because it had successfully eradicated the threat, the shift in its resource endowment forced the group to seek other sources of funding. The group offered its services to local politicians and criminal networks to protect their clientelist political and economic agenda. In some cases, that meant targeting community members who challenged or competed with the politician’s political ambitions or a criminal network’s territory; accordingly, the group’s exercise of violence moved from protective to predatory. With more resources, the CBAG began to recruit more youth, some of whom were more opportunistic rather than committed to principles of community service and protection. Less able to exercise disciplined command and control, the CBAG members exercised violence on a more ad hoc basis, sometimes indiscriminately, based on personal vendettas. Thus, a shift in resources and community-state relations changed the CBAG’s exercise of violence and thus its identity from a community protection group to a clientelist vigilante.

**Figure 2. CBAG Transformation in the Exercise of Violence in Kisuani, Kenya**

Source: Author.
In sum, this research presents two main discoveries on the CBAGs typology conceptual framework.

- First, CBAGs can be categorized based on their relationship with the state and the communities in which they are embedded and their use of violence.

- Second, how CBAGs exercise violence is determined by the execution of their internal functions (leadership, command and control, recruitment), which, in turn, is constrained by external factors in its environment (state and community relations, threat environment, societal norms of violence, international actors, and resources).

Shifts in external factors force CBAGs to change how they function to remain relevant. These internal changes can redefine their identities. Through these two discoveries, scholars and practitioners can monitor and assess their potential transitionary points, aiding in identifying opportunities to engage, manage, and transform their behavior or the state-community ecosystem in which they operate. The next section tests these discoveries in two historical case studies for validation.

**CASE STUDIES**

Applying this dynamic typology framework on CBAG transitions to two historical case studies will test the validity of the findings and the interactive effects of external forces on internal functions. What do CBAG operations and their exercise of violence look like under the influence of multiple intervening variables? For example, how does a CBAG recruit, exercise command and control, and use violence when it has legitimacy from the state and community, enjoys access to significant resources, and faces a rising threat? How does a CBAG exercise its functions (recruitment, command and control) and use violence when it is autonomous, coopted by the state, poorly resourced, and rejected by the community?

The two case studies offer a comparative analysis. On the one hand, the People Against Gangs and Drugs (PAGAD) emerged as an urban citizen-led protection group in response to rising criminality in the predominantly Muslim neighborhood of West Cape, South Africa. PAGAD transformed several times during its existence from an unarmed community organization to a vigilante group to a nationally and internationally designated terrorist organization.61

On the other hand, the Dozo hunters of Côte d’Ivoire and the Benkadi movement also went through multiple transitions from the 1990s to 2010. They started as branches of game hunters in Guinea, Mali, and Sierra Leone, united by a mystical relationship to the god-like Manmory. Precipitous declines in big game

61 Because community based armed groups often play controversial roles in a community or state, this report is careful to indicate when these roles are disputed. In the case of PAGAD, as a predominantly Muslim organization that carried out a series of attacks against South African government officials in the 9/11 timeframe, they came to the attention of the United States. Whether those attacks were retaliatory, meant to push back on a concerted effort by the state to shut PAGAD down, or whether PAGAD intended to overthrow the South African government is a contentious issue.
simultaneous with a country-wide rise in violent crime saw the Dozos in Côte d’Ivoire transition to a nationwide private security force that also engaged in restorative justice in the north. Later, caught up in the violent contestations for political power at the national level, some Dozos joined insurgency groups; most, however, were contained within their homeland in the north, where they were at times labeled an ethnic militia. They operated primarily in the bush to maintain peace and security in communities where state security forces did not reach.62

Côte d’Ivoire: The Dozo and the Benkadi movements

INTRODUCTION

From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, a nationwide crime wave washed over Côte d’Ivoire, caused by a tangling of economic factors: recession, high unemployment, and declining public sector spending.63 The police force, weakened by the administration’s austerity programs, could not control the situation, and criminal networks came to dominate swaths of territory.64 In the north, these networks controlled a major transport artery and committed acts of highway robbery.65 At the same time, the status of Dozo big game hunters in Côte d’Ivoire was declining in tandem with the overhunting of big game.66 In response to the growing insecurity, the Dozo living in the farthest northwest, bordering Mali and Guinea, organized security patrols and helped community members to achieve justice. These two forces—the decline in resources occurring at the same time as a national state of emergency—transformed a decentralized network of local, traditional hunting groups into a national security institution that rivaled state institutions.67 The transformation of the Dozo analyzed through the framework highlights the external factors that influenced changes in the organizational functions.

ORIGINS AND TRANSFORMATION

Côte d’Ivoire’s Dozo hunters’ groups inhabit the areas of the north where a Mande diaspora has settled, as in other countries, such as Burkina Faso, Guinea, Liberia, Niger, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.68 During the 1990s, many of these Mande hunter societies across the West African region transformed as state and aid donors sought their services to fight crime, secure borders, and protect environmental assets.69 In Sierra Leone, Mande hunters served alongside government troops in the civil war; in Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali, they were deputized as conservation agents in environmentally protected areas.70 A discrete class of hunters, the Dozo are a brotherhood of Mande-speakers distinguished by their mystical power of healing and protecting. They believe that their patron Manimory will only protect them if they

64 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
follow the ethical rules of the group. The Dozo have always held a special societal role beyond game hunting; the communities they live in believe the protective powers of Dozos keep evil away.\textsuperscript{71}

Requests from citizens and states for Dozo protection came from their right to bear arms, their affinity with immigrants, and their principled (not self-interested) way of operating and interacting with citizens and communities. In Côte d’Ivoire, these communal values were inculcated into their volunteer recruits through a lengthy, three-year initiation that included mentoring by senior hunters.\textsuperscript{72} The Dozo were highly decentralized and headed by the most senior member at the village level. Hunters’ groups relied on the inculcation of the hunter culture and morals for discipline and organization. They carried their moral code of reciprocity through the shift in their group identity to community security providers, protecting citizens from what they perceived as the Ivorian state’s immoral abandonment of the poor to crime. The Dozo saw their new policing and private security tasks as analogous to hunting; criminal activity degraded their communal ideals and justified their protective operations. It was a model of legitimate violence for social good.\textsuperscript{73}

By the early 1990s, with the decline in big game, hunter associations expanded functionally in the north in two ways that highlighted the absence of the state: as administrating justice and as auxiliary to the police. Local farmers often called the Dozo to mediate crop damage disputes with local herders, tracking the cattle that had caused the damage and negotiating settlements with the appropriate cattle owners. The farmers compensated the Dozo for their time and expenses. Their efforts at restorative justice improved food security in northern rural communities, as farmers received compensation for their losses and were able to maintain food production.\textsuperscript{74}

**State Relations**

Originating in the Odienne region of northern Côte d’Ivoire, the Dozo also organized a chapter of Benkadi—a hunters’ association movement that began in Mali and spread to neighboring countries, such as Burkina Faso. As crime spread rapidly throughout Côte d’Ivoire, government officials in the north began to deputize hunters’ associations established originally by the Dozo to patrol streets, maintain roadblocks, and secure thoroughfares. Crime rates declined.\textsuperscript{75} As a result, requests poured in from across Côte d’Ivoire for Benkadi security services, including from border towns and even the south. The effort to transform the Dozo into a government-sanctioned, anti-crime movement had transformative effects on the organization’s recruiting and operational functions. The national government under President Felix Boigny recognized the north’s regional security success and the trust in Dozo-rooted Benkadi hunters’ groups. The government sanctioned Dozo assistance to the police in fighting crime, which allowed hunters’ association members to carry arms without penalties if they carried official membership cards.

\textsuperscript{71} Katharina Heitz Tokpa, “Territorial Power without Sovereignty: Hunters and the State on Cote d’Ivoire’s Northern Margins,” in *Spatial Practices: Territory Border and Infrastructure in Africa*, ed. Ulf Engel, Matt Boeckler, and Detlef Muller, Mann (Boston: Brill, 2018), 100.
\textsuperscript{73} Hojberg, “Review of Hunting the Ethical State,” 565.
\textsuperscript{75} Bassett, T., “Dangerous Pursuits,” 11.
Membership in the Benkadi movement grew rapidly for several reasons: the ability to own a gun to provide food for poorer households and payment for security services, such as community patrols and road blocks. Other ethnic groups joined the security employment bandwagon (for example, Baoule, Bete, Guere, Gourou, and Yacouba), traveling to the north to join the Benkadi movement. A local Benkadi chapter in Korhogo took the movement to the national level by establishing the Hunter Association of the Great North and opening the ranks to any individuals who wanted to fight crime.

At that point, the Dozo multiyear initiation process was abandoned. New recruits received some training, and in a nod to Dozo culture, they took an oath of good behavior to an amulet they agreed to carry. The institutionalization of the Dozo within the Benkadi movement resulted in cleavages within the group as it transformed from an informal network of local hunters’ groups to a centralized organization. As Ivoirite national leaders initiated systematic discrimination of ethnic groups from the north, questions arose on the role that hunters played in the increasingly violent national political arena.

As the Benkadi movement grew and dispersed throughout Côte d’Ivoire to provide community security, it transformed into a transactional organization, established a bureaucratic command structure, and became enmeshed in national politics. In the 1995 Presidential elections, the President of the Hunters Association of the North, Edouard Coulibaly, announced that the Dozo had entered the national political scene. Rumors spread that Coulibaly had taken money from the Partie Democratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) to support Interim President Bedie’s candidacy. His manipulation of the Dozo, which at the time supported many different political parties, led to later suspicions by politicians that the Benkadi were a threat to the holders of political power. The manipulation, however, was mutual, as politicians competed for Dozo support to boost their electoral ratings.

Unable to coopt the Dozo, Bedie began to fear that they were a threat to his administration and the PDCI party; his rival, Alassane Ouattara, drew his strongest support from the north, the geographic base of the Dozo. The Dozo declared their official stance as apolitical, noting that they worked for their employers’ security, regardless of political affiliation. However, their public statements held little sway with the Bedie government, which moved to restrict the Dozo to eleven departments in the north, rather than grant them the legitimate private security organization status that the hunters’ association had requested. This meant that the Dozo were no longer to carry arms or work as guards in the south and were restricted to a culturally defined region in the north. Non-Ivorian citizens were prohibited from joining the hunters’ association, and members were stripped of modern weapons. The containment was not simply a political move to weaken the influence of northerners throughout the country and opposition

76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
81 Ibid., 15.
leader Ouattara’s standing in the upcoming 2000 presidential elections. It was intended to strengthen Ivoirite, the policy of manipulating ethnic identities to maintain political control by reducing the Mande diaspora’s influence in Côte d’Ivoire. The Dozo were not only caught up in politics at the national level; they also became a focal point for the politics of ethnicization ravaging Côte d’Ivoire.

In 1999, a coup against Bedie brought the military to power, led by General Guei, who relied on Dozo support symbolically and militarily. The General reinstated the Dozo as an auxiliary security force, guarding checkpoints throughout the country as well as public places in Abidjan. The Dozo leadership of Abidjan reportedly met with the general to pledge their loyalty and reaffirm their nonpartisanship. The President of the Benkadi movement wrote to the general to express the movement’s desire to support the police force on all levels in the service of the people of Côte d’Ivoire. However, in a remarkable repetition of large-scale ethnicization of Ivorian politics, Guei reinforced Ivoirite to eliminate Ouattara in the presidential elections he now wanted to win. The Supreme Court backed Guei’s exclusionary efforts, preventing any candidate from the north from running in the elections.

Guei’s attempts to steal the elections ignited massive protests by his competitor’s supporters in the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) party. Guei fled in response; Laurent Gbagbo, the opposition leader who had run against Guei, seized the presidency. Ouattaro’s Rally of the Republicans (RDR) followers refused to recognize his legitimacy, calling for immediate fair elections. As the north, an RDR stronghold, pushed back, requesting Gbagbo officials to leave amid demonstrations, the Dozo protected demonstrators from pro-government gendarmes. As violence and unrest spiraled, pro-Gbagbo forces painted the Dozo as a guerilla arm of Ouattaro’s RDR. Gbagbo sought regional opposition to the Dozo at a meeting of the Western African Entente Council. West African foreign ministers committed themselves to controlling illegal immigration (the movement of Dozo groups between states) and disarming Dozo groups considered a threat to the security of states in the region. These actions fed into Gbagbo’s polemic against the Dozo as infiltrated by foreigners, which, in turn, fed into Ivoirite exclusionary dogma. As the Dozo were removed from security provision in the south, the Benkadi movement began to fracture. Some Dozo sided with soldiers of northern origin, who instigated an insurgency against the Gbagbo government. Others acted as an auxiliary force that protected citizens in the north from state gendarme and police. Still others retreated from the violence.

In 2010, Ouattara won the presidential election. When Gbagbo refused to yield office, the international community organized a military intervention, including the United Nations and the French military and the Côte d’Ivoire insurgency forces. During the intervention, the Dozo participated in a massacre in Duekoue in the west. The international community pressured Ouattara to respond; in turn, he outlawed all

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83 Ibid.
87 Ibid., 24.
88 Ibid., 25.
state-sponsored private security forces. Despite his criminalization decree, the Dozo continued to play a public role in the north, providing security in areas where the state was not present. They protected communities in the bush, acted as border guards, and guarded village entrances. They coexisted with local state officials, inhabiting urban areas and maintaining the social order in the north.90

Conclusions

The Dozo case study validates the external factors selected for this framework. Natural resource declines drove the group to shift from traditional hunters’ groups to private and community-based security forces. State-sanctioned, they migrated throughout Côte d’Ivoire at the request of citizens to protect them from the nationwide crime spree. Legitimized by both the state and citizens, the Dozo institutionalized the Benkadi movement of hunters’ associations and expanded rapidly. As a result of the transformation in state and society relations, the Dozo organizational functions changed. First, the groups changed from a dispersed, networked organization embedded in communities to entities with centralized authority in negotiated relationships with the state. Second, the Dozo expanded their ranks to include other ethnic groups and reduced the initiation processes. As a result, when the state began to exercise violence against the Dozo under the Gbagbo regime, the hunters’ associations began to fragment into insurgents, auxiliary protectors of northern populations against police and gendarmes, and they returned to their traditional role of community protectors. The Dozo became less restrained in their exercise of violence, committing atrocities against citizens.

Hellwig argued that these “morally dubious choices” of indiscriminate violence should be understood as part of the Dozo culture of sacrifice and community protection.91 They may seem illegitimate to outsiders but were legitimate within the Benkadi movement that actively reviewed its actions in the context of Dozo spirituality and protective powers. Hunters’ groups likely committed acts of violence that violated Dozo principles due to changes in internal organizational functions. Higher recruitment levels, absent the extensive, traditional initiation period, resulted in more opportunistic individuals joining and less institutional discipline in abiding by the norms of Dozo order. New recruits did not join for Dozo lifestyle and values but because the government allowed them to carry guns and because private security service paid.

That said, the strong Dozo value system may explain how the group managed to weather political manipulations and attacks by the state. Many Dozo joined the insurgency and committed large-scale atrocities. However, even after decades of state repression, many Dozo retreated rather than turning into a major insurgency, even when they had the national presence and legitimacy to challenge the state and press for northern political power. The Dozo’s instinct was to turn inward to its cultural and spiritual roots.

Figure 3 shows how external factors drove the Dozo to first shift the negotiated relationship from the communities to the state. Then, as the state turned against the Dozo and established a more coercive relationship with them, some Dozo groups responded to attack the state. However, the bulk of the Dozo

90 Ibid., 102.
returned or remained in the north and recommitted to their role of providing security and protection to their communities.

Other external factors that appear to have influenced the Dozo and the organizational changes are the international community, which put pressure on Ouattero to disband them, and community expectations of social order, which contributed to Dozo legitimacy. Local communities throughout Côte d’Ivoire respected the integrity of the traditional role of hunters to protect their host communities.

**Figure 3.** Dozo Identity Shifts according to Their Use of Violence

![Diagram](source: Author)

**South Africa: People against gangsterism and drugs**

**Introduction**

The main dynamic behind the rise and transformation of the People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) in South Africa is the struggle of a community to manage the effects of the transition from apartheid to democracy. The Cape Flats are located outside Cape Town in South Africa’s Western Cape Province, inhabited by the province’s colored community; more than half of the 4.5 million people were
colored and predominantly Muslim. In the 1960s, the apartheid government relocated colored communities from downtown Cape Town to the Western Cape Province. These deportations tore communities apart, in particular, “the informal networks of communal welfare and social control” established around the imams and mosques. The removals broke the infrastructure of community care and protection and gangs became prevalent. Citizens in the six districts that made up the Western Cape (Mitchells Plain, Manenberg, Phillipa, Bishop Lavis, Belville South, and Elsies River) frequently organized neighborhood watches to push back against violence and drugs. However, the authoritarian apartheid government suppressed them under the Riotous Assembly Act.

To understand how and why PAGAD formed, it is important to understand the cultural, political, and social transformations in the Western Cape and South Africa after the fall of the apartheid. Throughout South Africa, the privatization of security was common, as the government sought to scale down administrative apartheid. At the same time, new forms of private security existed, with a long historical and cultural tradition of communities policing themselves and political and religious organizations organizing around social order and restraint. The new African National Congress (ANC) government also attempted to reform the police, introducing a community policing system at a time when communities in the townships had not yet forgiven the police for their apartheid-era abuse. There still existed a “culture of mutual defiance”; people often did not consent to be policed, and the police still operated with old conceptions of the people as the threat.

At the time, colored communities in Western Cape voted consistently and largely for the opposition to the ANC, the National Party/Democratic Alliance (NP/DA), to resist the dangers of majority black rule. As a result, the Western Cape was the only province where the provincial government provided an institutional home for the political opposition. The tensions between the NP/DA opposition and the national government, dominated by the ANC, played into the state’s response to PAGAD. Mobilization of security became caught in a partisan political contest in a highly contested constituency, the Western Cape. The ANC viewed community mobilized security movements and groups not only as a security issue, but also as a political problem the opposition could exploit. All this occurred while the ANC was beginning to crack down on all political opponents.

Meanwhile, the political legacy of the apartheid-era—where the police and the government forged relationships with gangsters to control the townships—later combined with well-documented cooperation between gangsters and liberation movements in the run-up to the 1994 elections, created suspicion on the part of PAGAD and its constituents that the ANC and the police were not really interested in solving

92 Monaghan, “‘One Merchant, One Bullet,’” 2.
94 Monaghan, “‘One Merchant, One Bullet,’” 2.
96 Ibid., 611.
97 Ibid., p 612–14.
the gangster problem.\textsuperscript{100} There was a growing alienation by large segments of the population to the ANC’s liberal democracy that claimed a human rights agenda but became increasingly corrupt, holding the political elite to different laws.\textsuperscript{101}

Finally, the other tectonic shift occurring in the Western Cape in the 1990s was the decades-long struggle between progressive and conservative Islam and the declining influence of progressive Islam.\textsuperscript{102} People in the Western Cape saw PAGAD as the epicenter for the struggle for the soul of South African Islam. Muslim groups in the Western Cape community valued liberal democracy and fought valiantly in the liberation struggle for a democratic state—a struggle that had little to do with religion but everything to do with being a South African citizen. Other Muslim groups felt that Muslims should not participate in politics until they had consolidated their religious position as a faith that could, from a position of unity, advocate from a Muslim religious perspective.\textsuperscript{103} Some of the more conservative elements followed Qibla, a Muslim movement formed in Cape Town in the late 1970s and 1980s that promoted the Iranian Revolution and advocated for South African Muslims to adopt the strict Islamic principles associated with it. Qibla played a militant role in the anti-apartheid movement.\textsuperscript{104}

**Origins and Transformation**

PAGAD, which operated primarily in the Western Cape between 1996 and 2001, developed within the community’s long-held tradition of neighborhood watches.\textsuperscript{105} PAGAD began as a grassroots community response in the new post-apartheid South Africa to a resurgence of crime, drug abuse, and gangsterism in the colored communities of the Cape Flats.\textsuperscript{106} Its organizational development was organic. The community recognized that it could not fight the gangs at the street and neighborhood levels. The gangs were too numerous and strong and would retaliate with violence. Communities had to develop a critical mass of popular support that would make it uncomfortable for drug dealers and gang leaders to live in their area.\textsuperscript{107} The leaders of PAGAD launched an intensive awareness campaign in churches, mosques, and civic groups. They held vigils and distributed pamphlets, and PAGAD grew from a small group of community organizers to a populist movement of public meetings and protests. In addition to community education, PAGAD engaged the government. The group delivered an ultimatum to Minister of Justice Dullah Omar to take action against drug lords and gangs within 60 days by such measures as implementing the death penalty, confiscating gang and criminal assets, denying bail to drug dealers, and imposing severe penalties for first-time offenders.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{100} Dixon and Johns, “Gangs, Pagad, and the State.”
\textsuperscript{101} Esack, “PAGAD and Islamic Radicalism: Taking on the State?” 9.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{103} Dixon and Johns, “Gangs, Pagad, and the State.”
\textsuperscript{104} Monaghan, “One Merchant, One Bullet,” 5.
\textsuperscript{106} Monaghan, “One Merchant, One Bullet,” 3.
\textsuperscript{107} Dixon and Johns, “Gangs, Pagad, and the State,” 11.
In addition to engaging the government, PAGAD became more confrontational with gang leaders and drug lords in the Western Cape, marching in great numbers to their homes and demanding that they leave the community within 24 hours. In August 1996, these clashes escalated; in a showdown at the house of drug dealer Rashaad Staggie, the crowds lost control, beat him to death, and burned his body. Publicly, the attack looked like the old apartheid tactics of necklacing, placing a burning tire around the necks of accused collaborators. At that point, the criminal groups began to fight back, organizing among themselves and launching attacks on PAGAD members and local Muslim citizens, including business dealers and religious leaders. Citizen support began to decline, partly due to public disapproval of PAGAD’s extreme tactics, but also due to threats to public safety and the launch of a full-blown conflict between PAGAD and the gangs, which raged from 1996–98. Civil society groups that had initially worked with PAGAD as a neighborhood watch group split with the organization because of its hardline stance on negotiations and reconciliations with criminal. The civil society organizations adopted a more lenient, negotiated approach to engaging community gangs and drug dealers.

PAGAD’s members were concerned about the increasingly violent resistance of drug dealers to PAGAD’s tactics of public demonstration, exposing and confronting the dealers. There was also an increasing disillusionment with the state’s ineffectual response to PAGAD’s demands for tougher action as negotiations with the Ministry of Justice broke down. These factors came together to drive a series of internal changes to PAGAD: new leadership, a tighter organizational structure, and the adoption of more robust tactics.

In October-November 1996, a split occurred between the movement’s populist-oriented moderates and the more fundamentalist and extremist faction associated with Qibla. The division was not only about the increasing ineffectiveness of PAGAD’s tactics; differing views on the best strategy were factors as well. The populist leaders Farouk Jaffries, Nathmie Edries, and Ali Parker envisioned PAGAD as a way to restore community values through the construction of community rehabilitation centers and engagement with state authorities to advocate for the community’s perspective. This strategy clashed with the Qibla faction’s anti-state, pro-jihadist agenda. In the end, the populists (Jaffries, Edries, and Parker) were thrown out of the organization. Although PAGAD had always emphasized the power of the community over the power of any individual, there was a growing sense within the community that its populist leaders fancied themselves larger than the organization, engaging in self-promotion nationally and internationally.

109 Ibid.
111 Ibid., 25.
112 Ibid., 5.
113 Ibid.
114 Monaghan, “‘One Merchant, One Bullet,’” 5.
With experience in the anti-apartheid struggle, Qibla leaders and members brought organizational savvy to PAGAD, institutionalizing it within the Western Cape and in satellite offices, for example, in KwaZulu Natal, Guateng, Port Elizabeth, Kimberley, and Johannesburg.\textsuperscript{117} The formation of Pagad United, its national organization, elevated PAGAD’s local strategy to the national level. To deal more effectively with gangsters and drugs and to have greater influence over the government, PAGAD needed a stronger and larger front.\textsuperscript{118} PAGAD’s national executive coordinated the activities of its satellite organizations, although none became as militant as the original branch in the West Cape.\textsuperscript{119} After the split in 1996, PAGAD began to develop more formal internal organizational structures:

- **Secretariat:** coordinated all activities within the organization and organized meetings, mass rallies, prayer meetings, conventions, and advertising and community notices
- **Legal:** handled bail, defense, and engagement with law enforcement agencies on behalf of accused members
- **Social welfare:** educated the communities about drugs and gangsterism in the schools and in factories and organized community recreation events, such as prayer meetings, outings, and sporting events; sponsored drug rehabilitation programs and rehabilitation for injured PAGAD member
- **Finance:** controlled and managed PAGAD finances, collected donations at public events, and organized fundraising campaigns
- **Security:** operated in cell structures to protect the homes of PAGAD members; within the security unit was a special unit of the most disciplined and well-trained within each cell that formed a paramilitary arm of PAGAD, known as the Gun Force or G-Force.
- **Education:** developed syllabi on the subject of gangs and drugs and assisted educators in providing classes in biology, science, and mathematics.\textsuperscript{120}

The internal organization of PAGAD is controversial and not completely understood. Some analysts and intelligence members believe that the Qibla takeover was complete and that the populist and community activities were a convenient front for its increasingly militant operations. Others, however, feel that while ideologues may have dominated PAGAD in its leadership ranks, the grassroots membership remained only loosely committed to the fundamentalist agenda. The G-Force operated on its own initiatives independently of the mainstream organization.\textsuperscript{121}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 33.
  \item \textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{119} Monaghan, “‘One Merchant, One Bullet.’” 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{121} Dixon and Johns, “Gangs, Pagad, and the State,” 26.
\end{itemize}
If there were internal turning points within PAGAD, such as the confluence of retaliatory violence by the gangs and the lack of response by the state to PAGAD’s negotiations, there were also turning points within the state. These were, in many ways, opportunities missed or misunderstood, as the post-apartheid government also underwent a substantial reformation of its institutions, especially the police. Throughout the fall of 1996, the government and PAGAD engaged in negotiations on a police and justice response to the growing threat of drugs and gangs in the West Cape townships. The Western Cape Attorney General suggested that, if PAGAD wanted to do something about drugs, it should focus on entry points. In December 1996, PAGAD organized a demonstration at Cape Town International Airport. The group applied for permission for the demonstration, but the Minister of Transport and the President’s Office refused to grant it. PAGAD proceeded with the demonstration, but viewed the whole negotiation process as a set-up for a confrontation with the government. Following the demonstration, PAGAD increased its presence at Muslim international protests outside of the Israeli Embassy and against the arrival of British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Violence escalated between the PAGAD paramilitary forces and the gangs. In response, the government issued a statement in December 1996 that PAGAD was a threat to national security and as anti-state as the gangsters themselves.122

With this statement, the government’s position hardened considerably. It began to institute legal and security measures against PAGAD, such as prohibiting members from owning guns and prohibiting demonstrators from wearing masks. Both measures reduced overt popular support for PAGAD; its members and supporters would not challenge drug lords and gang members openly without the ability to remain anonymous or to defend themselves against retaliation.123 The government’s twin track of more rigorous enforcement and public condemnation pushed PAGAD further from a popular mass movement into a smaller, tighter, better organized—but also more homogeneous, isolated, and defensive—group.124

PAGAD leaders felt that the state response was the ANC-led government’s move to quash political dissent and opposition, because the government feared that PAGAD leadership was pushing an internationalist Muslim agenda and its grassroots members were supporting the NA/DP.125 Either way, PAGAD was perceived as anti-ANC. PAGAD also cynically noted the ANC’s cooperation with the gangs in the lead-up to the 1994 elections and its lack of response to the criminal elements in the West Cape.126 The government’s statements in December 1996 were an attempt to associate PAGAD with militant Islam and fed into a domestic and global panic over the growth of Islamic fundamentalism. In making this connection, the government attempted to strip PAGAD of its support from moderate Muslims and non-believers.127

122 Ibid.
127 Ibid., 29.
As both PAGAD and the state positions hardened, the new head of PAGAD, Aslam Toefy, took a more instrumentalist approach in negotiations with the state, not seeking to transform citizen-state relations as previous negotiations had attempted. In 1998, PAGAD approached the government with a list of more than 100 gang and drug group members, identifying where they lived and the crimes they committed. The police responded that they could not pursue the gangsters because their resources were fully engaged in policing PAGAD. PAGAD agreed to stop its demonstrations for a month to allow the police to reallocate resources, but the group perceived very little police action during this time. The police noted that due to the new democratic processes it would take time to compile evidence and prepare for arrests. Soon, however, the police initiated Operation Good Hope, a special operation to arrest PAGAD members and fully undermine the organization. The operation was launched in response to a series of terrorist attacks on the city’s soft targets, including restaurants, which the government attributed to PAGAD and which PAGAD denied organizing. PAGAD members believed that, having revealed their leadership team in the negotiations, the police used this information to target them.128

The disjointed response by the police, engaging in negotiations while targeting PAGAD for arrest, was largely due to a growing split within the police force based on those who still adhered to apartheid techniques and perspectives and those who took a more nuanced view of PAGAD. The latter group felt that there was a pragmatic element within PAGAD with whom it could negotiate and engage.129 That latter group eventually lost to the hardened state position and was itself investigated for its “sympathy” for PAGAD. As the state’s position grew more repressive, PAGAD’s core became more reactionary, defensive, and militant. In the end, the violence caused by the rise in gangs and drug networks that first lead to PAGAD’s formation continued unabated, with the state largely unsuccessful in its efforts to break up organized crime.

**Conclusions**

The PAGAD case study also confirms that the interplay of external factors identified in this study —community organization, the relationship with the state, international actors, and norms of violence—contributed significantly to PAGAD’s original organization and to its transformations. This case demonstrates the complexity of CBAGs’ existence in times of post-conflict transitions and democratic consolidations, as government reforms and norms of violence shift. It was difficult for both PAGAD and the government to see through the fog of transition and to understand their new positions and new contexts.

The lesson to be learned is the difficulty of engaging CBAGs in a time of transition. As Figure 4 shows, the shift in how PAGAD exercised violence is more the case that the accepted norms of the state and communities on violence shifted and less the case that PAGAD radically changed its armed operations. Shifts in societal norms regarding acceptable violence may radically affect a CBAG’s legitimacy.

It is also clear from both case studies that state-CBAG relationships may not be defined as much by the absence of the state as by the government’s perception of whether CBAGs are supportive or aligned with

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129 Ibid., 27.
political opponents. Thus, the state can view CBAGs as political, not just, security actors. Whether CBAGs are, in fact, political actors is irrelevant to the state, which is more concerned with whether they could become political. Thus, there is the paradoxical aspect of the relationship; the state relies on CBAGs to enhance its legitimacy and allows them to operate and engage, until CBAGs present threats to the state.

Finally, in terms of the internal dynamics of CBAGs, comparisons of the PAGAD and Dozo organizations show that values matter. The Dozo, which had deep organizational values centered around community protection, retreated to the north rather than unleash national government security forces against their homeland. PAGAD, in contrast, wanted to transform an increasingly corrupt liberal democracy by focusing government officials on the needs of the people that it served. In challenging the state and publicly addressing its flaws, PAGAD valued political gains over community security—a position that invited a government response. Thus, external factors ultimately drive CBAG transitions, but internal factors are decisive in determining how well CBAGs navigate external changes.

**Figure 4.** Shift in State and Community Norms on Violence Increase Perceptions of PAGAD as Coercive

![Diagram showing the shift in state and community norms on violence increase perceptions of PAGAD as coercive.]

*Source: Author.*
CONCLUSION

This dynamic typology framework links the organization and operations of CBAGs to environmental factors and links CBAG transformations to shifts in these interrelated factors. External factors (relations with the state and the community, resources, social norms, threat environment, and international actors) influence the internal functions of the group (leadership structures, discipline, and recruitment processes). In turn, internal functions determine the fundamental characteristic of CBAGs: how they exercise violence.

At its core, two factors define CBAG identity: (1) the external factor of the group’s relationships with the state and communities, and (2) the internal function of the group’s exercise of violence. These two core typifying factors are interrelated and dynamically influence one another. Both state-community relations and the exercise of violence can be characterized as either coercive or negotiated; these two categories encompass diverse practices and meanings, but they demonstrate the underlying fluid sociopolitical and cultural relationships that create the identity.

The two CBAG cases in this report—PAGAD and Dozo—began as community protection groups but followed different trajectories. The comparative analysis of these different trajectories allows insights into the factors that drive the organizational and operational shifts.

The role of the state

The historical, long-standing social protective norms practiced by the Dozo hunters helped them withstand the political pressures exerted by politicians to declare their loyalty to a political party. In contrast, the protective norms practiced by PAGAD quickly fell away under the pressure exerted by the state. South Africa experienced profound changes in how local communities perceived the new state and how the state implemented security, and community support for PAGAD diminished because of its violence against local drug lords. As the group’s ties to community networks were broken and the state applied enormous pressure through police raids and incarcerations, PAGAD transitioned to a tight, hardliner group that committed violence against citizens and the state.

What state policies resulted in these divergent trajectories? At first, the Côte d’Ivoire government sought to contain the Dozo to the north, reduce their numbers, and partially disarm them. Later, when the Côte d’Ivoire government used security forces against the Dozo, some factions transitioned into ethnic militias and insurgent groups. The South African government implemented an escalatory option to eliminate PAGAD through police attacks, even as the group sought to negotiate with the government. The comparative analysis suggests that when the state seeks to eliminate CBAGs, they or their fractioned elements become non-state armed groups. However, when the state takes a more measured approach, even if the negotiations are coercive as in Côte d’Ivoire, CBAGs, such as the Dozo, morph into other types of CBAGs with more negotiated relationships to the state and communities.
Expanded human security roles

Both groups began as community protective groups and quickly added additional community responsibilities that responded to a more expansive view of security: human security. These human security tasks, such as dispute resolution for the Dozo and community clinics and youth programs for PAGAD, suggest that CBAGs that have high rates of legitimacy in their communities. Legitimate forces for protection will see their functions expand to fulfill additional aspects of human security if the state is not present and able to do so.

Both groups had international affiliations that the state used to discredit their legitimacy and loyalty to the nation or the state. The Dozo had connections to foreign hunters’ groups as the Ivoirian government was implementing a racial exclusionary policy. PAGAD’s association with the Iranian revolutionary group Qibla supported the state labeling PAGAD as a terrorist group. Thus, political actors can and do manipulate the different identities of CBAGs to discredit them with their communities as a way to assert state control.

Managing factions

Finally, shifts in CBAG identities and exercise of violence causes factionalization within the groups, indicating that not all members accept new modes of operating, especially if new norms challenge long-held organizational principles. In Cape Town, citizens increasingly distanced themselves from the more radical core of PAGAD, fearing the backlash of violence against communities by gangs and drug cartels. They remained focused on PAGAD’s community service institutions. In Côte d’Ivoire, the Dozo split as certain groups began to fight the state. Thus, in these transition moments, CBAGS are vulnerable—they can split apart, while certain factions may harden to commit acts of violence. The government and international community should be poised to act in these transitional moments. International actors can seek to leverage different groups to control the increasingly hardened faction and further isolate and contain it as it attempts to consolidate and expand its organization.

If the external indicators and internal functions identified in the typology and in the historical case studies are further validated in current cases, it will enrich a typology for CBAGs based on the type and direction of their armed operations and describe how and why CBAGs shift to other entities. For international organizations working in environments with CBAGs or for local civil society groups working within communities, it is critical to understand these shifts, especially if there is a possibility that CBAGs will change to more pernicious types of organizations, based on dynamic external changes.

This report also establishes the importance of a holistic monitoring and engagement strategy for CBAGs. Their existence is conditioned by their relationship to the state and communities. Thus, initiatives to engage with CBAGs also need to consider the entirety of their existence: norms of social order that may legitimize types of violence, endorsement by the state, and legitimacy rooted in their communities. Any
engagement strategy for CBAGs needs to address the social norms of violence, the history of state or community management or manipulation of armed groups, and their legitimacy.

International actors also need to recognize how they influence the external factors for CBAGs and how to anticipate responses in CBAG operations. For example, if the international community supplies increased resources to a particular CBAG, then it may attract a wider base of opportunistic recruits who may wield violence indiscriminately and abandon community-based norms. Similarly, the international community may appear as a threat in the particular environment, thereby institutionalizing that CBAG’s role and making it a more disciplined, effective fighting force. The international community’s changes to the external environment have profound effects on the group’s internal dynamics. Additional research is needed to more fully elucidate the effects of international and regional dynamics on CBAG operations.

Finally, CBAGs differ greatly, yet engagement policies are often similar. Engagement strategies need to take into consideration the internal characteristics, such as sources of legitimacy and loyalty, leadership capacities, recruiting pool, and institutional structures. A CBAG with extensive resources, whose members enjoy economic benefits, may be more attracted to employment-based or compensation-based transitions. CBAG members motivated by an internal set of principles and norms may be more attracted to transition programs that are more spiritual, intellectual, or rooted in community service, such as becoming an emergency response and rescue group. For example, does a negotiated, legitimate relationship with the state, which might moderate a group’s use of violence, predominate when a CBAG has access to significant resources, which might encourage more opportunistic violence? Further research should study interactive effects, determining if some variables are more influential on CBAGs’ functions than others.
SOURCES


ORIGINS OF HYBRID GOVERNANCE AND ARMED COMMUNITY MOBILIZATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This RESOLVE report, one of three, seeks to understand the origins, dynamics, and drivers of community-based armed groups (CBAGs) in Africa. As an explorative study, this report involves collecting, organizing, and synthesizing available information on non-state security actors and their relationships with local communities and formal state agencies, such as the law enforcement and justice systems. The report builds on academic literature that explores the relationships between the state and civil society, seeking to challenge simplistic renderings of these as distinctly separate entities with clearly defined boundaries. The report is also informed by interviews with members of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), a pro-state militia helping to repel the violent insurgency of Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria.

A consolidated definition of CBAGs has proven difficult because of their multiple types and characteristics, and because CBAGs are typically located in zones of ambiguity between the presence and absence of law and social order. Across Africa, CBAGs have organized at various levels (from lineage to ethnic group), in various spaces (from village ward to city streets), and for various reasons (from crime fighting to political lobbying to counterinsurgency). CBAGs draw their legitimacy from various and, at times, competing sources, including traditional and communal establishments, religious establishments, and political establishments.

CBAGs are perceived as defining boundaries and protecting or caring for the communities encompassed within these boundaries; they involve surveilling and acting against any threats to these communities. Such boundaries, however, are permeable and shifting and, therefore, amenable to change and vulnerable to conflict. For instance, over time, the expectations of CBAGs may differ from the expectations of the communities, so much so that CBAGs may distance themselves from the communities or may become threats to those communities. In such cases, CBAGs morph from community-based to non-state armed groups with a message and method that alienates the communities.

A common assumption is that state-building is the preserve of official state apparatuses. Yet, so-called weak or fragile states are ordinarily not in a position to provide security and other public goods on their own. Giving their degree of embeddedness within communities and the popular legitimacy that they appear to enjoy, at least in the early phases, CBAGs may be well-placed to carry out basic governance responsibilities, establish public norms of compliance and cooperation with local populations, and provide order and dispute resolution services. This situation forces the research to go beyond the narrative of CBAGs as national security threats and consider their roles as contributors to state-building and peace-building.

A study of CBAGs—their origins, dynamics, and drivers—could clarify for researchers and practitioners the multiplicity and complex relationships between these groups and the state, as well as their prominent roles and responsibilities in security provision and service delivery. The results of such research, in turn, could support ongoing efforts to improve civil-military relations and to foster a more stable and productive relationship between CBAGs and the state. Insights from this study could also enhance peace-building and state-building.
Heritage of colonialism

Analyzing how CBAGs were forged in the course of a colonial occupation provides a deeper understanding of these entities in particular and the postcolonial state in general. The rise of CBAGs in postcolonial Africa echoes decades of selective, limited, and unrepresentative forms of colonial policing. The relative absence of protective policing under a weak and violent colonial state encouraged marginalized communities to devise their own solutions to violent crime and challenges to the social order. In areas where the colonial police had limited presence—often rural or peri-urban zones—the maintenance of law and order fell to local security actors. Vigilantes, hunters, and civic guards stepped in to enforce law and order, normally prosecuted outside of conventional policing norms or state procedure.

In general, colonial police and Native Authority police had little to do with serving the local communities. Their primary responsibilities revolved around coercing labor, dealing with threats to colonially imposed law, protecting white-owned property, and upholding the authority of colonial rule. These police forces, which had narrow bases in the communities, relied on coercion rather than authority for compliance. This pattern has continued in postcolonial Africa, where state police forces are often perceived as corrupt, ineffective, and unconnected to the communities they serve. This perception has fueled the rise of self-help groups (for example, vigilantes, militias, and gangs), some of whom exist to challenge predatory and unaccountable modes of governance.

Given the financial, logistical, and knowledge constraints of the colonial state—which would qualify it as a “weak state”—a prevailing ideology emerged that emphasized the responsibility of the African community to police itself (for example, the “indirect rule” system). This system of governance manifests itself in the way that failing states in postcolonial Africa increasingly turn to CBAGs to maintain law and order due to their perceived cost-saving measures, effectiveness, or popular legitimacy.

Categories of CBAGs

This mapping paper discusses three categories of CBAGs:

- CBAGs that organize to fight insurgents or terrorists
- CBAGs that emerge to fight crime
- CBAGs that are manipulated by state actors to target ethnic or political rivals.

Despite the diversity of the threats facing these CBAGs, they all seem to have emerged from a postcolonial context in which the state and its institutions are incapable of delivering security and other public goods, and the primary objective of those who hold or compete for political office is self-enrichment.
This combination of state fragility and elite rapacity has become a trademark of neo-patrimonial\(^1\) states in Africa, giving rise to a range of security responses among local communities, one of which is a return to non-state forms of order.

**INTRODUCTION**

**Understanding community-based armed groups**

Most discussions about the provision of public goods, particularly security, focus on the role of formal state institutions. Yet the provision of security has always been a pluralized field of delivery rather than a state monopoly.\(^2\) Against the backdrop of weak states\(^3\) in Africa—characterized by often disempowered, under-resourced police struggling with corruption and politicization—local communities often have to rely on themselves for protection from security threats that range from petty crimes to insurgencies.\(^4\) They do this, for instance, by mobilizing themselves into community-based armed groups (CBAGs) that may take the form of vigilantes, militias, or gangs.\(^5\) The effectiveness of these groups in providing protection, and the local legitimacy they seem to enjoy, have been accompanied by a growing recognition that governance exists without government\(^6\) and that the state does not have a legitimate monopoly over the use of violence. This is particularly true in weak or failing states, where the incapacity to deliver security has eroded trust in their power and authority.

The phenomenon of CBAGs invites us to rethink the common tendency to reduce local communities mired in armed conflict, or facing the absence of an effective state authority, to passive victims of armed conflicts rather than active participants. Describing the significant successes of governance efforts within some local Somali communities in the face of state collapse since 1991, Ken Menkhaus draws attention to “the obvious but often overlooked observation that local communities are not passive in the face of [1] Neopatrimonialism is “a form of organization in which relationship of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines.” See Christopher S. Clapham, The World Politics: An Introduction (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 48.
state failure and insecurity; instead, they adapt in a variety of ways to minimize risk and increase predictability in their dangerous environments.”

A definition of CBAGs has proven difficult due to their many types and characteristics, and the fact that they are often located in zones of ambiguity between the presence and absence of law and order. Moreover, CBAGs draw their legitimacy from various and, at times, competing sources, including traditional and communal, religious, and political establishments.

In this report, CBAGs are viewed as entities that define boundaries and protect communities encompassed within these boundaries; they surveille and act against any threat to these communities. Such boundaries are permeable and shifting, and, therefore, amenable to conflict and change. Over time, the expectations of CBAGs may differ from the expectations of local communities, so much so that CBAGs may distance themselves from the communities or may become threats to the communities. In these cases, the CBAGs morph from community-based to non-state armed groups with a message and method that alienates the communities. The roles and activities of CBAGs are fluid as well.

The boundaries between CBAGs and the state are typically blurred because these groups tend to operate in the shadow of the state or mimic state institutions by delivering protection and punishment traditionally provided by formal state apparatuses. Existing literature repeatedly shows that CBAG roles and activities are closely related to ideas and structures of the state, from Kate Meagher’s analysis of how the Bakassi Boys were hijacked by the Nigerian state, to Micheal Fleisher and Helen Kyed’s ethnography of how the Tanzanian and Mozambican government outsourced policing by domesticating non-state vigilantes and turning them into local police forces.

The forms and extent of CBAG engagement with the state exhibits wide variations, both geographically and over time. In some cases, the state may actively oppose CBAGs to maintain its monopoly on security and justice delivery. In other cases, it may lend CBAGs its tacit or overt approval. The state (or other states in the region) may look away, seek to infiltrate, and influence CBAGs or may actively assume control over them or reinvent them. Two key advantages for states that condone or even sponsor CBAGs are cost and effectiveness. As Fleisher writes of the state-sponsored Sungusungu of Tanzania: “The government in effect ‘deputizes’ local people and sets them to work fighting ‘crime’ at little or no cost. It harnesses the energy of local people in this struggle, bypassing the lethargic, corrupt formal law enforcement system.”

13 Ibid.
Against this backdrop, adopting a state-centric approach (for example, a weak state thesis)\textsuperscript{14} to security governance stops short of explaining the complex relations between CBAGs and the state and the roles and responsibilities that each assumes in security provision. Ideal-typical models of stable and democratic states fail to reflect the societal realities of failing states in contemporary Africa, in which the absent state has been replaced by hybrid security arrangements or CBAGs working “beside the state.”\textsuperscript{15} In Nigeria’s Middle Belt, for instance, vigilante groups work beside the state in security delivery.\textsuperscript{16}

A state-centric approach is likely to alienate local actors. Such an approach may not only undermine the sense of local ownership and agency for managing insecurity; it may ultimately weaken the potential of weak states to govern. In contrast, a hybrid security governance approach that recognizes and supports the roles and responsibilities of CBAGs as co-providers of security and justice can be an effective means to strengthen the capacity of weak states to govern and maintain a strong base in communal forces. Acknowledging the effective roles and responsibilities of CBAGs with respect to the delivery of security and other public services involves recognizing their limitations as well, and debunking tendencies to romanticize CBAGs as the panacea to Africa’s security challenges. Evidence suggests that CBAGs are capable of morphing from the “saving grace” of local communities to the primary threat to them, reproducing the same weaknesses and abuses of power that plague formal state institutions.\textsuperscript{17} The challenge for researchers and policymakers is to recognize and build on the positive potential of CBAGs, while minimizing their negative potential.

\section*{EVOLUTION AND HISTORICAL DYNAMICS}

\subsection*{Origins of CBAGs}

Historically, community-based groups—such as hunter associations, night guard systems, and village patrols—have assumed security prerogatives and service provision in Africa.\textsuperscript{18} The interactions between these local security actors and the state have not always been those of resistance but also of complementarity.\textsuperscript{19} To gain a deeper understanding of the contemporary dynamics and drivers of CBAGs, it is  

\textsuperscript{14} States are considered “failed,” “collapsed,” or “weak” according to the level of their effective delivery of public goods, the most critical of which is security, especially human security. As Robert Rotberg argues, “The state’s prime function is to provide that political good of security—to prevent cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to eliminate domestic threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure; to prevent crime and any related dangers to domestic human security; and to enable citizens to resolve their disputes with the state and with their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion.” See: Rotberg, \textit{State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror}, 2-3.

\textsuperscript{15} Alice Bellagamba and Georg Klute, \textit{Beside the State. Emergent Powers in Contemporary Africa} (Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, 2008).


\textsuperscript{17} Meagher, “The Strength of Weak States?”


imperative to examine how the idea of the state was conceived and enacted.\(^\text{20}\) Doing so entails delving into the historical circumstances that gave rise to CBAGs and other local security providers. We learn a great deal about the evolution and transformation of CBAGs when we analyze their historical dynamics and trace the elements of continuity and discontinuity in their roles, responsibilities, and relations with state security services.\(^\text{21}\)

Foregrounding vigilantism in Nigeria as “a new name for an old practice,”\(^\text{22}\) that is, as an activity that has its roots in pre-independence Africa, Laurent Fourchard shows how the role and activities of the Oodua Peoples’ Congress (OPC), a Yoruba vigilante organization in southwest Nigeria, reclaimed the practices of former night guards and vigilantes of the 1930s, particularly with respect to their extralegal practices that involved the use of charms for crime control and extrajudicial killings tolerated on the grounds of community protection.\(^\text{23}\)

This section is informed by Mahmood Mamdani’s thesis that the key to understanding the state in contemporary Africa is the realization that it was forged in the course of colonial occupation.\(^\text{24}\) The emergence and reach of CBAGs in contemporary Africa echoes decades of selective, limited, and unrepresentative policing in colonial Africa, which alienated communities and forced them to look beyond the state for protection and other public goods. The focus here is on British-ruled Africa and the maintenance of law and order, with intermittent contrasts with French-ruled Africa.

**THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN COLONIAL POLICE FORCES AND THE COMMUNITY**

The emergence and legitimacy of CBAGs must be properly contextualized within the legacy of colonial policing in the region, when colonial administrations deployed indirect rule to maintain law and order.\(^\text{25}\) Indirect rule meant building alliances with local elites and subcontracting security provision to local policing bodies and militias. Because colonialism involved the transfer of laws and legal institutions from one society to another, it resulted in a bifurcated legal system: one for the colonized and one for the colonizers. The prevailing attitude was that “natives” required different treatment under the law.\(^\text{26}\) This bifurcated legal system applied to British Africa, as well as to French colonial Africa and its policy of assimilation.\(^\text{27}\) Inhabitants of French colonies in West Africa, for instance, were divided into two groups: citizens and non-citizens; French citizens were subject to French law, and non-citizens (Africans) were governed


\(^{21}\) See: Fourchard, “A New Name for an Old Practice”; Lar, “Historicizing Vigilante Policing in Plateau State, Nigeria.”

\(^{22}\) Fourchard, “A New Name for an Old Practice.”

\(^{23}\) Ibid, 36.


\(^{27}\) The ideological basis of French colonial policy in the 19th and 20th centuries, the French taught their subjects that, by adopting French language and culture, they could eventually become French.
As the most visible public symbol of colonial power and authority, colonial police forces were tools of direct colonial domination and agents provocateur. Colonial police forces served as the eyes and ears of the colonial government and enforced law and order against a largely hostile population. Recruitment into the colonial police force was predominantly shaped by the technical needs of the colonial state (rather than the everyday needs of the subject population) and its prejudices about the attributes of different races and cultures. Patterns of colonial police recruitment favored the so-called “martial races,” commonly drawn from the peripheral regions of the colony. Consequently, ethnic patterns of recruitment undermined the impartiality of the colonial police, creating and maintaining police forces that were neither representative of nor accountable to the local communities they served. Early colonial police forces were numerically small, hastily raised, and poorly trained. Many were recruited from former slaves, bandits, and brigands. One agent of colonial administration described the Kenyan police as “an armed mob... of partially trained men.”

Colonial police forces had “hardly anything to do with serving the community.” Their primary duties included coercing labor, dealing with threats to colonial-imposed law, protecting white-owned property, and upholding the authority of colonial rule. This pattern continues to this day as many citizens in post-colonial Africa perceive the majority of formal state policing forces as corrupt and strangers to the communities they serve. Colonial police institutions mirror the postcolonial state in Africa that “presented itself as an apparatus of violence, and while its base in social forces remained extremely narrow, it relied unduly on coercion for compliance, rather than authority.”

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31 According to the concept of “martial races,” certain ethnic, religious, caste, or social groups were regarded by British army officials as possessing a more masculine character, as being loyal and therefore especially suited for military service.


34 Anderson and Killingray, Policing the Empire, 184.


In post-apartheid South Africa, for example, the police are generally perceived as corrupt, incompetent, and non-responsive to the needs of the crime-ridden townships. It is against this backdrop that CBAGs such as the Amadlozi emerged to deliver security and justice to black-occupied and crime-ridden townships. The Amadlozi gained popularity based on their effective use of local forms of knowledge (such as gossip and eyewitnesses), physical punishment, and violence to address crimes. The power of the Amadlozi derived from their capacity to react immediately to problems of theft and justice. As a leader of the Amadlozi said, “We act here and now. We do not, as the police do, drag our feet.”

**Colonial Policing and Urban Bias**

Colonial policing focused primarily on urban areas, and its principal aim was the protection of property and the propertied classes. Even in certain urban areas, especially with high concentrations of Africans, colonial policing was sometimes “selective and often only superficial.” By contrast, rural areas and townships were notoriously under-policed and crime-ridden.

In much of colonial Africa, for example, there was only one policeman for every 1,000 inhabitants. In one “Letter from Unprotected” in Tanganyika (today part of Tanzania), it was noted that “majority of the people living in or around these forsaken [African areas] still have to teach children what a policeman looks like.” This selective nature of colonial policing had a snowball effect on crimes and gangsterism in African villages and townships. Against this backdrop, many postcolonial CBAGs have their origins in rural areas and periurban zones, where the presence of official state policing is generally limited or non-existent and crime abounds. Thandika Mkandawire observed that while postcolonial rebel movements in Africa tend to be fueled by “essentially urban issues,” rebels tend to retreat to the countryside—whence they exact a terrible toll on the peasantry—since incumbent regimes possess a monopoly of force in urban areas.

**Indirect rule, native authority, and the politics of predation**

**Colonial Africa**

Given the financial, logistical, and knowledge constraints of the colonial state—which would qualify it today as a weak state—a prevailing ideology emerged that emphasized the responsibility of the African community to police itself. In the mid-1920s, Sir Geoffrey Archer of the Karamojong, an ethnic group of agro-pastoral herders in northeast Uganda, stated, “There is only one way to treat these [Africans] and...”

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42 Burton, “‘Brothers by Day,’” 80–81.
that is (...) to leave them to their own customs, as far as possible, and under their chiefs.”44 This perspective is manifest in how failing states in postcolonial Africa increasingly turn to CBAGs to maintain law and order in communities outside their reach.

The distinction between the British and French approaches in Africa is worth noting. In theory, the French mode of governance—direct rule—was the antithesis of the British indirect rule. One of the most significant differences between British and French approaches in the region concerns the degree to which the natives were allowed to govern themselves. Under French administration, the French occupied all the important positions; British administration generally adopted the plan of governing, whenever possible, through native rulers.45 Derwent Whittlesey comments that the French, “feeling for logical systems and order, would not accept a scheme of government [like the British] which varied from place to place in conformity with local usage.”46 The implications for contemporary security governance is that former French colonies are more likely to exhibit a stronger state-centric focus compared to British colonies. More research is required to better understand how contrasting systems of direct and indirect rule in colonial Africa affected the rise and evolution of postcolonial CBAGs, particularly their relations with local communities and the official state apparatuses.

British colonial policy from the 1920s was guided by the system of indirect rule or “decentralized despotism,”47 underpinned by customary law.48 The colonial state adapted local hierarchies and judicial practices by delegating some form of Native Authority to administer law and order under colonial oversight.49 Writing in the early 1950s, Lord Hailey noted that “[o]rder is today largely secured by the system by which the native community polices itself, in the sense that only the major types of crime are dealt with by the Government Police Force, which has usually a very small establishment, the great majority of offenses or breaches of law being dealt with through the agency of Native Authority or Tribal Messengers.”50

The structure of indirect rule varied greatly. In Nigeria, for example, it ranged from the continuing rule of the northern emirs (Muslim rulers), through Warrant Chiefs imposed on acephalous (“headless”) societ-

47 Mamdani, *Citizens and Subject*.
ies in the southwest, to small chiefdoms and sub-chiefdoms.51 Many local chiefs were predatory in nature and abused their position to exploit those under their authority and to shore up patronage.52 Consequently, many chiefs were “feared and disliked.”53 Colonial officials were under obligation to support the state-appointed Native Authorities against their opponents, which emboldened the despotic and venal nature of the chiefs.54 Often, local chiefs abused their messengers to seize livestock and other property in what a colonial official graphically described as a “general civil war against the people.”55

In Uganda’s Eastern Provinces in the 1930s, African chiefs used forced labor to grow cotton. The indirect rule system allowed traditional African rulers to exercise a measure of control over Native Authority police, courts, and prisons, which opened up more avenues for authoritarian behavior and chronic opportunism. In northern Nigeria, Native Authorities administered many of the prisons, and until 1936, the courts had the authority to impose capital sentences. Despite the supposed civilizing mission of colonial administrations, many polities ran prisons and inflicted punishments that were at once “brutal and harsh.”56 Sir Lord Lugard even allowed northern emirs in Nigeria to retain the practice of beheading and drowning as “humane” methods of execution for principal crimes.57 This is not surprising if we consider Whittlesey’s argument that “the autocratic authority of the emirs [was] modified only in so far as necessary to make it conform with British ideals of fair play and justice.”58

In colonial Nyasaland (today part of Malawi), the Native Authority police punished tax defaulters by burning down their houses, keeping wives as hostages until their husband paid, and forcing defaulters to labor at public works.59 By and large, the central pillars of penal authority in Africa remained executions, floggings, imprisonment, and fines.60 A uniform often provided a license to loot, and the people perceived the Native Authority police as predators; this popular perception was not untrue. As early as 1891, the consul general of the Oil Rivers Protectorates in Nigeria denounced the “numerous acts of lawlessness and pillage” by the Native Authority police, who were known in the local communities as the “forty thieves” in police uniform.61 In Nyasaland, some members of the Native Authority police supplemented their wages by extorting “fowls, food, beer, and even women” from locals.62

52 Mamdani, “Citizens and Subject.”
56 Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order, 125.
62 McCracken, “Coercion and Control,” 144.
part of Zimbabwe), the Shona-speaking people taunted the Native Authority police as “imbga dza vasungate” that translates as “white men’s dogs.”

**POSTCOLONIAL AFRICA**

The predatory and patronage politics that characterized Native Authority and policing in colonial Africa has bled into postcolonial politics where elites appropriate state institutions as a conduit for private accumulation. This predatory and neo-patrimonial character of political economy, a legacy of colonial rule, is a key driver of non-state groups throughout the continent, some of which exist to challenge unaccountable modes of governance. Among the Boko Haram leadership, there is a firm belief that the problems within the Nigerian state are traceable to the corruption of its yan boko (Western-trained elites), who are seen as enriching themselves at the expense of the poor. As Andrew Walker argues in a U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) report, the term yan boko refers to “the elite created by the policy of indirect rule used by British to colonize Nigeria— the people who have their heads turned away from Allah by easy money and corrupting Western values. To be yan boko is to be spiritually and morally corrupt, lacking in religious piety, and guilty of criminally enriching oneself rather than dedicating oneself to the Muslim umma (community).”

In sum, the relative absence of protective policing under weak, corrupt, and violent states in colonial Africa encouraged marginalized civilian communities to develop their own solutions to violent crime and challenges to the social order. In areas where the colonial police forces had a limited presence, such as rural and periurban zones, the maintenance of law and order typically fell to local security initiatives. Vigilantes, hunters, and civic guards stepped in to enforce law and order of a very “rough-and-ready type.”

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65 This is not to say that predatory politics did not exist in precolonial Africa. Between 1804 and 1808, for instance, we know that Shaikh Usman Dan Fodio waged the Sokoto (Fulani) jihad across a series of emirates (in what is today known as Northern Nigeria) against what he perceived as the hopelessly corrupt and apostate Hausa ruling elite of his time. Dan Fodio decried the prevalence of routine exploitative taxes and oppressive practices among officials of the “sarkis”—the sovereign authority on which the political, judicial and military powers of the Hausa were invested —which he perceived as unjust and alien to da al-Islam, to “true Islam.” See Olufemi Vaughan, *Religion and the Making of Nigeria* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 18; M.G. Smith, “Historical and Cultural Conditions of Political Corruption among the Hausa,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 6, no. 2 (1964): 164–94.
66 Meagher, “The Strength of Weak States?”
CURRENT TRENDS

This section traces the patterns of continuity and discontinuity between the colonial state and the post-colonial state in East and West Africa, with particular attention to the dynamics and drivers of contemporary CBAGs. The central thesis of this section is that to understand the circumstances that generated postcolonial CBAGs in the region, we must look closely at not only the functioning of the postcolonial state and its institutions but also the perceptions and responses of the communities on whose behalf CBAGs frequently claim to act.

For analytical clarity, three major categories of CBAGs are identified, with a caveat that the lines between these groups can be fluid in reality:

- CBAGs that organize to fight insurgents or terrorists, for example, the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in northeast Nigeria
- CBAGs that emerge to fight crime, for example, the Sungusungu village groups in Tanzania
- CBAGs that are manipulated by state actors to target ethnic or political rivals, for example, the Mungiki youth movement in Kenya

Despite the diversity of the security threats that these CBAGs encounter, they all emerged from a post-colonial context in which, on the one hand, state structures are unable to provide security and other public services on their own, and, on the other hand, the primary objective of elites or those competing for political power is self-enrichment. Such a potent mix of state fragility and elite rapacity has become a prominent feature of neopatrimonial states in Africa, generating a range of responses in local communities. Mkandawire describes these reactions as “voice,” through which local groups openly articulate their discontent, and “exit,” whereby local groups withdraw from state-dominated spaces.70

Counterinsurgent CBAGs: The case of Nigeria’s Civilian Joint Task Force

Nigeria’s armed forces are often deployed in communities where they are strangers, with little to no knowledge of the local culture, terrain, and languages of the people whom they serve. This practice makes it difficult for these soldiers to gain the trust of those local communities. In the absence of a proper knowledge apparatus that made society intelligible, feelings rather than fact often became sufficient grounds for arrest, torture, and killings by state security forces in northeastern Nigeria.71 One security official in Gombe state said: “We feel some civilians are obstructing us in the discharge of our duties.

71 Human Rights Watch, Everyone’s in on the Game.
We also feel others are frustrating our efforts by collaborating with Boko Haram, and providing them with information and even a safe abode to hide in, thereby endangering the lives of all those living nearby.72

As Nigerian security forces deployed to protect communities affected by Boko Haram began to stamp those communities with the label of “suspect,” local residents in northeast Nigeria (particularly in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states) became a “happy hunting ground” for both Boko Haram insurgents and the Nigerian forces. While Boko Haram suspected and punished these communities for siding with government security forces, the Nigerian forces suspected and punished them for shielding Boko Haram insurgents and providing key information to the group. As another security officer noted, “When we can’t see the enemy, civilians become the enemy.”73

This section of the report is based on the author’s fieldwork conducted in Borno State between August 2017 and January 2018, during which he carried out more than 60 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with sectorial commanders and volunteers of the CJTF in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State and headquarters of the CJTF in northeast Nigeria.

**The CJTF As A Child Of Necessity**

Where a community is viewed as suspect, bonds may grow among the members of the community on the basis of shared experiences of persecution and interest in avoiding being constantly targeted as suspicious. As Breen-Smyth argues: “In the absence of the ability to turn to agents of the state in order to secure one’s safety and freedom, those identified as suspects and the communities they come from have a sense of being left undefended, insecure and are thus more, not less, likely to turn to non-state actors.”74 Breen-Smyth further argues that alienation from state security forces can lead to perceptions among the suspect community that “the state, not terrorism, represents the source of greatest threat to their security.”75 Nowhere is this most evident than in the rise of the CJTF in Maiduguri.

The CJTF was a product of a brutal war against Boko Haram that targeted local communities. The group emerged in reaction to the twin threats of Boko Haram’s jihad and the brutality of the Nigerian army. In an interview, the Super Overall Chairman of the CJTF in Maiduguri, Baba Shehu Abdul Ganiyu, confirmed that the CJTF was a direct result of “harassment by Boko Haram and harassment by Nigerian Army.” He added that “because Nigerian army did not know who is really Boko Haram, they just come and cordon off any area and take everybody away for screening. Then later on, we the youth of Maiduguri decided that enough is enough. That’s why we agreed to cooperate with the security agencies that we are going to fish those people out of our society. That’s how we started this community-based work in June 2013.”76

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72 Kyle Dietrich, ‘When We Can’t See the Enemy, Civilians Become the Enemy’: Living Through Nigeria’s Six-Year Insurgency (Washington, DC: Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2015), 51.
73 Dietrich, ‘When We Can’t See the Enemy, Civilians Become the Enemy,’ 6.
75 Breen-Smyth, “Theorizing the ‘Suspect Community,” 234.
76 Author’s interview with Baba Shehu Abdul Ganiyu, November 2018.
Among Maiduguri residents, there is also a sense that the repressive tactics of Nigeria security forces generated the CJTF. “Let me tell you,” says Mohammed, a taxi-driver from the Wulari area of Maiduguri, “we have three types of Boko Haram. We have a real Boko Haram. We have a military Boko Haram. And we have a political Boko Haram. You don’t know who will save you. Just only God. If Boko Haram doesn’t kill you, soldiers will kill you. This is why those CJTF boys took up sticks. Because they say if the state cannot protect us, let us protect ourselves.”

FORMALIZING THE CJTF

Understanding the process through which CBAGs acquire formal recognition is imperative because it can tell us on whose behalf these local security actors will fight. The CJTF emerged in Maiduguri in June 2013; by late 2013, the group had managed to flush Boko Haram members out of Maiduguri, forcing the insurgents to retreat to the countryside, especially to the mountain terrains and hills. Since then, very few attacks have occurred in Maiduguri, other than suicide missions targeting camps for internally displaced persons on the city’s periphery. Given this achievement, former Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan described the CJTF members as “new national heroes.” In addition, the counterinsurgent vigilante model of the CJTF began to be replicated throughout Borno State, spreading further across northeastern Nigeria, before making its way to neighboring countries in the Chad Basin, including Cameroon and Chad. Today, the CJTF has an estimated strength of about 26,000 members across northeastern Nigeria.

Operating as a pro-state paramilitary force, CJTF members deploy their intimate knowledge of the terrain, language, and people to identify and arrest Boko Haram members in their neighborhoods. “Sometimes when we arrest the insurgents, [and] we try them. If found innocent, we release them. If found guilty, we hand them over to the authority,” says Alhaji Bulama Kawu, a hunter from Gubja area of Yobe State. By supplying the local knowledge that was lacking in the counterinsurgency operations of the Nigerian military, the CJTF bolstered the war against Boko Haram and reduced the amount of arbitrary arrests and killings of locals by security forces. The CJTF effectively became the “eyes and ears” of the Nigerian military.

Upon seeing the effectiveness of the CJTF, and the popular legitimacy enjoyed by the group, the Borno State government felt compelled to invite the leadership of the CJTF to a security council meeting headed by the governor, Kashim Shettima. Notably, the involvement of the Borno State government came after much lobbying by the Shehu [traditional leader] of Borno State, Abubakar Ibn Umar Garbai El-Kanemi, who, very early on, was impressed by the brave acts of the CJTF and believed the group should be encouraged rather than left alone. Already overstretched by the threat of Boko Haram, the Borno State government officially endorsed the self-help group as a “voluntary organization” to support the Nigerian Joint

77 Author’s interview with Mohammed in Wulari, Maiduguri, December 2017.
78 Meagher, “The Strength of Weak States?” 1096.
82 Alhaji Bulama Kawu, interview by author, Gubja, Yobe State, Nigeria, December 17, 2017.
Task Force under the official moniker: “Civilian Joint Task Force.” Thereafter, the group joined the official counterinsurgency network in Borno State, a hybrid security arrangement that strengthened rather than weakened the war against Boko Haram. The CJTF was organized into military-like “sectors” and select members received “Special Force” training from the army for about eight months under the Borno Youth Empowerment Scheme (BOYES), including training in firearms and intelligence collection. Those who completed this training became known as “Civilian Joint Task Force Special Forces.”

**Accounting for the Effectiveness of the CJTF**

*Community Surveillance*

The information derived from the CJTF’s intimate knowledge of daily interactions greatly bolstered the official war against Boko Haram. In interviews conducted in Maiduguri, locals claimed that any newcomers settling in their neighborhoods would be quickly detected by the CJTF. A hotelkeeper in Wulari noted, “If you are a stranger coming to visit someone who lives in any of the wards [neighborhoods], members of the CJTF will send one of their boys to accompany that newcomer to the house of the person he is visiting, or they will call that person to find out if indeed they are expecting you. If the person you claim to be visiting cannot identify you, members of the CJTF will immediately arrest you and take you to the Nigerian military. If the person says you are their guest, they will tell that person they are responsible for you during your stay. If anything happens, that person you’re visiting will be arrested.”

*Children of the Community: Trust, Access, and Legitimacy*

The perception of CJTF members as children of the respective communities afforded them a privileged and powerful position of trust and access that Nigeria security forces clearly lacked. As Ali Muhammed, a CJTF driver in Damaturu in Yobe State, explains: “You know we are indigenes. Like most people living here, we suffer and are oppressed by Boko Haram insurgents, with nowhere to go. People either have our phone numbers or those of our relations and they can always reach out to report anything unusual around them. The moment they notice any unusual movement of cars or motorcycles, they phone one of our members; if there is no network, they can use bicycles to connect with someone and give information to be acted on.”

*Internal Disciplinary Measures and Accountability*

Leaders of the CJTF attributed the group’s effectiveness to the disciplinary and accountability measures within the group that binds leaders and members. “Actually, we in the CJTF don’t tolerate nonsense,” says Bakura Abba Ali, Chairman of CJTF (Sector 5). “If you are a CJTF, you must be law abiding. Whether you like it or not. If not, we ask you to leave. We dismiss you. Even me, Bakura Abba Ali, the Chairman. If I am in violation of anything that brings problem to the CJTF, I will be dismissed as well. But you know, in every society you must get the good ones and the bad ones. When we get a CJTF who stole something from a local, we lock him up in a cell for at least a month. Sometimes we take him to the police and say,

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83 Field interview, CJTF headquarters in the NITEL area, Maiduguri, January 2019.
84 Author’s interview with hotelkeeper in Wulari, Maiduguri, December 2017.
85 Author’s interview in with a CJTF driver in Damaturu, Yobe, September, 2017.
'This is our CJTF member. Let the law work on him.'"86 By keeping the discipline within the group, says Ali, the CJTF is well respected by the local community. To keep the discipline, leaders of the CJTF established some basic “rules of operations.” Members who joined the CJTF are required to take a sacred oath before the Qur’an (if they are Muslim) or the Bible (if they are Christian) that “they will identify the insurgents where ever found even if related to you.”87 The oath represents an inward commitment to abide by three tenets: “One, you will not accuse or implicate an innocent person who is not associated with Boko Haram because of whatever differences between you and them. Two, you must produce a member of Boko Haram, no matter how close they are to you; even if they are your family or brothers. Three, you will not extort money from anybody or take anybody’s property.”88

**CJTF: Nigeria’s Next Security Threat?**

Despite the celebratory discourses surrounding the counterinsurgency work of the CJTF in northeast Nigeria, mounting evidence suggests that some members of the group are abusing their power and access in the communities in which they serve. Such abuse can take several forms, for example, extorting money from motorists at checkpoints during “stop and search” operations; sexually abusing women and girls in camps for internally displaced persons; recruiting children into its counterinsurgent work; harassing members of the community; and acting as political thugs for self-serving politicians.89 In light of these practices, some critical questions have emerged:

- What will be the fate of the CJTF when/if Boko Haram is defeated?
- Could this CBAG of predominantly unwaged young men, desensitized to violence and accustomed to having a sense of power and purpose, pose a threat to the future of the region?

These questions have tempered the celebratory mood of the CJTF as “new national heroes” and prompted a more sober reassessment.

**Crime-fighting CBAGs: The case of Tanzania’s Sungusungu**

Several postcolonial states have encouraged CBAGs to take on community policing functions based on their local knowledge and/or perceived ability to be more effective than the state in instilling law and order.90 This section looks at the case of a crime-fighting CBAG as exemplified by the Sungusungu village groups in Tanzania.

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86 Author’s interview with Bakura Abba Ali, Maiduguri, September 2018.
87 Author’s interview with Bakura Abba Ali, Maiduguri, September 2018.
The Sungusungu is a form of village vigilism in rural Tanzania that emerged in the 1980s as an indigenous response to the widespread problem of cattle raiding and robbery and the failure of the law enforcement and justice system to prevent these crimes. Fed up with their situation, rural villages started organizing their own self-help groups called Sungusungu. From the beginning, the Sungusungu faced stiff opposition from the official police and courts, who saw them as a serious threat to the state’s administration of law enforcement and justice system; these officials argued that the Sungusungu was “attempting to turn the clock back to primitive punitive measures.” Over time, however, the effectiveness and popularity of the Sungusungu groups, combined with the growing dissatisfaction with the corrupt practices of the police, weakened the resistance to their activities. Ultimately, the state was forced to endorse the Sungusungu as a “revolutionary force within the villages that ought to be encouraged rather than harassed by bureaucracy.”

Dissatisfaction with the Police

The turn to the Sungusungu for law and order was an admission by the Tanzania government of the corruption and lack of trust in the police to deal with cattle theft. The local police routinely “demand a bribe before they will consent to investigate any complaint, and, having received it, they proceed to extort bribes from the alleged perpetrators and, having received those, will go on to demand more money from the complainant, and so on, until one or both sides are either broke or tire of the game.” This sentiment echoes the ways in which colonial police forces were frequently accused of supplementing their wages by extorting fowl, food, beer, and even women from the communities in which they worked (see Part 1). As with the British colonial state and its system of indirect rule, there was a perception among government officials that locals were best positioned to address security threats to their lives. In fact, “[t]he stated, and perhaps honestly intended, justification on the part of district government officials for the implementation of Sungusungu in the villages is that local people are the ones best equipped to identify the cattle thieves in their midst and bring them to justice—far better equipped, many argue, than the police, virtually all of them corrupt, all outsiders frequently contemptuous of local people and indifferent to their concerns.” The Sungusungu provided local communities with law enforcers who are members of the community and accountable to it.

Under government sponsorship and control, the Sungusungu were charged with the responsibility of policing cattle theft, with its hierarchy of village commanders accountable to government officials. As Fleisher explains, “[Sungusungu] village commanders were required to report to ward (kata) commanders, who reported to the divisional commanders, who in turn reported to their Division Officer, a district government official, who in turn reported direct to the District Commissioner, the district’s highest-ranking government officials.” As locals, the Sungusungu groups were ordinarily trusted by members of the villages they serviced, who generally saw them as providing an effective alternative to the corrupt,

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92 Ibid, 189–90.
93 Ibid, 189–90.
95 Ibid, 218.
96 Ibid, 214.
costly, and inept services of the formal police and courts. However, unlike the police, members of the Sungusungu could be voted out of office if they fail to consistently carry out their responsibilities because they are not “invulnerable to community sentiment.”97 Composed of men between ages 18 and 50, the Sungusungu routinely conduct house-to-house investigations, soliciting accusations against anyone suspected of cattle theft and seeking corroborating evidence from other accusers.98 Those found guilty of cattle theft are often handed over to the state police to be incarcerated while they awaited official investigation of their cases. Also, to enhance village security, members of the Sungusungu routinely conduct night-time patrols.

**Shortcomings of the Sungusungu**

Although the rise of the Sungusungu and its alliance with the police forces led to a dramatic reduction in the incidence of cattle-thieving, the group’s members succumbed to the same corrupt practices that undermined the official law enforcement agencies. For example, some Sungusungu village commanders were accused of soliciting pay-offs from cattle thieves in return for looking the other way. Other commanders were implicated in demanding advance payments from villagers who came to them with various security needs. After collecting these advance payments, the commanders made no efforts to perform the tasks. Others have actively cashed in on their privileged access to, and knowledge of, communal practices (for example, sleeping habits and security regimes) to weaponize their comrades in the cattle raiding business. In addition, some would incarcerate suspects, “sometimes for days, and beat them with a hippopotamus-hide whip.”99 All of these abuses notwithstanding, some villagers have argued that the Sungusungu is a “lesser evil” than the official police forces. These villagers are of the view that members of the Sungusungu often demand bribes that are considerably lower than those demanded by the police, and that, not infrequently, the Sungusungu delivers on its promise of security.

**State-manipulated CBAGs: The case of Kenya’s Mungiki**

The dynamics and drivers of CBAGs in contemporary Africa cannot be properly understood outside of “the instrumentality of electoral violence for the political elites.”100 Postcolonial states, including Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda, are awash with examples of politicians competing for the services of youth-based vigilantes, militias, and gangs as political thugs to intimidate political opponents, win elections, and tighten their grip on power. This section draws on existing literature to explain how some CBAGs are manipulated by political actors to target ethnic or political rivals, deploying ethnic violence as a tool for winning elections. In particular, it focuses on the Mungiki movement, a largely Kikuyu101-based religio-political gang in contemporary Kenya. It locates this movement within Kenya’s post-independence electoral politics and political violence, with a particular focus on how the state has been a key factor in the trans-
formation of the gang from a moral ethnic movement into a politically tribal one whose activities have “accentuated insecurity, violated human rights, and disrupted public order.”

**Organization and Politics of the Mungiki**

Formed in the late 1980s as a “principally cultural and spiritual movement promoting Kikuyu heritage and culture,” the Mungiki movement demonstrates a continuity with the religio-political revivalism and anti-colonial resistance in Kenya that dates back to the Mau Mau anticolonial war for “land and freedom” in the 1950s. The term Mungiki may be translated as “we are the public,” which implies that the movement seeks to reclaim the rights of the displaced, disaffected, and marginalized in a rapidly globalizing world. Most of the members of Mungiki are between the ages of 18 and 40 years. They were recruited from poor and disenfranchised Kikuyu youth from urban slums and other informal settlements and those displaced by land transition schemes of the 1990s.

Communal violence intensified in the wake of Kenya’s 2002 general election that ended Daniel Arap Moi’s 24-year rule (and brought in Mwai Kibaki), resulting in the death of up to 4,000 people and the displacement of 600,000 others. Although Kenyan authorities blamed the violence on the spontaneous consequence of the return to political pluralism, human rights organizations and other sources all pointed to the fact that the Kenyan government provoked the ethnic violence for political purposes and has been reluctant to address the spiraling violence. Government officials adopted a strategy of “informal repression” to “silence and disempower critics and to intimidate, displace and disenfranchise hostile voters in multi-ethnic electoral zones.” The outcome was a rise in bloody clashes implicating ethnic vigilantes and militias.

The Mungiki formed and mobilized in opposition to Moi’s government, especially its system of patrimonial rule. The Mungiki blamed Kenya’s problems on the influence of European colonialism and the injustices of state actors. Mungiki leaders yearned for a generational change in politics and a return to the traditional cultural values of egalitarianism and social order in precolonial society. Central to the Mungiki’s political and religious aims are poverty reduction, overcoming exclusion and marginalization, and tackling historical injustices. These themes reflect the marginalized position that many Mungiki members see themselves occupy within Kenyan society. In keeping with its struggle for the poor and the dispossessed, the Mungiki joined forces with other community-based groups in Nairobi, such as the Organization of the Villagers, in protesting corrupt land-grabbers and oppressive landlords. In poor

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105 Human Rights Watch, *Organized Violence in the Rift Valley*.
106 Kagwanja, “Facing Mount Kenya or Facing Mecca,” 36.
108 A community-based group established among slum dwellers in Nairobi to fight evictions and protect tenants.
parts of Nairobi where state services were nonexistent, members of the Mungiki became involved in social welfare activities, such as “setting up illegal electricity connections, providing access to water, and supplying micro-loans to its members [and] local vigilante groups to provide security in areas with high crime rates.”\textsuperscript{109} The Mungiki also launched a successful crusade against drunkenness, drug addiction, broken families, and prostitution.\textsuperscript{110}

However, the Mungiki’s unconventional approach to the struggle for social justice often exacerbated rather than addressed insecurity, including its reputation for extortion and political violence.\textsuperscript{111} Like the Mau Mau rebel movement, the Mungiki relies on strict discipline and tolerates no dissent\textsuperscript{112} in the promotion of its violent brand of Kikuyu chauvinism. An ex-member of the gang told prosecutors at the International Criminal Court (ICC) that “if a member disobeys, they would cut that member’s head off and put the head in public view at the place where they had a problem with the member.”\textsuperscript{113}

**Mungiki-State Relations**

At the outset, Kenyan government under Moi viewed the Mungiki as a secretive, anti-government, and anti-Christian group of criminals. Not surprisingly, the Mungiki’s relationship with the authorities, especially after 2002, was characterized by harassment, including “persecution, intimidation, jailing of its members, and gross human rights abuse.”\textsuperscript{114} Under Moi’s successor, Kibaki, the Kenyan police stood accused of “thousands of abductions and extrajudicial killings of Mungiki members.”\textsuperscript{115} The Mungiki countered with attacks of their own on government targets, especially state security forces who arrested their members and executed their leaders. “By resorting to confrontational methods,” argues Kagwanja, “Mungiki unwittingly provoked further confrontations with the police, drew negative coverage from the press and opened itself to further repression from the state.”\textsuperscript{116}

From 2000 onward, the Kenyan police cracked down on the Mungiki and infiltrated its ranks with the intention of monitoring and controlling its activities from within.\textsuperscript{117} Over time, the state co-opted the Mungiki, which became a political tool of violence, intimidation, and abuse of human rights in the slums and transit spaces of Nairobi, including organized crime, “extortion rackets, and gruesome punishments.”\textsuperscript{118} In 2003, Kenyan authorities banned the Mungiki after a 2002 clash with a rival gang that left 20 people dead. Yet the Mungiki remains strong due to its clandestine nature; its leaders maintain strong ties to leading politicians and pursue their own independent political agenda.\textsuperscript{119}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{109} Rasmussen, “Outwitting the Professor of Politics?” 437.
  \item \textsuperscript{110} Kagwanja, “Facing Mount Kenya or Facing Mecca.”
  \item \textsuperscript{111} Rasmussen, “Outwitting the Professor of Politics?”
  \item \textsuperscript{113} Goffard, “Court Sheds Light on Scary Kenya Gang.”
  \item \textsuperscript{114} Kagwanja, “Facing Mount Kenya or Facing Mecca.”
  \item \textsuperscript{115} Rasmussen, “Outwitting the Professor of Politics?” 438.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} Kagwanja, “Facing Mount Kenya or Facing Mecca.”
  \item \textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{118} Goffard, “Court Sheds Light on Scary Kenya Gang.”
  \item \textsuperscript{119} Human Rights Watch, *Organized Violence in the Rift Valley.*
\end{itemize}
In the aftermath of the disputed 2007 presidential election in Kenya, the Mungiki played a key role in the government-sponsored ethnic violence that killed more than 1,000 people. Its long-standing dispute with the Kenyan police notwithstanding, prosecutors at the ICC claim that the police allowed Mungiki members to conduct house-to-house searches, targeting mostly Luo supporters of the opposition’s presidential candidate Raila Odinga, a Kikuyu, who claims that the election was rigged against him. Kenyan authorities rounded up and killed 500 young men believed to be linked to the Mungiki, but these killings only provoked more reprisal attacks from the brutal criminal gang.

The media and public discourse accept the state’s perception of the Mungiki as violent and dangerous; personal narratives by members of the Mungiki present the movement as a victim of state harassment and highlight their position on the margins of Kenyan society.

CONCLUSIONS

A state-centric approach to security governance in East and West Africa is less useful to explain the complex relations between CBAGs and the formal state, particularly the roles and responsibilities that each assumes in security provision and service delivery. Ideal-type models of well-functioning states are unlikely to accurately reflect governance in African societies where formal institutions are often absent or ineffective and have been replaced by local security groups and hybrid security arrangements. Moreover, a state-centric approach is likely to undermine the potential of local actors for security and service delivery.

The emergence of CBAGs does not necessarily spell doom for the power and authority of the state; it can help to expand and complement the state or rebuild trust in formal state institutions. A hybrid security approach has the advantage of helping to build up the sense of local ownership and agency for managing various security threats to their daily lives. A hybrid security approach that recognizes and supports the roles and responsibilities of CBAGs as coproviders of security and justice can strengthen the capacity of weak states to govern and to maintain a strong base in social forces. Although local security providers may be thought of as alternatives to weak or failing states, CBAGs as a phenomenon generally aim for “more state, not less state.” More often than not, their goal is to prop up a weak state by taking on some of its functions.

Acknowledging the effective role and responsibilities of CBAGs with respect to the delivery of security and other public goods, however, involves recognizing their limitations and debunking any tendency to romanticize them as the panacea to Africa’s insecurity. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that CBAGs

120 The Luo is an ethnic group in Western Kenya, northern Uganda, and the Mara region in northern Tanzania.
122 Rasmussen, “Outwitting the Professor of Politics?” 445.
123 Ibid.
are capable of morphing from the protector of local communities to the primary threat to those communities, replicating the same weaknesses that plague formal state institutions, such as the abuse of power. This was certainly the case with the Mungiki of Kenya. Sometimes, CBAGs may cash in on their powerful presence in local communities and abuse the civilians they are supposed to protect. This dynamic, in turn, undermines the order and security they initially sought to uphold. States may also use CBAGs to perpetuate certain types of violence against civilians.124 The challenge for researchers and practitioners is to recognize and build on the positive potential of CBAGs, while mitigating their negative potential.

Early and ongoing oversight and accountability mechanisms by local authorities, such as the traditional and state authorities, can reduce the chances that CBAGs will morph into predators.125 Furthermore, the rise of CBAGs establishes the need for state forces (including the police) that are part of the community and accountable to it; state security forces need to understand the local culture and language of the communities they serve. This reform will help to develop the trust, reciprocity, and local legitimacy of the police and courts system, which, although lacking in many contexts, remains a sine qua non for effective and responsible security provision. Any effort to address the issue of CBAGs must include reconfiguring the everyday culture and practice of bribery, corruption, and abusive policing in Africa.

125 International Crisis Group, Double-Edged Sword, 7.
SOURCES


APPROACHING COMMUNITY-BASED ARMED GROUPS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Lessons Learned & Measures of Success

Dr. Moritz Schuberth
ABOUT THIS REPORT

This report was written and researched by Dr. Moritz Schuberth. Several members of the RESOLVE Network Secretariat contributed to this report’s development, including Ms. Bethany McGann, Research & Project Manager; Ms. Boglarka Bozsogi, Research and Communications Coordinator; Ms. Kateira Aryaeinejad, Research and Project Manager; and Ms. Leanne Erdberg, Interim Executive Director. RESOLVE would like to thank the reviewers of this report and the members of the RESOLVE Network Research Advisory Council who lent their support and guidance. Finally, RESOLVE would like to thank the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Africa Bureau for its generous support for this report and RESOLVE’s research initiative on Community-Based Armed Groups in Sub-Saharan Africa.

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Dr. Schuberth completed his Ph.D. in Peace and Conflict Studies on the challenge of coordinating stabilization, conflict resolution and statebuilding efforts in fragile and conflict-affected states. He has contributed to a Department of Defense white paper on the implications of cultural cognitive diversity on decision-making and planning, and his research has been used to train US special forces in conflict resolution. He is the author of recent articles in Africa Spectrum; the Journal of Eastern African Studies, Conflict, Security & Development; the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development; Contemporary Security Policy; Stability: International Journal of Security and Development; International Peacekeeping; and Environment and Urbanization.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose of this study

A surge in the prevalence of community-based armed groups (CBAGs) in sub-Saharan Africa has led to concerns that they pose a growing challenge to governments and citizens across the region. This paper maps how different intervening actors—communities, governments, civil society organizations, humanitarian and development agencies, and security providers—have approached the challenges posed by CBAGs and how to best measure the success of these interventions. The mapping of approaches, analysis of lessons learned, and identification of success factors will contribute to a deeper empirical understanding of the strengths and shortcomings of current responses to CBAGs, which will inform the development of more effective and appropriate practices and policies.

EMT approaches to CBAGs

CBAGs typically fulfill security, political, and economic functions simultaneously. However, three main ideal types of CBAGs can be discerned. Depending on the main function that they fulfill at a given point, they can be classified as (1) vigilantes providing security for their communities, (2) militias working at the behest of political sponsors, or (3) criminal gangs pursuing the economic self-interest of their members. Approaches to CBAGs can be categorized as following three different logics: engagement, management, and transformation (EMT).

- **Engagement** follows a short-term logic; actors pursuing this approach do so for instrumental reasons, that is, because they want to ensure the safety of their own staff members while implementing their projects or because they want to promote mediation and reduce violence within communities.

- **Management** approaches follow a mid-term logic as actors envision a substantive change in the targeted groups. Coercive management approaches include the use of force to defeat CBAGs or incarcerate their members. Cooperative management approaches strive to alter the behavior and roles of CBAGs through co-optation, negotiation, or mediation.

- **Transformation** follows a long-term logic and refers to a set of approaches to replace the functions that CBAGs provide to their members, sponsors, and the communities they are nested in with a modern and accountable state bound by the rule of law. Transformation addresses the root causes and structural conditions that led to the emergence of the CBAG ecosystem. This goal is difficult to achieve because it requires lengthy commitments and buy-in from multiple actors.
KEY FINDINGS

Metrics to measure the success of EMT approaches

Given the multiple confounding factors and overlapping interventions, it is difficult to measure results of EMT approaches, attribute them to specific interventions, and evaluate their impacts. This report proposes a set of specific indicators that intervening actors and interested third parties could use to measure the progress of EMT interventions in meeting their objectives. For instance, a program seems to be on the right track to achieve improved community security if data show an increase in the percentage of the population perceiving increased security and decreased violent incidents in their communities.

CBAGs and the legitimacy of the state

Current literature proposes that state fragility is a key cause for the emergence of CBAGs. However, the concept of state fragility does not offer a universal explanation for the proliferation of such groups, notably in the case of relatively strong states characterized by a high degree of inequality, including South Africa. In such settings, those living in the most affluent parts of the main cities often enjoy or leverage functioning protection by police and private security firms; however, those living in neglected areas are denied access to formal security systems and so turn to CBAGs, which act as informal security providers. Accordingly, it is important for intervening actors not to focus exclusively on state-building efforts, because these might not address the root causes that lead to the emergence of CBAGs.

From CBAGs to community security providers?

Although vigilantes have regularly turned into political militias or predatory criminals, there are also examples of CBAGs with a strong security function that have averted such a devolution. This report identifies potential success factors—including the presence of oversight procedures, a binding legal framework, and accountability mechanisms—that intervening actors may consider when designing strategies to alter the internal and external characteristics of CBAGs to reinforce their constructive potential and limit their destructive potential. These success factors can help to turn multidimensional CBAGs into more accountable, capable, and rule-abiding providers of community security.

Challenge of coordinating EMT interventions

The coordination of EMT interventions can be challenging due to a lack of policy coherence and because various intervening actors pursue conflicting strategies toward CBAGs. Moreover, different intervening actors, such as armed forces and humanitarian agencies, show diverging attitudes to coordinating EMT approaches. Coherence and coordination between the multitude of actors involved in the EMT of CBAGs is important for the overall outcome of interventions and for the security of intervening actors and beneficiary communities. Moreover, improved interagency coordination can help pool existing resources and use them in a more efficient and sustainable way by streamlining efforts and diversifying funding sources.
INTRODUCTION

A surge in the emergence and operations of community-based armed groups (CBAGs) in sub-Saharan Africa has led to concerns that they pose a growing challenge to governments and citizens across the region. Communities, governments, civil society organizations, humanitarian and development agencies, and security providers in these and other settings have developed a wide variety of approaches to deal with them. CBAGs are defined as armed groups that are embedded within communities and whose delineation can be defined by territory, blood ties, or shared identities; this definition includes vigilantes, militias, and criminal gangs.

How have local, national, and international actors approached the challenge posed by CBAGs and how successful have these approaches been? This study seeks to provide an overview of policy-relevant findings from the vast literature on approaches to CBAGs and to offer metrics to assess the success of completed or ongoing initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa. The mapping of approaches, analysis of lessons learned, and identification of success factors will contribute to a deeper empirical understanding of responses to the proliferation of CBAGs, which will inform the development of more effective and appropriate practices and policies. The core research questions pursued by this mapping paper are as follows:

- What approaches have states, civil society, and international actors pursued to engage, manage, and transform CBAGs in sub-Saharan Africa?
- What lessons learned and success factors can be identified from the literature on approaches to engage, manage, and transform CBAGs in sub-Saharan Africa?
- What metrics can help measure the success of approaches to engage, manage, and transform CBAGs in sub-Saharan Africa?

The primary data collection instrument used was an in-depth desk review of the academic and gray literature on approaches to CBAGs. In addition to academic articles, we consulted documents produced by governments, civil society organizations, think tanks, and international agencies, including terms of reference, guidelines, lessons learned or best practices, evaluations and audits of projects, factsheets, and internal reports. We used keyword searches to identify initial source material and subsequently employed snowball sampling by looking up citations from the initial sources. The academic and gray literature on the topics and approaches covered by this mapping paper was too extensive to be elaborated in its entirety. However, an in-depth review of the most relevant publications by the foremost experts and institutions in this field pointed to the most pertinent literature.

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Functions and ideal types of CBAGs

In contrast to many non-state armed groups (NSAGs), CBAGs are by definition embedded within their communities, whose delineation can be defined by territory, blood ties, or shared identities. The concept of CBAGs excludes formal security providers, such as private security and military companies. Politically motivated NSAGs like insurgents and terrorists are also excluded from the concept of CBAGs because NSAGs are ideologically or religiously driven and aspire to take over the state to establish another political system. CBAGs do not primarily pursue a political mission; if they are pulled into the political sphere, they act on behalf of political entrepreneurs whose political aims are parochial in nature.2

Although CBAGs typically fill multiple functions simultaneously, three ideal types can be discerned, depending on their predominant function. As table 1 shows, depending on the main function that CBAGs fulfill at a given point, they can be classified as vigilantes providing security for their community, as militias working on behest of political sponsors, or as criminal gangs pursuing the economic self-interest of their members.3 Each ideal type can be subdivided into two subtypes. It is important to note that the distinctions among different ideal types and subtypes of CBAGs can be blurred, and the functions are constantly shifting, depending on external factors and internal motivations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUNCTION</th>
<th>SECURITY</th>
<th>POLITICS</th>
<th>ECONOMIC/CRIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDEAL TYPES</td>
<td>VIGILANTES</td>
<td>MILITIAS</td>
<td>GANGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBTYPES</td>
<td>CRIME-CONTROL GROUPS</td>
<td>SELF-DEFENSE MILITIAS</td>
<td>ETHNIC MILITIAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXAMPLES</td>
<td>BAKASSI BOYS (NIGERIA)</td>
<td>MAI MAI (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO)</td>
<td>WHITE ARMY (SOUTH SUDAN)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author.


3 Ibid.
• **Vigilantes** can be further subdivided into crime control groups directed internally at members of their own communities,\(^4\) such as the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria,\(^5\) and self-defense groups protecting communities against external threats,\(^6\) such as the Mai Mai and Raia Mutomboki in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.\(^7\)

• **Militias** can base their claims to legitimacy on notions of ethnicity and kin- or clan-based identity, such as the Nuer White Army in South Sudan,\(^8\) or on an ideology that evokes the image of a common enemy of the masses, such as the popular militias made up of the youth wing of ZANU PF, Zimbabwe’s ruling party since independence.\(^9\)

• **Gangs** have two subtypes. First, youth gangs such as the so-called “microbes” in the Ivorian capital of Abidjan are conventionally associated with petty crime and a subculture of juvenile delinquency rather than with organized criminality.\(^10\) Second, the more organized and institutionalized criminal gangs, such as the “Americans” or the “Hard Livings” in South Africa’s Cape Town, include members of various age cohorts and are committed to profit-generating criminal activities, including drug trafficking.\(^11\)

## QUESTIONING COMMON ASSUMPTIONS

### Challenging the centrality of state fragility

The emergence of CBAGs is a common theme that runs through the literature on state failure, state weakness, state collapse, and state fragility. Studies in this tradition commonly frame the proliferation of CBAGs within the context of war-torn, conflict-prone, or post-conflict societies, where basic state responsibilities, such as the provision of security, “fall into the hands of those who will fight for it—warlords and gang leaders.”\(^12\) From this point of view, the failure or collapse of the Westphalian state system since the

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end of the Cold War has resulted in the state’s loss of the monopoly on the legitimate means of violence.\textsuperscript{13} However, an emerging pool of scholars contest the very concept of state failure as conceptually flawed, historically ill-informed, and culturally biased; they argue that it presents contemporary liberal Western democracies as the universal role model, even for countries where such an archetype never existed and is unlikely to take root.\textsuperscript{14}

CBAGS are also present in a number of relatively strong, viable, and modern states.\textsuperscript{15} South Africa, for instance, ranks in the upper-middle range in the Fragile States Index\textsuperscript{16} and in the State Fragility Index\textsuperscript{17}, but it is frequently listed among the ten most unequal in the world.\textsuperscript{18} In the context of such strong but unequal states, not all citizens are equally affected by the state’s inability or unwillingness to provide security. Those living in the most affluent parts of the main cities often enjoy or leverage functioning protection by police and private security firms, while those living in neglected areas are denied access to formal security systems and turn to CBAGs as informal security providers.\textsuperscript{19} In both fragile and strong states, the marginalized populations living in areas of limited statehood turn to alternative systems of justice and security.\textsuperscript{20}

From state security to hybrid security governance

The focus on state fragility is also reflected in traditional notions of national security or state security that see military security as contingent on the capability of governments to fend off internal and external threats to the nation-state. However, a growing number of non-traditional issues has also been securitized as existential threats, such as migration flows or climate change.\textsuperscript{21} The broadening of the security framework to encompass referent objects other than national or state security has ushered in a shift in the dominant security paradigm.\textsuperscript{22} This shift has been captured most prominently in the concept of human secu-

\begin{itemize}
\item South Africa was ranked 86th out of 178 countries. See The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index 2018. http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/.
\item See The World Bank, GINI Index. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.POV.GINI?page. The GINI Index looks at the distribution of a country’s income or wealth, where 0 represents complete equality and 100 total inequality. South Africa has a high Gini coefficient of 63.
\end{itemize}
rity, which includes both “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want.” However, the all-encompassing definition of human security, including positive and negative rights and freedoms, has been criticized as too vague, which makes it difficult for policy makers to prioritize certain threats over others.

In the context of CBAGs, the concept of community security might be more useful because it bridges the gap between initiatives focusing on the state-level and those focusing on the individual as a starting point. Community security can be conceptualized both as an end state and as the process leading to this end state. When seen as an end state, community security “is the situation in which communities feel secure from threats exerted by violent conflict [...], crime, and a lack of protection [...] by the state.” When understood as a process, community security “means that communities participate in identifying and prioritizing their security needs, as well as in the development and implementation of appropriate responses for their security needs.” In other words, community members are both the beneficiaries and agents of human security. From this perspective, improved community security as an end state can be seen as the overall goal of EMT approaches to CBAG; EMT approaches can be considered as community security in its conception as a process.

From security providers to sources of insecurity

Following justified critiques of failed states and national security paradigms, the focus of attention has shifted to community security arrangements that provide security “from below” or “from the perspective of end users.” Although acknowledging that such hybrid security arrangements include militias and organized crime groups, advocates stress the relatively effective provision of security by CBAGs, compared to state security actors and the higher local legitimacy these groups enjoy. From this perspective, CBAGs might offer the best available option for effective justice and security provision in the short term. At the same time, CBAGs might be seen as more legitimate due to their strong links to local cultural practices and their greater alignment with the social attitudes and norms of their communities. In the absence of strong oversight and accountability mechanisms, however, CBAGs might transform from security providers into sources of insecurity.

The literature on vigilantism portrays a general shift in motivation that turns conscientious vigilantes providing security for their communities into self-interested criminal gangs or state-sponsored militias. In the context of sub-Saharan Africa, studies have warned that “most of the time, they turn criminals, besides the mandate given to them by the community to keep vigil in the neighborhood” and that in Kenya, among other places, “vigilantes can turn into gangs, and gangs can turn into armed militia.” However, this paper identifies cases of CBAGs, including Arrow Boys in Uganda, that did not turn into predatory gangs or militias due to external factors, such as strong state oversight or a conducive legal framework. The transformation of vigilantes into sources of community insecurity is, therefore, not the inevitable trajectory of CBAGs.

**Standard tools as the universal panacea**

Over recent decades, numerous national and international actors have developed a set of standard tools to engage, manage, and transform CBAGs. The use of such “one-size-fits-all” tools has practical advantages, but it can also be ill-suited when applied to new settings and across circumstances. Important differences exist, for instance, between urban and rural-based armed groups, or between CBAGs that emerged in response to petty criminals compared to those that formed to combat violent extremist groups. Yet, national and international actors have been slow to adapt to the new operational environment of cities where CBAGs are present, such as Nairobi, Kenya, or Beni, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

In Haiti’s capital city of Port-au-Prince, a United Nations Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH) attempted to deal with urban CBAGs in the same way as rural rebels in Central Africa. Due to poor understanding of the context and nature of CBAGs in Haiti, MINUSTAH was initially tasked with implementing a traditional disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program despite the fact that the conflict environment was not conducive to such an endeavor. When the failure of this initial strategy became clear, MINUSTAH changed its approach to a more adapted Community Violence Reduction (CVR) program. The CVR program focused on disincentivizing at-risk sections of the population from joining Haiti’s CBAGs, which have more in common with street gangs than with rural rebel forces—the conventional targets

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of DDR.\textsuperscript{39} Even though the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations viewed CVRs as a role model for DDR efforts in UN stabilization missions in Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, and South Sudan, others questioned how an approach tailored to urban gangs could be applied to rural armed groups.\textsuperscript{40}

MAPPING EMT APPROACHES TO CBAGS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Logic behind approaches to CBAGs

Over the past decade, policy circles have increasingly debated how international agencies working in post-conflict countries should deal with NSAGs,\textsuperscript{41} especially in fragile and conflict-affected states.\textsuperscript{42} For instance, Stedman counted three strategies employed by intervening actors vis-à-vis “spoilers”—groups who use violence to undermine peace for their own interest. The three strategies are inducement, coercion, and socialization. Inducement involves “giving the spoiler what it wants,” and coercive strategies rely on the “use or threat of punishment to deter or alter unacceptable spoiler behavior.”\textsuperscript{43} Socialization combines carrots and sticks by constructing norms and values that define what behavior is acceptable and what demands are legitimate, thereby altering the ecosystem in which spoilers operate.\textsuperscript{44}

Although the concept of spoilers had initially been limited to contexts in which a peace agreement between two warring factions had been signed, it has since been applied more liberally to a range of NSAGs\textsuperscript{45} and even to organized crime groups.\textsuperscript{46} As an example, Hofmann and Schneckener categorized strategies toward NSAGs as bargaining, force/leverage, and persuasion, which can be seen as representing Stedman’s inducement, coercion, and socialization, as depicted in table 2.\textsuperscript{47} In contrast to Stedman’s


\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.


typology, however, Hofmann and Schneckener propose that force/leverage “involve a mixture of sticks and carrots,” thereby classifying bribery and talks with moderate elements within NSAGs as coercive.48

Table 2  Timeframes, Objectives, and Examples of EMT Approaches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPROACH</th>
<th>ENGAGEMENT</th>
<th>MANAGEMENT</th>
<th>TRANSFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TIMEFRAME</td>
<td>SHORT-TERM</td>
<td>MID-TERM</td>
<td>LONG-TERM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVES</td>
<td>SAFE ACCESS; IMPROVED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMUNITIES AND CBAGS</td>
<td>CHANGE IN ROLE, REACH, AND BEHAVIOR OF CBAGS</td>
<td>CHANGE ROOT CAUSES AND STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS OF THE CBAG ECOSYSTEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXAMPLES</td>
<td>BARAZA COMMUNAUTAIRES AND ACCESS NEGOTIATIONS BY ICRC AND MSF IN EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO</td>
<td>TALKS WITH GRANDS TRAFIQUANTS IN MALI; CO-OPTATION OF CJTF BY NIGERIAN STATE</td>
<td>DDR, SSR, AND CVR IN UN STABILIZATION MISSIONS IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, AND MALI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LITERATURE ON SPOILERS (STEDMAN, 1997)</td>
<td>INDUCEMENT</td>
<td>COERCION</td>
<td>SOCIALIZATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LITERATURE ON NSAGS (SCHNECKENER, 2009)</td>
<td>BARGAINING</td>
<td>FORCE/LEVERAGE</td>
<td>PERSUASION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author.

It may seem logical to include both cooperative and coercive aspects under the banner of force/leverage, but we propose to use the overall term management for these two approaches to alter the behavior of CBAGs. We use engagement instead of bargaining or inducement for approaches that do not attempt to change the behavior of CBAGs, and transformation instead of socialization or persuasion for approaches that try to alter the structural conditions of the CBAG ecosystem. The terminology of engagement, management, and transformation (EMT) acknowledges the spectrum of available responses to CBAGs beyond

standard tools such as DDR and SSR, as well as the different timeframes during which intervening actors can reasonably be expected to focus their EMT efforts on specific CBAGs. These timeframes range from short-term engagement to long-term transformation.

**Engagement**

Engagement follows a short-term logic; actors pursue this approach for instrumental reasons, because they want to ensure the safety of their own staff members while implementing their projects or to promote dialogue between CBAGs and their respective communities. Engagement refers, for instance, to traditional community conflict resolution systems, such as barazas communautaires in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Another example of engagement is provided by humanitarian and development actors, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or Médecins sans Frontières (MSF); these groups implement projects in CBAG-controlled areas of Democratic Republic of Congo and need to engage members of such groups to gain safe access for their staff members. Although this approach does not seek to alter the behavior or structural environment of CBAGs, it can inadvertently strengthen their autonomy vis-à-vis the state or the communities in which they are based if intervening actors provide financial or in-kind compensation in exchange for safe access.

**Management**

Management approaches follow a mid-term logic, envisaging a substantive change of the targeted groups; they aim to directly impact the role, reach, and behavior of CBAGs, by either coercive or cooperative means.

Coercive management approaches involve security forces and include the use of force to defeat CBAGs or incarcerate their members, such as militarized police raids against gangs in South Africa. If coercive approaches indiscriminately target the communities in which CBAGs are based, they can unintentionally weaken the legitimacy of the state and strengthen the links between CBAGs and their communities, as happened with organized gangs in Cape Town.

Cooperative management approaches strive to alter the behavior and roles of CBAGs by way of co-optation, negotiation, or mediation. In Mali, for instance, local leaders involved in illicit economies (grands trafiquants) were invited to take part in the negotiations between the government and Tuareg rebel leaders.
groups. In the Central African Republic, local mediation between ex-Séléka rebels and anti-Balaka self-defense groups was more successful than international and regional mediation efforts. Negotiation and mediation can improve the positive behavior of CBAGs, but they can also strengthen their legitimacy. Co-optation, by contrast, can strengthen the legitimacy of both the state and CBAGs; it can also lead to the uprooting of CBAGs and to more abusive behavior vis-à-vis their communities, as happened with the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) as a result of co-optation by the Nigerian state.

Transformation

Transformation refers to a set of approaches that aim to replace the functions that CBAGs fulfill for their members, their sponsors, and the communities they are nested in with a modern and accountable state bound by the rule of law. According to the logic of transformation, this can be achieved by breaking the patronage between CBAGs and their politico-criminal sponsors through demobilization, disengagement, and reintegration (DDR), by strengthening state security forces through security sector reform (SSR), and by using community violence reduction (CVR) to cut the ties between CBAGs and their communities. As an example, the UN stabilization missions in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mali all employed a combination of DDR, SSR, and CVR, with varying degrees of success. Following a long-term logic, transformation seeks to address the root causes and structural conditions that led to the emergence of the CBAG ecosystem. This approach requires lengthy commitment timeframes and the buy-in of local, national, and international actors.

By crossing the EMT framework with the three functions of CBAGs, we developed an intervention matrix of standard approaches to CBAGs. As table 3 shows, the intervention matrix lists the standard tools routinely employed to deal with CBAGs. The matrix is derived from theoretical conceptualization based on an extensive review of the literature. It is feasible and important to coordinate strategies along the y-axis to ensure that the E, M, or T approach tackles all three functions of CBAGs, for instance, by combining SSR, DDR, and CVR. By contrast, coordination along the x-axis—for instance, between coercive and cooperative approaches to manage CBAGs—is difficult because the different approaches follow conflicting institutional logics.

55 Kyle Dietrich, 'When We Can’t See the Enemy, Civilians Become the Enemy’: Living Through Nigeria’s Six-Year Insurgency (Washington, DC: Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2015).
Table 3  Standard Tools Employed by Intervening Actors to Deal with CBAGs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUNCTION OF CBAGS</th>
<th>APPROACHES TO CBAGS</th>
<th>MANAGEMENT</th>
<th>TRANSFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SECURITY</td>
<td>HIRE CBAGS AS SECURITY PROVIDERS</td>
<td>DEFEAT CBAGS (PACIFICATION)</td>
<td>REPLACE CBAGS WITH POLICE (SSR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLITICS</td>
<td>ENTER CBAG-CONTROLLED AREAS WITH CSOS</td>
<td>GAIN LOCAL SUPPORT (COUNTER-INSURGENCY)</td>
<td>NEGOTIATE WITH CBAGS (POWER SHARING)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMICS/Crime</td>
<td>SIDELINE CBAGS IN COMMUNITY PLATFORMS</td>
<td>INCARCERATE CBAG MEMBERS (WAR ON GANGS)</td>
<td>MEDIATE BETWEEN CBAGS (GANG TRUCES)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author.

Measures of success of EMT interventions

Among the desired results of EMT approaches are a protective rather than predatory behavior vis-à-vis local communities; a sustainable approach; identification of all key stakeholders and coordination among implementing partners; respect for the principles of conflict sensitivity; and adherence of CBAGs to good governance standards and norms, such as human rights and the rule of law. Given multiple confounding factors and overlapping interventions, it is difficult to measure results, attribute them to specific interventions, and evaluate their impacts.\(^57\) Table 4 provides an example of potential indicators that intervening actors and interested third parties could use to measure the impact of EMT interventions.

Although the overall goal of EMT approaches is an improvement in community security for the populations living in areas where CBAGs are present, each EMT approach has its specific objective. Engagement focuses on ensuring safe access for intervening actors to areas with CBAGs; coercive management aims to reduce the reach and legitimacy of CBAGs; cooperative management strives to improve the treatment of local populations by CBAGs; and transformation aspires to render CBAGs obsolete for their members, sponsors, and communities. Table 4 proposes two specific indicators each to measure the progress in achieving the overall goal and the four objectives. For instance, a program seems to be on the right track to achieve improved community security if data show an increase in the percentage of the population

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perceiving security in their communities and a decrease in the number of violent incidents reported in the communities.

Table 4  Indicators to Measure Results of Different Approaches to CBAGs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESULTS</th>
<th>INDICATORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| GOAL: IMPROVED COMMUNITY SECURITY FOR POPULATION LIVING IN AREAS WITH CBAGS | INDICATOR 1: PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION PERCEIVING (IN)SECURITY IN THEIR COMMUNITY  
INDICATOR 2: NUMBER OF VIOLENT INCIDENTS REPORTED |
| OBJECTIVE 1 (ENGAGEMENT): SAFE ACCESS FOR INTERVENING ACTORS TO AREAS WITH CBAGS | INDICATOR 1.1: PERCENTAGE OF STAFF OF HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT ACTORS PERCEIVING SAFE ACCESS TO AREAS WITH CBAGS  
INDICATOR 1.2: NUMBER AND FREQUENCY OF ATTACKS ON STAFF MEMBERS OF HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT ACTORS |
| OBJECTIVE 2 (COERCIVE MANAGEMENT): REDUCED REACH AND LEGITIMACY OF CBAGS | INDICATOR 2.1: NUMBER OF PEOPLE LIVING IN COMMUNITIES WITH CBAGS  
INDICATOR 2.2: PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION PERCEIVING CBAGS AS LEGITIMATE |
| OBJECTIVE 3 (COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT): BETTER TREATMENT OF POPULATION IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES BY CBAGS | INDICATOR 3.1: PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION PERCEIVING CBAGS AS POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE FORCES IN COMMUNITIES  
INDICATOR 3.2: NUMBER OF REPORTED INCIDENTS OF ABUSIVE BEHAVIOR BY CBAGS TO COMMUNITIES |
| OBJECTIVE 4 (TRANSFORMATION): OBsolescence of CBAGS FOR MEMBERS, SPONSORS, AND COMMUNITIES | INDICATOR 4.1: NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF CBAGS  
INDICATOR 4.2: PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION PERCEIVING STATE SECURITY PROVISION AS SUFFICIENT WITHIN COMMUNITIES |

Source: Author.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM EMT APPROACHES

Intervening actors should not export standard templates, such as DDR, from one setting to another. Interventions should reflect contextual variation and focus on the predominant functions of the targeted CBAGs, following a thorough context analysis and actor mapping. Yet, keeping in mind the limitations of blueprints, the findings of this report entail a number of implications for the engagement, management, and transformation of CBAGs, precisely because of the high probability that past experiences will be influential.

Lessons learned from short-term engagement

Although CBAGs rarely control territory in a comprehensive manner or operate in the total absence of government services, the civilian populations living in areas where CBAGs operate often suffer from limited access to basic services, such as security provision, health care, or education. Under these circumstances, national or international actors whose mandate is to provide basic services need to engage
members of CBAGs to gain safe access for their staff members to the areas of operation. Some intervening actors choose to provide CBAGs with financial or in-kind rewards in exchange for safe access to their areas of operation. In Somalia, for instance, aid agencies hired armed clan-based militias to provide protection or to transport food to insecure areas.\(^{58}\) Research has shown that this can have adverse effects, however, because it might reinforce the destructive tendencies of CBAGs.\(^{59}\)

To ensure that aid reaches the most vulnerable sectors of the population, national or international actors could try to enter the strongholds of CBAGs with civil society representatives, since these actors frequently command considerable authority, even vis-à-vis armed groups. Yet, there is often no clear-cut distinction between peaceful civil society organizations and armed criminals, as exemplified by district water committees in Somalia acting on behalf of warlords rather than representing their communities.\(^{60}\) Some intervening actors have decided to work only with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) registered with the ministries in charge of their authorization; however, this approach can be problematic because it might exclude credible civil society organizations that have been banned for political reasons.\(^{61}\)

Another approach is to include CBAGs in community platforms as representatives of one sector among others, such as business, education, health, culture, and religion. Doing so can give CBAG leaders the impression that their rule over their territory and the functions they fulfill are respected; actually, however, these leaders are sidelined by the other actors that dominate the decision-making within the platforms. In the same vein, actors with existing relations with CBAGs can facilitate safe access so that other actors are able to implement development projects and deliver humanitarian aid. As an example, the international NGO Medair used well-connected intermediaries, such as medical professionals and traditional leaders, to gather security information and negotiate with military and armed groups to gain access for their staff members to deliver aid in conflict-affected zones of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s Ituri province.\(^{62}\)

Apart from humanitarian or development actors establishing platforms, communities regularly use or revive traditional conflict mediation institutions to engage CBAGs and enhance community cohesion, often with the support of state authorities.\(^{63}\) Such traditional structures of community conflict mediation aim to promote reconciliation, reinforce reciprocal trust among communities, and prevent local conflicts between CBAGs. In the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, a government initiative reinstalled large meetings called baraza communautaires to discuss issues among representatives from different communities and elect local peace committees. However, while the baraza and peace

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62 Pottier, “Roadblock Ethnography,” 166.
63 Verkore, Willems, Kleingeld, and Rouw, “From DDR to Security Promotion,” 5.
committees initially succeeded in resolving ethnic disputes and reducing cases of ethnic violence, they broke down due to internal conflicts and community perceptions that they were under the influence of armed groups. Accordingly, it is important for community-level institutions engaging CBAGs not to be perceived as too close to such groups lest they lose their legitimacy among the population.

Lessons learned from mid-term management

Compared to the short-term engagement of CBAGs, management approaches vis-à-vis CBAGs follow a mid-term logic and envisage a substantive change in the behavior or nature of the targeted groups. Coercive management approaches involve security forces and heavy-handed measures to defeat CBAGs or incarcerate their members, for instance, militarized police raids against gangs in South Africa. Actors pursuing cooperative management approaches, by contrast, strive to alter the behavior and roles of CBAGs. Such changes can be achieved by negotiating with CBAGs, as happened with grands trafiquants in Mali; mediating between them, as occurred the Central African Republic between ex-Séléka rebels and anti-Balaka self-defense groups; or co-opting them, as done in the Nigerian state with the CJTF.

Coercive Approaches

When CBAGs are perceived as threats to the state, coercive management approaches by state security forces include forceful raids, as well as the mass incarceration of presumed CBAG members. Security forces using pacification or counterinsurgency (COIN) methods—sometimes applied coercively—to target the political function of CBAGs—aim to win “hearts and minds” by “competing with the insurgent for influence and control at the grassroots level.” COIN utilized in this manner is seen primarily as a “political strategy” that needs to focus on building “the political legitimacy and effectiveness—in the eyes of its people and the international community—of a government affected by an insurgency.”

CBAGs with a less antagonistic relationship with state authority can also face coercion, however. In Côte d’Ivoire, for instance, traditional hunters from the North called dozo underwent a state-sanctioned transition to a nationwide private security force, but they were later banned when they became caught up in power struggles at the national level.

Coercive approaches to CBAGs, such as COIN operations or mass incarcerations, have important limitations. Local communities will feel further alienated if their experiences with state agencies are limited to military raids that result in civilian casualties due to stray bullets. This result can have the unintended effect of driving local people to support or join CBAGs “because they are alienated by heavy-handed

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65 Lamb, “Police Militarisation and the ‘War on Crime’ in South Africa.”
68 Ibid, 265.
actions of the intervening force.”70 Thus, coercive approaches might inadvertently contribute to further alienation of marginalized communities from an already delegitimized state, thereby allowing CBAGs to position themselves as legitimate defenders of the communities against abusive state security forces. For instance, organized gangs in the Cape Flats section in South Africa’s Cape Town provide protection for residents against rival gangs. Many perceive these gangs as more legitimate than law enforcement agencies, associated with violent raids that lead to the deaths of local youths.71

Refocusing the efforts of the security and judicial sectors to combat high-scale organized crime and corrupted sections of the political elite that instrumentalize CBAGs for their own benefit has been found to be more effective in the long term than simply containing the marginalized sections of society.72 Moreover, a key feature of COIN is the building of effective and legitimate local security forces that are able to provide “population-centric security.”73 In practice, doing this involves the “creation of self-defending populations through community-based security measures, such as local neighborhood watch and guard forces.”74 Yet, the use of CBAGs as a stop-gap form of law enforcement or as informal defense forces against other NSAGs can unintentionally contribute to the delegitimization of the state and the legitimization of abusive actors that lack oversight, accountability, or internal control mechanisms and are therefore prone to turn on their own communities.

**Cooperative Approaches**

The collaboration of CBAGs and the state as part of COIN interventions is but one example of the multiple types of connections between CBAGs and state actors. Government officials from Kenya to Zimbabwe regularly hire CBAGs to attack or intimidate the opposition or to advance a vested political agenda by spreading insecurity. Governments might also tolerate or even encourage CBAGs as cost-effective crime-control mechanisms in areas of limited statehood, as happened with Sungusungu in Tanzania.75 In some conflict-affected states, the state co-opted CBAGs or CBAGs acted as self-anointed defenders of the state against other types of NSAGs, including violent extremist groups such as Boko Haram. To boost their legitimacy, CBAGs might hide connections to the state or proclaim a degree of proximity to the state that goes beyond what the state would officially acknowledge.

When promoted as agents of hybrid security governance, CBAGs are seen as the best available option for effective and legitimate justice and security provision in the short term; as such, they are given the space to fill the security void left by an absent state. In numerous cases across sub-Saharan Africa, efforts to co-opt CBAGs ultimately gave legitimacy to predatory and illiberal armed actors, while they delegitimized the state and other intervening actors that risked being perceived as supporting criminals. Examples range from Kenya, where anti-crime vigilantes were co-opted by the main political parties and trans-

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74 Ibid.
formed into political goons and criminal gangs, to Democratic Republic of Congo, where the promise of lucrative positions for Mai Mai leaders who join state security forces created incentive structures that promoted the proliferation and expansion of CBAGs and led to increased violence.

There are, however, examples of CBAGs providing security without turning into sources of insecurity. The RESOLVE report on the origins of armed community mobilization shows, by means of the case of the Arrow Boys of Teso in eastern Uganda, that early oversight by the national army can limit abuses by CBAGs. In Kenya, it has been found that faith-based vigilantes—for instance, Kibera’s Nubian-based Al Safa or an antinarcotics vigilante group established by the Council of Imams in Mombasa—have strong religious and cultural foundations and are more resistant to being instrumentalized by drug lords than secular CBAGs. Another example is the attempt by a former police officer to provide oversight of vigilantes in Nairobi’s Kibera slum by employing them in a private security company. This practice provided members of these groups with regular salaries and embedded them within a framework of clear and enforceable rules by formalizing their role as security providers, thereby removing the incentive to join a CBAG, providing employment, and enforcing regulation.

The common denominator across these cases is that the presence of oversight procedures, a binding legal framework, and accountability mechanisms can help to prevent CBAGs from turning into predatory sources of insecurity. These experiences are in line with findings presented in the USIP typology mapping paper on CBAGs which shows that group discipline and the acceptance of formalized norms, roles, and processes are keys to prevent CBAGs from engaging in unregulated, reactive, or opportunistic violence. External interventions can reinforce the formalization of command and control structures that institutionalize and legitimize norms and rules, for instance, by the socialization provided by shared beliefs, and clearly established organizational norms and codes of conduct, or accountability and oversight mechanisms. Table 5 in the section on Current Trends and New Directions identifies success factors for accentuating the productive aspects of CBAGs and steering them in a favorable direction.

Lessons learned from long-term transformation

Security Sector Reform

Security Sector Reform (SSR) follows a transformative logic and is primarily aimed at replacing CBAGs with, or channeling their members into, functioning state security forces. Failed attempts to integrate CBAGs into state security forces, as happened with the Mai Mai in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, have shown that SSR is as much a political process as it is a technical approach; as such, it needs to take local

80 Ibid.
81 Van Metre, *From Self-Defense to Vigilantism*.
politics into account. Given the long-term and wide-ranging objectives of SSR, it is not enough to train more effective police forces and curb corruption among the members of the judiciary, as difficult as these endeavors are. SSR initiatives must be complemented by promotion of the rule of law; state security forces must be subjected to democratic civilian oversight and held accountable to laws that are aligned with international human rights standards. Moreover, to improve their legitimacy and acceptance among different sections of the population in the host country, SSR initiatives must give special consideration to local ownership, both with respect to political elites and to the communities in which security is provided.

More concretely, special courts or hybrid national and international tribunals can deal with war crimes or transnational organized crime groups and handle politically sensitive cases to tackle the patron-client relationship between CBAGs and their sponsors. For example, the Special Court for Sierra Leone convicted two former leaders of the Civil Defence Forces, a CBAG composed of traditional hunters who defended their communities during the civil war but who were also accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Moreover, SSR can strengthen efforts to expand state security provision into areas formerly abandoned by law enforcement agencies, where CBAGs assumed the roles of informal crime control and self-defense agencies. Intervening actors can do this by enhancing the capacity and legitimacy of the police and judiciary through capacity building and training in contextually appropriate techniques, such as community policing or proximity policing.

**Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration**

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) is another set of tools and approaches that has been discussed in an extensive academic and policy-oriented literature on technical and operational lessons learned. Such guidelines offer useful guidance for disarmament, which is arguably the most straightforward and technical aspect of DDR. Yet, as early DDR attempts in Angola and Mozambique showed in the 1990s, DDR is an inherently political endeavor that needs to be informed by a sound understanding of the political economy of post-conflict societies. The political nature of DDR is notably visible during demobilization, which aims to replace the patron-client relationship between “entre-
preneurs of violence” within the political elite and ex-combatants by dismantling the former command structures and breaking the bonds of hierarchy.91

As research in the Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone has shown, former mid-level commanders often play an important role as intermediaries between the elite and demobilized members of armed groups; their influence over their former subordinates often remains sufficiently strong that they can effectively remobilize them.92 Moreover, the timing for DDR is crucial; premature disarmament and demobilization will not be sustainable if the external threat that led to the emergence of CBAGs remains in place. This is especially true for CBAGs protecting their communities against NSAGs, such as the CJTF fighting Boko Haram in Nigeria.

Although the successful social, economic, and political reintegration of ex-combatants is both the most crucial and the most complex aspect of DDR, programs in practice too often focus on short-term reinsertion instead of long-term reintegration.93 Community-based reintegration programs aim to improve their sustainability by bringing together ex-CBAG members and their communities to identify and work together on projects that benefit the entire communities, such as the construction or rehabilitation of critical infrastructure.94 In Democratic Republic of Congo’s Maniema province, for example, local civil society organizations and Oxfam Novib implemented a “weapons for development” project, whereby voluntary disarmament was rewarded with agricultural assistance and the rehabilitation of schools and a health center.95 However, studies have shown that community-centered DDR programs must be truly community-led, while being prioritized by national and international funders, to be successful.96

Community Violence Reduction

Although community-led DDR efforts are well suited for the reintegration of former CBAG members, they tend to overlook those in a community who have not joined, but are at risk of joining CBAGs. To overcome this limitation, national and international actors have operationalized community violence reduction (CVR) programs that can best be described as community-based DDR programs that incorporate aspects of armed violence reduction and prevention (AVRP).97 AVRP focuses on identifying risk factors “that contribute to increasing the likelihood that an individual will commit a violent act” and resilience factors “that aid individuals in adverse circumstances to overcome adversity and avoid violence.”98 With the identification of these two sets of factors, targeted interventions can focus on alleviating risks to prevent the occurrence of armed violence.

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92 Ibid.
95 Verkoren, Willems, Kleingeld, and Rouw, “From DDR to Security Promotion,” 19.
97 Verkoren, Willems, Kleingeld, and Rouw, “From DDR to Security Promotion.”
CVR efforts form part of the innovative second-generation approaches to deal with armed violence that focus on addressing the complex set of root causes of violence and insecurity at the local level. To do so, CVR aims to stabilize communities in the short term by providing alternative means of income to at-risk youth while simultaneously improving community cohesion in the long term. CVR can thus be seen as a comprehensive approach to community-building that offers alternatives to youth at risk of joining CBAGs, replacing the functions that these groups fulfill for their members, such as protection and access to resources and higher status. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), for instance, provided unemployed youth with temporary employment and professional training to sway them away from economic opportunities offered by CBAGs. One key success factor was to include communities themselves in the planning, implementation, and monitoring of CVR projects.

CVR’s extensive focus on temporary employment through cash-for-work programs has been criticized as unsustainable and prone to corruption and exploitation. Another criticism is that the thematic scope of CVR initiatives is too broad, that they are disconnected from one another, and, in many cases, that they are not clearly linked to the ultimate goal of reducing violence. At the same time, the thematically broad scope of interventions in geographically well-delineated communities is precisely what sets CVR apart from traditional and often unsuccessful DDR experiments. Traditional DDR focuses on particular groups, whereas CVR has a clearly defined geographical focus. Accordingly, CVR might be more applicable in settings in which CBAGs with weak hierarchies and loose organizational structures are present, while DDR might be better suited to armed groups with strict hierarchical command.

CURRENT TRENDS AND NEW DIRECTIONS

CBAGs and state legitimacy

As discussed, the lens of state fragility does not offer a universal explanation for the proliferation of CBAGs. In some cases, a lack of state legitimacy rather than a lack of institutional capacity contributes to the formation of CBAGs. At the same time, the security, political, and economic functions that CBAGs fulfill for various stakeholders can have both legitimizing and delegitimizing effects. Research on CBAGs in Kenya shows that while the security function is legitimizing, the economic element tends to

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102 Ibid, 45.
be more delegitimizing; the impact of the political factor on the legitimacy of CBAGs is bifurcated along ethnic lines.\textsuperscript{104}

By providing security in areas of limited statehood that law enforcement agencies neglect, Kenyan CBAGs fill an institutional void and gain legitimacy. On the downside, however, they are known for extorting protection money from residents, which diminishes their legitimacy.\textsuperscript{105} At the same time, CBAGs in Kenya have been found to work on the behest of organized crime groups for self-interested motives, further undermining their own legitimacy.\textsuperscript{106} Finally, ethnic entrepreneurs manipulated and instrumentalized CBAGs as political tools to attack members of rival ethnic groups around the time of elections. This leads to their complete delegitimization among those targeted in the attacks; however, it contributes to their legitimacy among ethnic peers whom they protect against similar attacks from rival militias.\textsuperscript{107}

\section*{From CBAGs to providers of community security?}

The USIP/RESOLVE Research Report on the dynamics and drivers of CBAGS has shown that hybrid security governance is a reality in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa and that plural security provision can manifest itself in more constructive or more destructive ways.\textsuperscript{108} The USIP/RESOLVE typology mapping paper on CBAGs underlined how the trajectory of CBAGs is influenced by internal factors, such as their organizational structure, as well as by external factors, such as norms and social order.\textsuperscript{109} This Mapping Paper identified a number of case studies in which vigilantes have not transformed into political militias or predatory criminals due to internal factors, such as enforceable rules, and external factors, such as strong state oversight or a conducive legal framework. Intervening actors can thus influence the trajectory of CBAGs and steer their behavior in the desired direction. This process is, however, far from straightforward because multiple factors can influence the behavior of CBAGs and EMT interventions can have unintended consequences, especially if they are not adequately adapted to specific contexts.

Table 5 lists the potential success factors that intervening actors may consider when designing strategies to alter the internal and external characteristics of CBAGs to reinforce their constructive potential and limit their destructive potential.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{105} Erik Henningsen and Peris Jones, “‘What Kind of Hell is This!’ Understanding the Mungiki Movement’s Power of Mobilisation,” \textit{Journal of Eastern African Studies} 7, no. 3 (2013): 372.
\item \textsuperscript{106} Schuberth, “The Impact of Drug Trafficking on Informal Security Actors in Kenya.”
\item \textsuperscript{107} Schuberth, “Hybrid Security Governance.”
\item \textsuperscript{108} Agbiboa, \textit{Dynamics and Drivers of Community-Based Armed Groups in Sub-Saharan Africa}.
\item \textsuperscript{109} Van Metre, \textit{From Self-Defense to Vigilantism}.
\end{itemize}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUCCESS FACTOR</th>
<th>LEGAL AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT</th>
<th>ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY</th>
<th>ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT</th>
<th>FINANCIAL VIABILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY</th>
<th>SECURITY PROVISION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>THERE ARE CLEAR LAWS ON THE REGISTRATION OF CBAGS AND CBAGS REGISTER WITHOUT BARRIERS.</td>
<td>CBAGS HAVE AND FOLLOW CLEARLY DEFINED MISSIONS AND OBJECTIVES.</td>
<td>LOCAL AND/OR CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS PROVIDE FUNDS TO CBAGS IN AN OPEN AND TRANSPARENT MANNER AND CBAGS TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO AVOID CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.</td>
<td>CBAGS HAVE ACCESS TO SUSTAINED SOURCES OF FUNDING TO CONTINUE THEIR OPERATIONS IN BOTH THE SHORT AND LONG TERM.</td>
<td>THE SECURITY SERVICES THAT CBAGS PROVIDE REFLECT THE NEEDS AND PRIORITIES OF THEIR COMMUNITIES.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON CBAGS SET OUT CLEAR AND LIMITED ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES, LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THEIR PERMISSIBLE ACTIVITIES.</td>
<td>CBAGS HAVE CLEARLY DEFINED MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES AND WRITTEN POLICIES OR PROCEDURES TO GUIDE ORGANIZATIONAL OPERATIONS.</td>
<td>CBAGS HAVE ADOPTED AND FOLLOW A CODE OF ETHICS, OPERATE IN A TRANSPARENT MANNER, AND UNDERGO REGULAR FINANCIAL AUDITS.</td>
<td>CBAGS RAISE THEIR FUNDING FROM LOCAL SOURCES, INCLUDING GOVERNMENTS, BUSINESSES, AND INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS.</td>
<td>CBAGS HAVE CLEAR AND TRANSPARENT PROCEDURES IN PLACE TO DETERMINE THE NEEDS AND PRIORITIES OF THEIR COMMUNITIES.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON CBAGS ARE IMPLEMENTED CONSISTENTLY AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR TERMS.</td>
<td>CBAGS ARE ABLE TO MAINTAIN PERMANENT, PAID STAFF.</td>
<td>THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS PROVIDE CLEAR GUIDANCE ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT OVER CBAGS.</td>
<td>CBAGS DO NOT RELY ON FOREIGN FUNDING THAT MIGHT BE INFLUENCED BY SHIFTS IN FUNDING LEVELS AND PRIORITIES OF FOREIGN DONORS.</td>
<td>CBAGS PROVIDE THEIR SECURITY SERVICES TO INDIVIDUALS BEYOND THEIR OWN MEMBERS AND WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION WITH REGARDS TO RACE, GENDER, ETHNICITY, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, ETC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>THERE ARE LAWYERS WHO ARE TRAINED IN AND FAMILIAR WITH LAWS RELATED TO CBAGS WHO CAN PROVIDE LEGAL ADVICE.</td>
<td>CBAGS TRAIN THEIR STAFF IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND MEDIATION AS WELL AS IN GOOD GOVERNANCE, INCLUDING ANTI-CORRUPTION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND RULE OF LAW.</td>
<td>THERE ARE CLEAR AND TRANSPARENT EXTERNAL OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS IN PLACE, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT AND NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS.</td>
<td>CBAGS HAVE SOUND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN PLACE OR ACCESS TO PROFESSIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES.</td>
<td>CBAGS RECOVER PARTS OF THE COSTS OF SERVICE PROVISION THROUGH VOLUNTARY FEES BUT REFRAIN FROM ENFORCING THE COLLECTION OF COMPULSORY FEES.</td>
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Source: Author.
For these strategies to be successful, they need to strengthen and formalize the security function of CBAGs while diminishing their political and criminal functions, without weakening the legitimacy of the state. The success factors aim to turn multi-dimensional CBAGs into more accountable, capable, and rule-abiding providers of community security that function more like civil society organizations than like informal vigilantes.\(^{110}\) It is important to keep in mind, however, that such a transformation is difficult to achieve in complex political emergencies because it is costly and requires long-term commitments by multiple actors.

**Challenge of coordinating EMT interventions**

Complex political emergencies, a typical context in which intervening actors employ EMT approaches to CBAGs, require a comprehensive approach because of their “multi-causal nature.” However, such an approach remains a challenge given a formal division of labor among different intervening actors—such as development or humanitarian agencies and armed forces—that operate on the basis of differing institutional logics and deep-seated worldviews. In the case of the UN Mission in Sudan, for instance, attempts to pursue an integrated international approach to support national DDR efforts stalled because of tensions between UNDP and DPKO and a lack of political will on the part of the Sudanese government. Moreover, different intervening actors show diverging attitudes to coordinating EMT approaches. For instance, the military tends to seek to subordinate and instrumentalize other actors, while some humanitarian actors developed a general aversion to integration, feeling that it had “systematically compromised their organizations’ core values.”

The lack of coherence and coordination among the multitude of actors involved in the EMT of CBAGs can have serious repercussions not only for the overall outcome of interventions, but also for the security of intervening actors and of supposed beneficiary communities. Although coherence and coordination across different E, M, or T approaches is difficult, the challenge of coordinating different tools within the same E, M, or T approach can potentially be overcome by an integrated and coherent framework for action aimed simultaneously at the three functions of CBAGs: security, economic, and political. An example is transformative approaches to replace CBAGs with a modern and accountable state that is bound by the rule of law and serves all sections of society in a fair and equal manner. As illustrated in Figure 1, an integrated transformative approach involves SSR to replace the security function of CBAGs, DDR to substitute their political function, and CVR to supplant their economic function.

DDR can help break the top-down patron-client relationship between CBAGs and their sponsors; CVR aims to cease the bottom-up flow of new recruits from communities to CBAGs. SSR can play a complementary role by contributing to ending the impunity for the politico-criminal elite and improving state security provision in areas of limited statehood. These transformative strategies can be usefully supported by certain coercive and cooperative approaches, such as the precise targeting of CBAG leaders resisting calls to disarm and demobilize and to provide safe access to humanitarian and development

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\(^{110}\) The success factors are adapted from indicators presented in the USAID Civil Society Organizations Sustainability Index (CSOSI) and USAID Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Indicator Reference Sheets.
actors. However, transformative approaches may be potentially overambitious, particularly when considering short implementation timeframes and budgetary limitations. Improved interagency coordination can help pool existing resources to improve efficiency and can diversify sources of funding to optimize sustainability.

![Figure 1](image)

**Figure 1** Integrated Framework for Transformative Approaches to CBAGs

CONCLUSION

CBAGs rest in a complicated space between security and development, requiring a whole-of-community and whole-of-government approaches. This paper mapped lessons learned from EMT approaches to CBAGs, identified success factors to turn CBAGs into providers of community security, and proposed indicators to measure the progress of EMT approaches against their objectives. It also showed that contrary to much of the literature on state fragility, CBAGs are also present in countries that enjoy relative economic strength and strong statehood within their respective regions but suffer from a high level of social inequality, including South Africa.
Important limitations run across all types of EMT approaches. Intervening actors frequently attempt to apply “one-size-fits-all” tools that have been developed and tested in specific contexts to seemingly similar settings, without taking into account the differences in the context and nature of CBAGs. Furthermore, lack of coherence and coordination among different intervening actors regularly leads to duplication of efforts and the use of contradictory approaches to individual CBAGs. Based on the findings of this paper, there are important additional lessons to be learned from different approaches to CBAGs in a variety of settings. Some of the questions that emerged and that should be explored more in-depth through country case studies include the following:

1. What EMT tools are most appropriate for which type of CBAGs (vigilantes, militias, gangs) and in what context (for example, urban versus rural; presence of violent extremism versus no violent extremism)?

2. What timeline is needed for different EMT tools? When is the situation ripe for different types of EMT approaches?

3. Who are the most effective intervening actors for different types of EMT approaches? Whose buy-in is crucial for the different approaches?

4. How have concrete examples of EMT approaches to CBAGs affected the legitimacy of the state?

To answer these questions, it would be beneficial to conduct in-depth research on select case studies, including from the two main regional conflict complexes in sub-Saharan Africa: the Lake Chad Basin and the African Great Lakes Region. For instance, Nigeria and Democratic Republic of Congo would provide cross-country comparison of one state facing violent extremism and one facing other more pressing threats than violent extremism, even though ISIS has recently reclaimed its first attacks in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Both case studies would allow in-country comparisons of responses to urban and rural CBAGs. Moreover, the Ebola outbreak in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo would provide a unique opportunity to look at lessons learned from the EMT of CBAGs in the context of an epidemic or health crisis; it could lead to urgently needed policy recommendations for how national and international responders can engage them.
SOURCES


LINKING P/CVE & ILLICIT ARMS FLOWS IN AFRICA

NICOLAS FLORQUIN

“"The synergies between the fields of small arms control and P/CVE are critical, yet only tangentially explored.""}

FAST FACTS

» While some illicit small arms and light weapons in Africa are trafficked from other regions, there are prominent sources within the continent itself.

» Counter-trafficking interventions need to consider the livelihoods of border and transit communities, while also recognizing the shorter-term imperative of preventing violent extremist actors’ access to deadly weaponry.

» Purely security-centered counter-trafficking approaches risk pushing border and transit communities towards criminality and, potentially, towards facilitating violent extremism.

CONTEXT

Small arms and light weapons are among the main instruments of conflict and violence, including violent extremism, in Africa. The member states of the African Union (AU) have acknowledged this link by prioritizing both small arms control and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) in their strategy to prevent and reduce armed conflict. The 2016 AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by 2020 makes commitments on both policy fields.¹

¹ With respect to P/CVE, these include operationalizing the AU Special Fund for Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and Violent Extremism; adopting human security and community involvement approaches to counter and prevent terrorism and violent extremism; deploying efforts to track down terrorists and their supporting networks; and enhancing national capacities for the prevention and combating of terrorism and violent extremism. See AU, Master
Reliable information and analysis are critical for effectively dealing with such complex and multi-dimensional challenges as violent extremism and illicit arms flows. The AU Commission partnered with the Small Arms Survey to undertake a regional mapping of illicit weapons, culminating in the release of the report *Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa* in Addis Ababa, July 2019. This Policy Note highlights the relevance of the report’s findings and recommendations for P/CVE efforts, with an emphasis on arms trafficking across the continent’s land borders.

**RELEVANCE TO POLICY AND PRACTICE**

The overlap between small arms trafficking and violent extremism poses challenges for policymakers and practitioners in terms of inclusivity, coordination, evaluation of best practices, and balancing short- and long-term programmatic objectives.

Contrary to common perceptions that the bulk of illicit small arms and light weapons circulating in Africa is trafficked from other regions, the AU-Small Arms Survey report finds prominent sources of illicit weapons within the continent itself. Fifteen of the twenty-one African states that contributed information to the study ranked the (re-)circulation of arms across land borders as the main source of illicit arms. Evidence from peace support operations, UN embargo monitoring groups, and specialized research institutions also reveals that the majority of materiel confiscated in conflict zones is decades-old and was diverted from once licit stockpiles in the region before being smuggled and recirculated across borders.

Another intraregional source of arms, although usually a small proportion of arsenals, is craft weapons produced by local artisans. Craft production of weapons occurs outside of state control, by hand, in small quantities, and with a reduced capability. Their low price makes craft firearms particularly attractive for self-protection and hunting. Yet craft firearms have also been found in the hands of violent extremist groups such as Boko Haram and are smuggled across borders.

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3 This does not mean that new illicit transfers from other regions no longer take place at all. Recent transfers can comprise old, often surplus materiel. Moreover, the report notes that while they represent a small proportion of seized equipment, weapons and ammunition manufactured since 2010 have been documented in several African conflicts, pointing to recent illicit arms transfers, or to recent diversion of national stockpiles. See: AUC and Small Arms Survey, *Weapons Compass*, 34–35.

4 “Craft production of small arms refers principally to weapons and ammunition that are fabricated largely by hand in relatively small quantities,” for more on craft weapons, see: [http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/producers/craft-production.html](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/producers/craft-production.html).


6 Nowak and Gsell, *Handmade and Deadly*, 1.

7 AUC and Small Arms Survey, *Weapons Compass*, 55.
State security providers are often absent in remote border regions affected by arms trafficking. They can also be part of the problem through the actions of corrupt elements who engage in the illegal trade for personal profit. As a result, local communities seek to arm themselves for protection and thus contribute to the increasing demand for illicit weapons. For instance, informal gold diggers in northern Niger resorted to illicit firearms possession to take security in their own hand, relying on converted imitation handguns smuggled from Libya.\(^8\) Members of pastoralist groups in Kenya, Somaliland, South Sudan, and Uganda have similarly acquired small arms for protecting cattle and property.\(^9\) The ensuing availability of these weapons can lead to the rapid escalation of local conflicts and deteriorating security perceptions, which further stimulates the illicit firearm market—local, national, and regional.

Illicit arms flows in Africa are closely connected to the livelihoods of populations in isolated border areas. These border communities often depend on informal cross-border trade to sustain their livelihoods. Cross-border small arms trafficking can be embedded in or use the same routes as other forms of legitimate trade. Consequently, when authorities crack down, they risk further marginalizing border communities and pushing them towards other dangerous and destabilizing criminal activities and trade routes. As research in the Sahel has shown, policies initially aimed at preventing and criminalizing human trafficking have led some traditional, legitimate migrant transporters to engage in drug trafficking, extremism, and insurgency.\(^10\)

On the other hand, while counter-trafficking efforts can have unintended consequences, the issue of illicit arms flows often requires a robust response to counter the extremist violence that can stem from it. Analysis of the assault rifles recovered at multiple sites of attacks perpetrated by al-Qaeda-linked organizations in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali in 2015–2016 suggests that some of the weapons were produced in the same factory in 2011 and originated from the same batch—as evidenced by their sequential serial numbers.\(^11\) Such cases illustrate how rapidly armed groups can move weapons across borders and use them in terrorist attacks. A particular policy challenge therefore lies in preventing and reducing armed groups’ capacity to move deadly materiel across borders, while not marginalizing border communities to themselves become actors of trafficking and violent extremism.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

The AU-Small Arms Survey study suggests two principal ways to link the policy fields of small arms control and P/CVE. From a prevention perspective, counter-trafficking interventions need to consider the livelihoods of border communities during implementation, while recognizing the shorter-term imperative of preventing violent extremist actors’ access to deadly weaponry. Understanding, communicating, and acting upon these contradictions can improve the coordination of interventions, rationalize the use of scarce resources, and enhance policy impact.

As few relevant interventions have been thoroughly assessed to date, further investigation is needed to develop practical guidance and tools in specific and mature policy areas and to coordinate initiatives more efficiently.

Addressing knowledge gaps

» Improve monitoring and analysis of illicit sources of weapons and ammunition for violent extremist actors. The report notes that international actors and NGOs produce much of the weapons-related intelligence currently available on the continent. States need to report more systematically to the existing weapons-related international and regional information exchange platforms. Under the framework of the Sustainable Development Goals, states are also encouraged to develop national indicators to monitor progress towards a reduction of illicit arms flows by 2030 (target 16.4).

» Better understand the sources of insecurity, the role of border populations, and the gender dynamics in hard-to-access areas affected by small arms trafficking. The report notes instances where women actively participated in trafficking willingly or by lack of choice. Women and girls should not only be considered as victims of small arms-related violence, but also as those with active roles in trafficking, as well as agents for change with insight into stemming arms flows. In Libya, for instance, the UN Mine Action Service supported women to raise awareness in their communities of small arms-related risks and control measures through educational sessions, radio programs, and distributing material on safe storage and handling. Existing initiatives to engage with women in the search for and implementation of solutions need to be

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12 For instance, the Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System, see: INTERPOL, Illicit Arms Records and tracing Management System (iARMS).
scaled up and more thoroughly assessed to leverage women as agents of change in reducing the security risk of small arms and light weapons to civilians and local communities.\textsuperscript{15}

**Generating practical guidance**

» Implement joint border security arrangements. Border security initiatives should engage border communities in their efforts to stem trafficking. Existing efforts include state-led sub-regional cross-border security strategies, tripartite, quadripartite, and joint border commissions,\textsuperscript{16} as well as cross-border committees and projects facilitated by civil-society organizations.\textsuperscript{17} Creating a monitoring and evaluation framework for these initiatives is a necessary step towards generating practical guidance in this critical operational domain.

» Organize civilian weapons collection initiatives. While international guidance on voluntary weapons surrender exists,\textsuperscript{18} the context-specific experiences of African states require further evaluation. The annual Amnesty Month, held every September to support the AU’s Silence the Guns agenda, provides momentum for states and their partners to contextualize their approaches to weapons collection and identify best practices through adequate monitoring and evaluation. During Amnesty Month, AU member states promote and organize weapons surrender programs, while assuring anonymity and immunity to those surrendering their weapons.\textsuperscript{19}

» Address craft production and converted firearms. Although craft production has been a challenge for decades\textsuperscript{20} and across the continent, good practices in this area remain poorly understood. While penalizing supplies to illicit networks, regional governments should provide alternative career paths to artisans and consider regularizing their activities for instance through censuses, registration campaigns, and the marking of products. States also need to clarify and harmonize their national regulations concerning readily convertible imitation firearms to prevent their illicit transformation into lethal weapons and trafficking, similar to policies in other regions.\textsuperscript{21}


\textsuperscript{17} See, for instance, the work of the Danish Demining Group (DDG) at the Tunisian-Libyan border: DDG, “Tunisian-Libyan Border FactSheet.”

\textsuperscript{18} See, for instance, Module 05.40 in United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), *Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC).*

\textsuperscript{19} AU, “Africa Amnesty Month.”


\textsuperscript{21} For a review of initiatives and challenges in Europe, see Nicolas Florquin and Benjamin King, *From Legal to Lethal: Converted Firearms in Europe* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2018).
Improving coordination

» Coordinate small arms interventions at the strategic level. Myriad international and regional actors are involved in implementing small arms-related interventions on the continent, with emphasis on regions affected by conflict and violent extremism, such as the Sahel. Developing regional and national strategies and action plans on small arms can support more effective inter-governmental coordination of these efforts. These policy frameworks are more locally owned, and therefore effective, when elaborated through inclusive processes. Prioritization tools, such as the physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) matrix, can facilitate the development and coordination of such strategies.22

» Coordinate with other policy fields. Small arms control is closely interconnected with other policy areas, including security sector reform, the fight against transitional organized crime, women, peace, and security, and P/CVE. All these policy fields have their own strategic frameworks and implementation processes, yet to date there has been insufficient interaction and coordination with them at the national and local levels. There are obvious opportunities for researchers from these different sectors to better coordinate their research agendas and projects through participation in networks such as RESOLVE, for instance. Practitioners from relevant national commissions and civil society groups could identify opportunities to exchange experiences and coordinate their actions with the other communities of practice.

CONCLUSION

The challenges of tackling illicit arms flows in Africa should resonate strongly with P/CVE practitioners. On the one hand, counter-trafficking initiatives must prevent terrorist access to weapons in the short term. On the other hand, if undertaken without consideration for the livelihood of transit communities, security-centered counter-trafficking approaches are bound to be counter-productive in the long-run and may push these populations towards deeper criminality and, potentially, the facilitation of violent extremism. The synergies between the fields of small arms control and P/CVE are therefore critical, yet only tangentially explored. Both fields need more meaningful cooperation between researchers and practitioners.

SUGGESTED FURTHER READINGS, BY TOPIC

On the AU Master Roadmap


On Gender and Small Arms Control


On Illicit Flows and Violent Extremism


On Armed Groups and Small Arms Control


SOURCES


About the Author

Author: Nicolas Florquin, Research Coordinator, Small Arms Survey.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the RESOLVE Network, the U.S. Institute of Peace, or any entity of the U.S. government.
LINKING OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL APPROACHES OF ENGAGING ARMED ACTORS

CLAUDIA HOFMANN

COMMUNITY-BASED ARMED GROUPS SERIES

“Conflicts in which one or more of the main actors are not part of the state demonstrate the limitations of engagement in a state-centric system.”

FAST FACTS

» By using their dependence on a positive public image, NGOs and private actors have been able to persuade some armed actors to change their behavior.

» Coordinated approaches between different actors utilizing their respective strengths may help achieve specific goals and sustainable resolutions where non-state armed actors are involved.

» Strategically linking official and unofficial approaches may avoid adverse consequences and provide beneficial and constructive approaches to engaging non-state armed actors now and in the future.

CONTEXT

Internal conflict¹—conflict between a government and a non-governmental party, such as non-state armed actors or community-based armed groups—remains the most common type of conflict today.² In 2015, the number of internal conflicts rose to over 50 and have since remained at that level, vastly outnumbering the two interstate conflicts recorded most recently

² Definition of “intrapstate conflict:” “A conflict between a government and a non-governmental party, with no interference from other countries.” Numbers include those for “internationalized conflict:” “armed conflict between a government and a non-governmental party where the government side, the opposing side, or both sides, receive troop support from other governments that actively participate in the conflict.” See “Definitions,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), accessed March 27, 2020, https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/.
in 2018. These type of conflicts, occurring within states rather than between them, as well as the involvement of non-state armed actors within them, pose fundamental challenges to the traditional conflict resolution approaches of state actors and international organizations. Conflicts in which one or more of the main actors are not part of the state demonstrate the limitations of engagement in a state-centric system.

From counterinsurgency and containment, through negotiation and mediation, to integration and cooptation, state and international approaches to address non-state armed actors face a significant obstacle: legitimacy. On the one hand, there is a need to engage armed actors to meaningfully address the conflict. On the other, the assumed illegitimacy of non-state armed actors and community-based armed groups’ activities means that there are implications for seeming to accept their grievances as legitimate through such engagement. The appearance of the latter could adversely affect the traditional strategic position of international and state actors with regard to their negotiation position and conflict resolution efforts as well as their status as governing power through their monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force and undermine the effectiveness of their approaches.

In the face of this dichotomy, official, state-based actors, specialized non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private actors—including elder statesmen, influential international figures, and retired high political officials—have developed independent conflict resolution approaches, leveraging their non-state status to fill the gap left by states and international organizations. These unofficial, approaches are mainly centered around:

1. promoting international norms among non-state armed actors with the goal of persuading armed actors to change their behavior, particularly in favor of the protection of civilians and combatants; and
2. engaging in dialogue, mediation, mediation support, and negotiation with the goal to resolve the conflict itself.

In practice, states, international organizations, and these specialized NGOs and private actors frequently operate in the same locations at the same time, yet independently from each other. In the past, this led to unintended consequences that undermined the effectiveness of their respective approaches, such as duplication of effort and the instrumentalization of their efforts. To avoid such adverse effects while

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5 NGOs, particularly in the development field, have also demonstrated constructive engagement with non-state armed actors in facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance in territory controlled by armed actors. Such action rarely moves beyond short- and medium-term practical considerations. See Jörn Grävingholt, Claudia Hofmann, and Stephan Klingebiel, Development Cooperation and Non-State Armed Groups, Bonn: German Development Institute (DIE) (Studies 29), 2007, chapters 4 and 5.
leveraging their respective strengths in engaging non-state armed actors and state-based actors, these diverse actors alike need to improve communication, coordination, collaboration, and cooperation.

RELEVANCE TO POLICY AND PRACTICE

In many cases, specialized NGOs and private actors have attempted to leverage contacts and access from their existing or previous work to facilitate dialogue with non-state armed actors, conduct informal pre-negotiations, prepare non-papers, and mediate directly between non-state armed actors and host governments. The goal of these unofficial efforts is to mitigate armed actor violence, especially when committed against civilian populations.6 Despite considerable limitations, these approaches have offered constructive new avenues for engaging non-state armed actors that can, in some instances, offset the challenges state-based actors encounter.7 Policymakers can involve such approaches in their official or unofficial efforts of conflict resolution or stabilization to improve their overall effectiveness, reach, and sustainability.

For example, NGOs and private actors have been successful in leveraging the claims of moral authority, popular representation, and governance of armed actors that promote a political agenda and program—such as traditional rebel groups or clan chiefs—as sources of legitimacy. By using their dependence on a positive public image, NGOs and private actors have been able to persuade some armed actors to change their behavior. This mechanism can also be effective for community-based armed groups that claim responsibility towards a constituency or stakeholders.

For instance, Geneva Call, a Swiss NGO, has persuaded over 50 armed actors to unilaterally sign their “Deed of Commitment”. The Deed commits signatories to adhering to a total ban on anti-personnel mines, undertaking stockpile destruction, allowing monitoring and evaluation of these efforts, adjusting internal orders and directives in accordance with the Deed, and treating this commitment as part of a broader commitment to humanitarian norms.8 Incentives for signatories to promote stockpile reduction among their constituencies can range from the provision of training in international humanitarian law and the prestige of engaging with a Swiss organization. In 2018, 52 signatories were actively engaged with Geneva Call in awareness-raising and training sessions, 16 groups were engaged in strengthening their internal rules and procedures, and 2,500 stockpiled anti-personnel mines were destroyed by the Polisario Front in coordination with the Sahrawi Mine Action Coordination Office in the Western Sahara.9

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The Carter Center—a U.S.-based NGO headed by elder statesman, Nobel Peace Prize laureate, and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter—for example, offers high-level mediation services to both non-state armed actors and states. The approach builds on existing relationships and the rationale that constructive dialogue will eventually lead to a reduction of violence. For instance, the Carter Center successfully negotiated a six months ceasefire between Colonel Omar al-Bashir and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), and assisted in achieving mutual commitments by Bashir and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda in the Nairobi Agreement in 1999. Similarly, the Carter Center has engaged in conflict resolution efforts between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, resulting in constructive impact on the 2008 Israel-Hamas ceasefire, the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in October 2011, and the May 2011 Fatah-Hamas agreement.

Initiatives such as these broaden the range of engagement and conflict resolution approaches with non-state armed groups as well as community-based armed groups available to international actors and should be taken into consideration more strategically. Instead of focusing solely on “track 1” or even “track 1.5” approaches, policymakers should consider more careful coordination and support for “track 2” and “track 3” engagement. Coordinated approaches between different actors utilizing their respective strengths may help achieve specific goals and sustainable resolutions where non-state armed actors are involved.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The nature of NGOs and private actors allows them to engage non-state armed actors from a different vantage point than state actors. They portray their work as independent from strategic and financial considerations and they lack the resources to coerce armed actors into an agreement. Accordingly, in the field, NGOs and private actors can be perceived as more principled, altruistic, and committed to a sustainable resolution than more political state actors. As a result, some armed actors have been more open to engaging constructively with NGOs and private actors for conflict resolution or violence reduction.

At the same time, NGOs and private actors face a number of challenges in this work that state actors and international organizations should take into account when considering a collaboration. Often, limited financial resources present NGOs and private actors with an obstacle to continued and committed

10 Hofmann, Reasoning with Rebels. The Carter Center reduced their conflict resolution involvement in Sudan after the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) established itself as a strong mediator after 2002. The Center remains active with government officials, opposition leaders, and civil society members in Sudan and South Sudan to present. See “Sudan,” Carter Center, accessed March 27, 2020, https://www.cartercenter.org/countries/sudan.html.
engagement over a longer period, leading to serious questions about the sustainability and feasibility of their efforts. Additionally, the mandate, credibility, and legitimacy of unofficial actors are not as clear-cut as that of official actors, such as states and international organizations. Accordingly, collaboration between a state actor or international organization and an NGO or private actor should be clearly outlined, defined, and in line with the official policy it would complement.

The plurality of simultaneous unofficial initiatives has also led to duplication of effort and instrumentalization in the past. Programs that underdeliver their potential can present security issues for international personnel and local staff, for example if a particular effort is no longer appreciated by the armed actor. This could affect related efforts of state actors and international organizations. Finally, measuring the longer-term effectiveness and sustainability of unofficial engagement by NGOs and private actors has been almost impossible and often lacking in effective monitoring and evaluation as access and resources wane when funding changes.

Nonetheless, the contributions of specialized NGOs and private actors are worth considering in three particular fields: i) supplementing official policy; ii) taking on responsibility for distinct policy components; and iii) developing policy and early warning.

**Supplementing official policy**

NGOs, private actors, states, and international organizations do not work independently from each other. Not only are they active in the same fields, especially in development assistance and humanitarian aid, NGOs and private actors can also receive funding for many of their initiatives from states and international organizations. Additionally, NGOs and private actors often provide specialized expertise to states and international organizations through consultations that may impact official policy. To date, the collaboration between NGOs and private actors and states and international organizations primarily remains ad hoc and focused on development and humanitarian aid.

> States and international organizations should increase their engagement with specialized NGOs and private actors’ expertise through regular cross-sectoral consultations and exchanges, specifically in the context of engagement with non-state armed actors and community-based armed groups.

Regular and systematic exchanges with officials that have the ability to influence decision-making on armed actor engagement could improve official policy and coordination between unofficial and official actors. An example of such regular exchange and consultation is the Oslo Forum, a series of retreats for international conflict mediators, high-level decision-makers, and other peace process actors.

States and international organizations should engage with and learn from the diverse vantage points that NGOs and private actors can bring to official processes.

Specialized NGOs and private actors may be able to supplement an official initiative with non-state to non-state mediation services and mediation support. As an example, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), a Swiss NGO, provides ongoing support to the Norwegian government in their facilitation of the conflict between the government of the Philippines and the communist National Democratic Front. The HD Centre oversees the work of the Joint Monitoring Committee responsible for receiving and processing complaints of violations of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law. In spaces where community-based armed groups are active, specialized NGOs and private actors can facilitate their official or unofficial engagement in national mediation and reconciliation processes to support a holistic process.

Taking responsibility for distinct policy components

States and international organizations continue to experience challenges in engaging non-state armed actors related to the sovereignty, legitimacy, and authority of armed actors, and the credibility of their grievances. Many are hesitant to involve NGOs and private actors more strategically because of potential uncertainty and unintended political consequences of engaging armed groups even through a secondary organization. However, specialized NGOs and private actors may be in a position to step into that space and circumvent broader issues of legitimacy.

States and international organizations should support specialized NGOs and private actors to engage armed actors on specific issues through strategic partnerships.

Specific policy components that require cooperation from non-state armed actors and community-based armed groups to be addressed comprehensively could be covered by strategic partnerships with NGOs and private actors. As an example, in its effort to comprehensively address the elimination of the use of anti-personnel landmines and other explosive remnants of war, the Swiss government entered strategic partnerships with Geneva Call, the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), the Cluster Munition Coalition, and the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.17 Geneva Call, for its part, engages armed actors to persuade them to unilaterally commit to banning anti-personnel landmines and to destroying any landmine stockpile. This strategy allows the Swiss government to comprehensively approach their mine action policy, without grappling with issues related to sovereignty, legitimacy, authority, and

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credential. The International Committee of the Red Cross utilizes a similar approach of persuasion with non-state armed actors in the field of international humanitarian and human rights law.18

Developing policies and providing early warning

States and international organizations working on development policy and humanitarian aid employ traditional bureaucracies that rely on established reporting and response systems. While these systems tend to be reliable, they often fail to capture nuanced developments on the ground and can be slow in addressing new ones. Specialized NGOs and private actors’ existing proximity to armed actors and community-based armed groups may allow for faster detection and shorter reaction times.

» States and international organizations should engage specialized NGOs and private actors’ in-depth knowledge of situations on the ground.

Their proximity in the field and their personal connections often provide NGOs and private actors with insight into the development of situations in the field. NGOs and private actors may be able to identify windows of opportunity and potential for decline in a situation and provide early warning of imminent risks. An example is the Carter Center’s work in Uganda, which seized a window of opportunity and access before an official process through the Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (NUPI) and supported by USAID was established in 2003. Regular cross-sectoral consultations and exchanges between state actors, international organizations, and NGOs and private actors active in the respective field would facilitate the identification of such opportunities.

» States and international organizations should engage with NGOs and private actors who are already on the ground to act more promptly in a window of opportunity.

NGOs and private actors tend to be more flexible and nimble in their actions, allowing them to take initial steps towards instituting a constructive dialogue with non-state armed actors and community-based armed groups before states and international organizations are able. Support from states or international organizations could also alleviate concerns regarding lack of resources and appropriate training in negotiation and mediation, situational awareness, and recommended security measures. Seizing immediately on an opportunity may open the door for higher-level talks later on. As an example, the facilitation by Geneva Call between the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance and the African Union in 2007 regarding the destruction of land mine stockpiles served as a trust-building measure that benefited the combatant parties in their following interactions.

CONCLUSION

Many intervening external actors—official and unofficial—are involved in engaging non-state armed actors. These external actors employ different approaches, follow different goals, prioritize different instruments, provide different perspectives, and may even compete with each other in terms of goals, funding, and recognition. The lack of coordination between these approaches may not only fail to optimize engagement and maximize outcomes, but it may also lead to unintended, adverse consequences. Strategically linking official and unofficial approaches may avoid such adverse consequences and provide beneficial and constructive approaches to engaging non-state armed actors now and in the future.
SUGGESTED FURTHER READING

On Contemporary Conflict


On Armed Actors and Small Arms Control


On Creating Negotiation Momentum


On Persuasion Strategies for Engagement


SOURCES


About the Author

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The views expressed in this publication are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the RESOLVE Network, the U.S. Institute of Peace, or any entity of the U.S. government.
TRANSFORMING COMMUNITY-BASED ARMED GROUPS INTO COMMUNITY SECURITY PROVIDERS

MORITZ SCHUBERTH

COMMUNITY-BASED ARMED GROUPS SERIES

“"A number of factors can help transform CBAGs from sources of insecurity into community service providers.”"  

FAST FACTS

» In some cases, CBAGs in sub-Saharan Africa enjoy higher local legitimacy than state security forces due to their strong links to local cultural practices and their greater alignment with the social attitudes and community norms.

» When promoted as agents of hybrid security governance, CBAGs may fill the security void left by an absent state.

» To turn CBAGs into community security providers, interventions need to strengthen and formalize the security function of CBAGs while diminishing their political and criminal functions, without weakening the legitimacy of the state.

INTRODUCTION

Community-based armed groups (CBAGs) such as vigilantes, militias, and criminal gangs are armed groups that are embedded within communities and whose delineation can be defined by territory, blood ties, or shared identities.\(^1\) While CBAGs have been found to engage in political violence on behalf of their sponsors and to commit crimes for self-motivated reasons, in many contexts including parts of sub-Saharan Africa they are also among the main providers of security. A recent RESOLVE research report mapped how local,\(^1\) Moritz Schuberth, “The Challenge of Community-based Armed Groups: Towards a Conceptualization of Militias, Gangs, and Vigilantes,” Contemporary Security Policy 36, no. 2 (2015): 296–320.
national, and international actors have responded to a surge of CBAGs in sub-Saharan Africa and what lessons can be learned from these interventions.²

A number of factors can help transform CBAGs from sources of insecurity into community service providers. The RESOLVE report shows how both CBAGs’ internal functions and external factors influence their behavior. CBAGs’ internal functions include their organizational structure and internal processes and procedures, while external factors make up the environment in which they operate, such as norms and rules, regulatory and legal frameworks as well as accountability and oversight mechanisms.³ This categorization helps determine at what level approaches to CBAGs should intervene in order to change their behavior. This policy note provides recommendations for intervening actors to reinforce the constructive potential of CBAGs and limit their destructive potential. These recommendations—including the presence of oversight procedures, a binding legal framework, and accountability mechanisms—can help to transform multidimensional CBAGs into more accountable, capable, and rule-abiding providers of community security.

**RELEVANCE TO POLICY AND PRACTICE**

Hybrid security governance is a reality in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Plural security provision can manifest in more constructive or destructive ways. In some cases, CBAGs in sub-Saharan Africa enjoy higher local legitimacy than state security forces due to their strong links to local cultural practices and their greater alignment with the social attitudes and community norms.⁴ CBAGs may be the best available option for justice and security provision in the short term given the ineffectiveness of state security actors.⁵ However, CBAGs have the potential to be both providers of security and sources of insecurity.⁶

Some governments tolerate or even encourage CBAGs as cost-effective crime-control mechanisms in areas of limited statehood, as happened with Sungusungu in Tanzania.⁷ Government officials from Kenya to Nigeria also hire CBAGs to attack or intimidate the opposition or to advance a vested political agenda by spreading insecurity.⁸ In some conflict-affected states, the state co-opted CBAGs, or CBAGs acted as

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self-anointed defenders of the state against other types of non-state armed groups (NSAGs), including violent extremist groups such as Boko Haram.9

When promoted as agents of hybrid security governance, CBAGs may fill the security void left by an absent state. In numerous cases across sub-Saharan Africa, efforts to co-opt CBAGs ultimately gave legitimacy to predatory and illiberal armed actors. In Kenya, for example, anti-crime vigilantes were co-opted by the main political parties and transformed into political goons and criminal gangs.10 In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the promise of lucrative positions for Mai Mai leaders who join state security forces created incentive structures for the proliferation and expansion of CBAGs and led to increased violence.11

There are, however, examples of CBAGs providing security without turning into sources of insecurity.12 The common denominator across these cases is that internal functions, such as enforceable rules, and external factors, such as strong state oversight or a conducive legal framework can prevent CBAGs from turning into predatory sources of insecurity.13 Group discipline and the acceptance of formalized norms, roles, and processes are keys to prevent CBAGs from engaging in unregulated, reactive, or opportunistic violence.14 The following recommendations help intervening actors accentuate the productive aspects of CBAGs.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

By approaching CBAGs as potential partners in the provision of community security, intervening actors can influence their organizational development trajectory and steer their behavior in a desired direction, similar to engaging with civil society organizations. The following recommendations are far from straightforward, as multiple factors can influence the behavior of CBAGs and interventions can have unintended consequences, especially if they are not adequately adapted to specific contexts.15

**Internal functions**

Interventions can reinforce and capitalize on constructive internal functions of CBAGs, for instance by building the organizational capacity of CBAGs, establishing clear organizational codes of conduct, improving their financial viability and sustainability, and formalizing command and control structures that insti-
tutionalize and legitimize norms and rules. In Nairobi’s Kibera slum, a former police officer attempted to formalize vigilantes by employing them in a private security company. This provided members with regular salaries and embedded them within a framework of clear and enforceable rules. Formalizing their role as security providers removed the incentive to join a CBAG, provided employment, and enforced regulation. The following recommendations for intervening actors such as governments and development programs are aimed at strengthening the capacity of CBAGs to provide community security:

» Increase Financial Viability and Sustainability

CBAGs should have access to sustained sources of funding to maintain permanent, paid staff and to continue their operations in the short and long term. In this respect, development programs must ensure that CBAGs do not rely on foreign funding that might be influenced by shifts in funding levels and priorities of foreign donors. Rather, interventions should help CBAGs raise their funding from local sources, including governments, businesses, and individual members. To promote public transparency and accountability, local governments can consult communities on their willingness to fund CBAGs as part of participatory budgeting, a process that allows citizens to directly participate in the allocation of a defined part of a government’s budget.

» Build Organizational Capacity

CBAGs should have and follow clearly defined missions, objectives, management structures and written policies or procedures to guide organizational operations. To increase the organizational capacity of CBAGs, development programs should conduct trainings on management and logistics as well as in good governance, including anti-corruption, human rights, and rule of law. Interventions should focus specifically on putting sound financial management systems in place or ensuring that CBAGs have access to professional financial management services.

» Reflect Community Needs and Priorities

The security services CBAGs provide should reflect the needs and priorities of their communities. Development programs can help CBAGs put clear and transparent procedures in place to determine the needs and priorities of their communities, for instance through participatory methods such as the community score card (CSC) tool. Intervening actors should make sure that CBAGs consult and provide their security services to individuals beyond their own members and without discrimination with regards to race, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc.

External factors

Interventions can also contribute to the institutionalization and legitimization of CBAGs through enhancing or leveraging norms and rules, shared beliefs, and clearly established accountability and oversight mechanisms. In the case of the Arrow Boys of Teso in eastern Uganda, for instance, early oversight by the national army helped limit abuses by CBAGs. The following recommendations for governments and other intervening actors are aimed at establishing a conducive environment where CBAGs can thrive as community security providers:

» Establish Accountability and Oversight Mechanisms

Governments should pass national laws and regulations that provide clear guidance on government oversight over CBAGs. To put these laws and regulations into practice, governments, national human rights commissions and civil society organizations should establish clear and transparent external oversight mechanisms and provide easily accessible channels through which communities can report complaints related to CBAGs and other security providers, for instance hotlines or online forms. Moreover, local or central governments should provide funds to CBAGs in an open and transparent manner and require CBAGs receiving public funding to undergo regular financial audits.

» Pass Clear Laws and Regulations

A clear legal and regulatory environment is key to governing the security services provided by CBAGs. Governments should pass and consistently implement laws and regulations on CBAGs, including on their registration. Laws and regulations should also set out clear and limited roles and responsibilities for CBAGs, limiting the scope of their permissible activities. To make sure all stakeholders have a common understanding of the legal and regulatory framework within which they operate, governments and legal experts should train CBAGs, communities, and local authorities in specialized laws related to CBAGs.

» Capitalize on Norms and Social Rules

While it is difficult for intervening actors to directly influence long-established norms and social rules, interventions can capitalize on existing beliefs or cultural aspects that are conducive to strengthening the productive features of CBAGs. Faith-based vigilantes in Kenya—such as Kibera’s Nubian-based Al Safa and an antinarcotics vigilante group established by the Council of Imams in Mombasa—are more resistant to being instrumentalized by drug lords than secular CBAGs due to their strong religious and cultural foundations. Building on deep contextual knowledge and actor mapping will help intervening actors understand what beliefs or cultural aspects can be leveraged to transform CBAGs into more reliable security providers.

19 Agbiboa, Origins of Hybrid Governance and Armed Community Mobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa.
CONCLUSION

This paper provided recommendations for intervening actors working with CBAGs to reinforce their constructive potential and limit their destructive potential. To turn CBAGs into community security providers, interventions need to strengthen and formalize the security function of CBAGs while diminishing their political and criminal functions, without weakening the legitimacy of the state.

The recommendations aim to turn multi-dimensional CBAGs into more accountable, capable, and rule-abiding providers of community security that function more like civil society organizations than like informal vigilantes. It is important to keep in mind, however, that such a transformation is difficult to achieve in complex political emergencies because it is costly and requires long-term commitments by multiple actors.

SUGGESTED FURTHER READINGS, BY TOPIC

On Community-based Armed Groups


On Security Sector Reform


Sources


About the Author

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Moritz Schuberth is a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Public Authority and International Development at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He has extensive experience managing projects and conducting research in fragile and conflict-affected settings, including over the past three years for the global humanitarian agency Mercy Corps in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Moritz has published widely on peacekeeping, nonstate armed groups, security governance, and organized crime. He consults the U.S. government on stabilization operations and his research on cultural cognitive diversity has been used to train U.S. special forces.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the RESOLVE Network, the U.S. Institute of Peace, or any entity of the U.S. government.
MEASURING THE SUCCESS OF APPROACHES TO COMMUNITY-BASED ARMED GROUPS

MORITZ SCHUBERTH

COMMUNITY-BASED ARMED GROUPS SERIES

“\textit{It is difficult to measure results of approaches to CBAGs, attribute them to specific interventions, and evaluate their impacts.}”

FAST FACTS

» Over recent decades, numerous national and international actors working in fragile, conflict-affected, and post-conflict states have developed a set of standard tools to approach CBAGs.

» Better metrics are needed to measure the success of interventions and to more accurately evaluate their impacts.

» Although the overall goal of approaches towards CBAGs is an improvement in community security for the populations living in areas where CBAGs are present, each approach has its specific objective.

INTRODUCTION

Community-Based Armed Groups (CBAGs) are armed groups that are embedded within communities and whose delineation can be defined by territory, blood ties, or shared identities; this definition includes vigilantes, militias, and criminal gangs.¹ A recent RESOLVE paper has mapped how different intervening actors—governments, communities, civil society organizations, humanitarian and development agencies, and security providers—have approached the challenges posed by CBAGs in sub-Saharan Africa and how successful these approaches have been.²


One of the key findings is that it is difficult to measure results of approaches to CBAGs, attribute them to specific interventions, and evaluate their impacts due to multiple confounding factors and overlapping interventions. This policy note offers recommendations on how to assess the success of different approaches to CBAGs, proposing a set of indicators that intervening actors could use to measure the progress of interventions in meeting their objectives.

RELEVANCE TO POLICY AND PRACTICE

Over recent decades, numerous national and international actors working in fragile, conflict-affected, and post-conflict states have developed a set of standard tools to approach CBAGs. Approaches to CBAGs can be categorized as following three different logics: engagement, management, and transformation (EMT).

Engagement follows a short-term logic; actors pursuing this approach do so for instrumental reasons, that is, to ensure the safety of their own staff members while implementing their projects or to promote mediation and reduce violence within communities. Engagement refers, for instance, to humanitarian and development actors hiring armed clan-based militias to provide protection or to transport food to insecure areas in Somalia. Another example of engagement is provided by traditional community conflict resolution systems, such as barazas communautaires in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

Management approaches follow a mid-term logic as actors envision a substantive change in the targeted groups. Coercive management approaches involve security forces and heavy-handed measures to defeat CBAGs or incarcerate their members, for instance, militarized police raids against gangs in South Africa. Actors pursuing cooperative management approaches, by contrast, strive to alter the behavior and roles of CBAGs. Such changes can be achieved by negotiating with CBAGs, as happened with grands trafiquants in Mali; mediating between them, as in the Central African Republic between ex-Séléka rebels and anti-Balaka self-defense groups; or co-opting them, as done in Nigeria with the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF).

Transformation follows a long-term logic and refers to a set of approaches to replace the functions that CBAGs provide to their members, sponsors, and the communities they are nested in with an accountable

7 Katrin Planta and Véronique Dudouet, Fit for Negotiation? Options and Risks in the Political Transformation of Non-conventional Armed Groups (Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF), 2015).
state bound by the rule of law. Transformation addresses the root causes and structural conditions that led to the emergence of the CBAG ecosystem. This goal is difficult to achieve because it requires lengthy commitments and buy-in from multiple actors. As an example, the UN stabilization missions in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mali all employed a combination of security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), and community violence reduction (CVR) programs, with varying degrees of success.\(^\text{10}\)

Even though standard tools such as DDR and SSR have been applied in various settings and across circumstances, their effectiveness is regularly questioned.\(^\text{11}\) This is partly due to the difficulty of attributing the results of EMT approaches to specific interventions. Multiple actors typically implement projects with similar objectives simultaneously. External factors such as elections and natural disasters might influence the outcome of any given intervention. Better metrics are needed to measure the success of interventions and to more accurately evaluate their impacts. The following recommendations are aimed at improving the measuring of success of approaches to CBAGs.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

The desired results of approaches to CBAGs include a protective rather than predatory behavior vis-à-vis local communities; identification of all key stakeholders and coordination among implementing partners; respect for the principles of conflict sensitivity; and adherence of CBAGs to good governance standards and norms, such as human rights and the rule of law. Moreover, approaches should yield sustainable results that persist after funding for the intervention runs out. The following recommendations show how intervening actors can better measure the progress towards these objectives:

**Assessments**

» Conduct context analysis

Before deciding to intervene in areas with a high presence of CBAGs, it is essential to understand the nature of these groups and the local power dynamics. In Haiti, for instance, the United Nations Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH) attempted to deal with urban CBAGs in the same way as rural rebels in Central Africa despite the fact that the conflict environment was not conducive to such an endeavor.\(^\text{12}\) It is therefore recommended to design and implement interventions only after a thorough political economy analysis and evidence-based mapping of all local actors in coordination with academics and practitioners knowledgeable of the terrain.


» Conduction baseline study and impact evaluation.

From the outset, intervening actors should plan for undertaking an impact evaluation after the intervention is completed. Rigorous impact assessment requires a thorough methodology that allows for testing underlying assumptions and causal relationships that underpin the intervention. Systematic baseline assessments and monitoring throughout the implementation phase are key to the success of an impact evaluation. Baseline assessments help to understand the environment of the intervention and inform the development of realistic indicator targets. A number of relevant monitoring and evaluation guides are referenced in the suggested further reading section below.

» Use wide range of available data.

A host of quantitative and qualitative resources are publicly available to conduct micro-level analyses and evaluations at the output and outcome level, including conflict and insecurity data, crime rates, judicial statistics, public perceptions (as measured by opinion polls and focus groups), and reports by civil society organizations. Moreover, to measure the macro-level impact of interventions, it may be suitable to use global indicators to compare the performance of states with regards to governance, rule of law, or peace and conflict related issues. The suggested further reading section below presents a range of publicly available resources—including conflict and insecurity data as well as global indices—that can be used to design, plan, implement, and evaluate approaches to CBAGs.

Coordination

» Improve coherence among intervening actors.

It is not only important to address issues of local ownership and ensure coordination between intervening actors and local partners, but also to promote integration between intervening actors themselves. The lack of coherence and coordination among the multitude of actors involved in the EMT of CBAGs—such as development or humanitarian agencies and armed forces—can have serious repercussions both for the overall outcome of interventions and for the application of lessons learned by other organizations, in different contexts. It is therefore imperative for all actors to closely coordinate interventions and their impact evaluation across geographical and institutional boundaries.

» Harmonize reporting requirements.

Humanitarian and development actors currently use countless formats to report on progress and impact of their interventions. Simplifying and harmonizing reporting practices is one of the main goals of the Grand Bargain, an agreement between large donors and humanitarian organi-

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organizations to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of aid delivery. To reduce the administrative burden for implementers and standardize terminology across the sector, the harmonized “8+3” reporting template represents a useful tool to reduce the reporting burden for partners, while providing the necessary information for donors.

Indicators

» Take politics into account

Approaches to CBAGs are hardly purely technical in nature; as such, their evaluation needs to take local politics into account. For instance, failures to address political dynamics in the integration of CBAGs into state security forces, as was the case with Mai Mai in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, have shown that SSR is as much a political process as a technical approach. Indicators that measure progress against targets should reflect this reality and focus on political as well as technical aspects of the intervention.

» Use locally adapted indicators

Just as intervening actors should use locally adapted approaches to CBAGs, they should also use measures of success that reflect contextual variation and focus on the predominant functions of the targeted CBAGs, following a thorough context analysis and actor mapping. The Everyday Peace Indicators research approach or the country-led approach to Governance Indicators in Justice and Safety at the Harvard Kennedy School provide useful guidelines on how to develop locally adapted indicators.

» Use transferable indicators

While it is crucial to use locally adapted indicators as per the previous recommendation, whenever feasible, it is preferable to have a set list of standard indicators that are applicable across contexts to allow for comparability between interventions. Table 1 below shows a set of specific indicators that intervening actors could use across contexts to measure the progress of interven-
tions in meeting their objectives. More resources on key performance indicators can be found in the suggested further reading section below.

Although the overall goal of approaches towards CBAGs is an improvement in community security for the populations living in areas where CBAGs are present, each approach has its specific objective. Engagement focuses on ensuring safe access for intervening actors to areas with CBAGs; coercive management aims to reduce the reach and legitimacy of CBAGs; cooperative management strives to improve the treatment of local populations by CBAGs; and transformation aspires to render CBAGs obsolete for their members, sponsors, and communities.

Table 1 proposes two specific indicators each to measure the progress in achieving the overall goal and the four objectives. For instance, a program seems to be on the right track to achieve improved community security if data show an increase in the percentage of the population perceiving security in their communities and a decrease in the number of violent incidents reported in the communities.

**Table 1** Indicators to Measure Results of Different Approaches to CBAGs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
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| **Goal:** Improved community security for population living in areas with CBAGs | **Indicator 1:** Percentage of population perceiving (in)security in their community  
**Indicator 2:** Number of violent incidents reported |
| **Objective 1 (Engagement):** Safe access for intervening actors to areas with CBAGs | **Indicator 1.1:** Percentage of staff of humanitarian and development actors perceiving safe access to areas with CBAGs  
**Indicator 1.2:** Number and frequency of attacks on staff members of humanitarian and development actors |
| **Objective 2 (Coercive Management):** Reduced reach and legitimacy of CBAGs | **Indicator 2.1:** Number of people living in communities with CBAGs  
**Indicator 2.2:** Percentage of population perceiving CBAGs as legitimate |
| **Objective 3 (Cooperative Management):** Better treatment of population in local communities by CBAGs | **Indicator 3.1:** Percentage of population perceiving CBAGs as positive and constructive forces in communities  
**Indicator 3.2:** Number of reported incidents of abusive behavior by CBAGs to communities |
| **Objective 4 (Transformation):** Obsolescence of CBAGs for members, sponsors, and communities | **Indicator 4.1:** Number of members of CBAGs  
**Indicator 4.2:** Percentage of population perceiving state security provision as sufficient within communities |

Source: Author
CONCLUSION

This Policy Note provided recommendations on how to better measure the progress of EMT approaches against their objectives. Before designing and implementing any interventions, it is crucial to plan and conduct assessments, such as context analysis and actor mapping, baseline studies and impact evaluations. It is also recommended to use a wide range of publicly available data to set indicator targets and measure progress against objectives, both at the macro and micro level. When defining measures of success, it is important to take politic dynamics into account and to ensure a good balance between locally adapted indicators and transferable indicators that are comparable across contexts. To improve comparability and application of lessons learned, it is equally important for intervening actors to coordinate their efforts to measure the success of their projects and to reduce duplication of efforts, for instance by harmonizing reporting requirements.
SUGGESTED FURTHER READINGS, BY TOPIC

On Guidance for Monitoring and Evaluation


On Key Performance Indicators


Common Indicators for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) – International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS)/New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States: https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/a1/52/a152494f-0bb0-4ff3-8908-14bb007abd25/psg_indicators_en.pdf


On Conflict and Insecurity Data

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED): https://www.acleddata.com/

Uppsala Data Conflict Program (UDCP): https://ucdp.uu.se/

Small Arms Survey: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/


The Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX): https://data.humdata.org/

On Global Indices

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Fragile States Index – Fund for Peace: https://fragilestatesindex.org/
Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) – Mo Ibrahim Foundation: http://iiag.online/

SOURCES


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The views expressed in this publication are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the RESOLVE Network, the U.S. Institute of Peace, or any entity of the U.S. government.